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Abstract. 
The thesis contains a literature survey phis five original chapters which address 
different topics in the area of money in general equilibrium macro models that 
consist of contemporaneously infinitely lived agents who operate in an economy 
with an imperfect financial structure; namely missing markets. Particular issues 
addressed are the necessary conditions for the valuation of intrinsically worthless 
fiat money, issues pertaining to the optimum quantity of money, money's intrinsic 
nature, and the occurrence and persistence of macroeconomic fluctuations. The 
original chapters are as follows: 
Chapter two exposits a model where money is held as a precaution against 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. I derive necessary conditions for money to 
have value and find that despite the presence of an alternative to money as a value 
store, no monetary equilibrium with circulating money exists with a positive rate 
of interest on money. 
In chapter three I investigate a conjecture that if we possessed information 
sufficient to allow the correlation of taxes with the states of nature so as to avoid 
the kind of problems outlined in chapter 2 then we could not have the imper- 
fections that generated a monetary economy in the first place. The result 1 find 
refutes this conjecture. 
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Chapter four addresses the issue of the optimum quantity of money in a frame- 
work where other assets are available to agents. I show that an economy with fiat 
money may be Pareto dominated by one without it. 
Chapter five addresses the issue of the superneutrality of money. I show that 
the problem that led to the non-existence of monetary equilibrium in the BeNv- 
ley(1983) model can cause money to be superneutral in another scenario. 
Chapter six addresses the issue of macroeconomic fluctuations in models where 
the distribution of money holdings is important. I show two models that each 
demonstrate such issues. The first idea I exposit is that Nve can develop an econ- 
omy where market participation is endogenous and gain a richer picture of en- 
dogenous fluctuations than the exogenous participation overlapping generations 
models provide. The second idea demonstrated is that in an economy where 
productive investment opportunities are intrinsically risky, the incompleteness of 
markets means that poor productivity shocks can yield persistence of low output 
levels, and reduce the frequency of investment. 
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Chapter I 
Literature Review 
1. Literature Review. 
1.1. Setting the Scene. 
I begin by setting out some of the existing results in the field and summarising 
the contributions of the original chapters. 
This thesis contains a survey of, and original contributions to the field of mod- 
elling fiat money in a general equilibrium setting. The models can be placed under 
the headings of the microfoundations of both macro and monetary economics. All 
models are sequence economies in the sense of Radner(1972) and Hahn (1971a) 
with trading at all dates of the model, Walrasian prices and rational expectations. 
nading at each date is motivated by the lack of market completeness in the sense 
of Arrow-Debreu. Despite the topic of money being a traditionally macroeco- 
nomic issue, the frame of reference is of course one that historically has been 
'micro' based so that its point of departure is the Arrow Debreu model and many 
of the contributors to the field are seen as micro rather than macro economists; 
issues of existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium loom large on the re- 
search agenda. Of course such micro/macro distinctions are increasingly blurred 
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and the models in the field provide insights for macroeconomics, even though some 
of them might be termed to be concerned with 'philosophising' about money. 
The issue of how an economy deals with the absence of perfect financial mar- 
kets in the presence of individual risk is however clearly a matter of macroeconomic 
interest. It is sensible to relate inefficiencies due to liquidity constraints in these 
'micro' models with those pertaining to unemploymentfor instance. Fundamen- 
tally they are both simply low levels of economic exchange. 
All the original models in chapters two to six are non-representative agent 
models where the distribution of money among agents plays an important role. 
Indeed, as the work of Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Levine (1991) and the mod- 
els of my final chapter show, the distribution of liquidity can play an important 
role in explaining aggregate fluctuations. Due to their non representative agent 
nature we might hence also put the models alongside the overlapping generations 
framework, for reasons that will be explained later. 
Despite the common theme we can identify each chapter with different issues 
in the field. Not all of these topics are covered in the survey so far and some of 
the chapters commence with some survey material which will aid understanding 
of the particular model presented. Below I outline the issues addressed in each 
chapter and the answers found. 
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Chapter two exposits a model where money is held as precaution against id- 
iosyncratic productivity shocks. I derive necessary conditions for money to have 
value and find a role of the rate of time preference different to that found by 
Bewley(1980) and Levine(1989). I then investigate the issue of implementing 
the oPtirmun quantity of money proposal of Riedman(1969) under a regime of 
lump sum taxation, where the taxes are independent of the state of nature. I 
find a result that is at odds with the intuition provided by the Bewley (1983) 
model. Despite the presence of an alternative to money as a value store, no mon- 
etary equilibrium with circulating money exists with a positive rate of interest on 
money. 
Chapter three moves away from the restriction that taxes have to be inde- 
pendent of the level of income of each agent. I investigate a conjecture made by 
Hellwig(1982) and Woodford(1990) that if we possessed information sufficient to 
allow the correlation of taxes with the states of nature so as avoid the kind of 
problems outlined in chapter two then we could not have the imperfections that 
generated a monetary economy in the first place. The result I find refutes this 
conjecture. A scheme of taxing individuals in a way that varies with the state of 
nature and then uses the proceeds to change money's value is shown to be less 
informationally demanding than a scheme of taxation and direct redistribution. 
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The reason I put forward for this is based on an essential property of fiat money; 
its homogeneity, anonymity and common usage. This chapter's reflections shed 
new light on the optimum quantity of money proposal when it is examined in a 
framework that is specific about the information structure. 
Chapter four addresses the issue of the optimum quantity of money in a frame- 
work where other assets are available to agents, that in. a sense are better suited 
for the insurance purpose that money is valued for in the model. For a particular 
class of preferences 1 address a question posed by Levine(1985) to show that an 
economy with fiat money may be Pareto dominated by one without it. I show 
that the result derives from money's intrinsic uselessness as an insurance asset, 
since its payoff is the same in all states of nature. 
Chapter five addresses the issue of the superneutrality of money. I show that 
the problem that led to the non-existence of monetary equilibrium in the Bew- 
ley(1983) model can cause money to be superneutral in another scenario; where 
agents have finite horizons. 
Chapter six addresses the issue of macroeconomic fluctuations in models where 
the distribution of money holdings is important. I develop two models to show 
two ideas. The first one uses a non convexity in the form of a minimum size of in- 
vestment and indivisiblity of projects across agents together with an endogenously 
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determined level of liquidity to show that the model can display multiple steady 
states with high or low levels of activity and also may cycle between the two 
states in a deterministic fashion. The endogenously varying market participation 
is the cause of these results, and hence paints a picture of endogenous aggregate 
fluctuations different to that which invokes exogenous participation restrictions. 
The second model examines how the endogenous distribution and redistribution 
of liquidity can lead to the persistence of shocks. If the stock of liquidity is not 
held by the more 'risk loving' agents in the economy then a low level of economic 
activity will result through a lack of investment in the productive technology 
which is intrinsically risky. Incomplete markets means no mechanism is available 
for the speedy transfer of liquidity to the less risk averse agents when a bad shock 
to productivity leaves them at a level of wealth below that required to undertake 
the investment. 
I complete the thesis by assessing the contributions and suggesting avemies 
for further research that it opens up. 
I have identified questions which the chapters are going to address. The survey 
material that follows will set the scene for these. The initial survey chapter covers 
the topics of the valuation of fiat money, particularly relevant for chapter two, 
implications of incomplete markets, multiple budget constraints, the optimum 
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quantity of money, of relevance for all chapters, and the record keeping role of 
money, of particular relevance for chapter three. Chapter five will address the issue 
of the superneutrality of money and chapter six looks at endogenous competitive 
equilibrium fluctuations, and the survey material most relevant for those chapters 
is contained within them. 
1.2. Valuing Fiat Money: Some Issues 
As stated the focus of the thesis is on models of contemporaneously infinitely 
lived agents where money plays a role in the model that allows it to have positive 
value. For the sake of providing background for the model of chapter 2 and to aid 
comparison with other classes of monetary models, a general survey of how the 
challenge of giving money value has been met will be of much interest. 
The problem with finding a role for money is that it is an intrinsically worthless 
piece of paper. Holding it yields no direct utility (except in some reduced form 
models) and ultimately optimising agents must look to spend it. There are hence 
two pre-requisites for money to have value. There must be agents in the economy 
at all points in time who might be prepared to hold money. Secondly, its yield, 
pecuniary or otherwise must be such that it is sufficiently attractive to these 
agents. Even if a theorist were to insist that money's key role is as a mediurn of 
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exchange, it must serve as a store of value as a necessary condition to it being 
demanded by agents. 
The first modern seminal paper in the field was by Hahn (1965). The 'Hahn' 
problem lie noted was that every model that has a monetary equilibrium also 
has a non monetary equilibrium. This result was subsequently seen to be true 
in any model where money is truly fiat in nature (intrinsically worthless paper 
given value only by decree, at best). In such economies money is only demanded 
for its value relative to other goods. If its value is zero its demand is zero. It 
will hence make no contribution to individual wealth either, so a non monetary 
equilibrium will result, if such an equilibrium exists. One further implication is 
that no monetary equilibrium can exist in a finite horizon economy if money is 
truly flat in nature. All money will be spent in the last period of the agent's life so 
zero money demand forces a zero price of money in the last period if competitive 
equilibrium is to obtain. Money hence cannot serve as a store of value and will 
not be demanded in the penultimate period. The argiunent holds recursively for 
all preceding periods of the model and so its price must be zero in all periods of 
the model. Put another way, as long as utility functions are strictly monotonic in 
at least one real good then the value of purchases will exceed the value of sales of 
goods unless the value of money is zero. If there are I agents, and vectors f. j and 
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Lxjj denote consumption and endowments respectively of consumer i over all goods 
and time periods, and p denotes the vector of money prices then this implies; 
II 
EP'Ci 
> rpwi 
i=l 
Since; 
+E 6AIi > I" Aýli 
i=l i=l 
Where M is the total nominal money stock. 
This holds unless agents violate their transversality conditions, or all money 
prices of the goods are infinite. This kind of problem in fact also has to be 
addressed in infinite horizon economies, that of a potential mismatch between the 
value of expenditures and the value of income. We shall see that if the problem is 
to be overcome then we must either make sure that the economy is never ending in 
the sense that there are always new agents arriving or in the case that agents live 
contemporaneously we need to give agents a motive to hold the money throughout 
their lives instead of spending it. We will firstly deal with the issue of a finite 
horizon economy and how the terminal date problem can be solved. 
Since the finite horizon economy is such an intrinsically unforgiving environ- 
ment for fiat money, it is ironic that some of the approaches taken to answer this 
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remove the Hahn problem completely. The paradox arises because the solutions 
are exogenously imposed and in some sense remove the true fiat property from 
money. A method used by Starr (1974) for example is to induce the return of 
money at the end of the final period to an outside authority by imposing a real 
valued tax demand for which money may be used as payment, though this is not 
compulsory. A final period positive price of money is. lience a possibility. The 
effect on the budget constraints (2) of the tax when looked at in the above con- 
text is obvious; the tax reduces the value of income; i. e. the left hand side of the 
inequality. If the tax bill is to be paid in fiat money by a compulsory arrange- 
ment and the tax demand is expressed in real terms then a unique positive final 
period value of money is guaranteed. Arbitrage will guarantee a positive price 
in all preceding periods if utility is monotonic in at least one good in the final 
period. As subsequent models will show the value of money will be higher than 
the base level implied by the tax if it is given an extra role to perform. If the 
total tax demand is denominated in nominal terms equal to V (the total money 
supply) then a monetary equilibrium will be possible, but not guaranteed as the 
final period price level will be indeterminate (see Starr(1974) and Geanakoplos 
and Mas-Collel(1989)). 
The technique used by Bewley (1980,1983) is to put terminal money balances 
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into the utility function. If nominal balances are put in the utility function then 
a positive price level is guaranteed in all periods. If the balances in the utility 
function are real then the positive price of money is possible but not assured. 
Alternative methods are employed by Kultti (1995), Faust (1989) and Duffie 
(1990). Kultti assumes the existence of some agents who are indifferent about 
consuming their goods or not in the last period. The lack of value store problem 
does not apply here since effectively there is no value to store. In Faust's model, 
lie invokes the assumption of continuous trading and notes that by the contimium 
property, at any instant before the final date there is always another future date of 
trading and hence a date at which money might have value. So Faust introduces 
the effects of an infinite horizon model 'via the back door'. 
The method of Duffie (1990) is ingenious and creates a scenario where indeed 
the value of purchases exceeds the values of sales. He arrives at this by noting that 
in an economy with intermediated costly transacting, buying and selling prices 
diverge. Duffie sets up such an economy with two transacting possibilities, one is 
a non monetary transactions technology which is operated privately, the other is a 
monetary transactions technology operated by the government. It is assumed that 
the latter dominates the former. The agents are endowed with fiat money at the 
start of the model. The government administers the transactions intermediation 
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service and collects the money in payment from buyers. Such a scenario holds 
for the final period also, and hence the terminal date problem is negated. Duffie 
notes that his model achieves this result without giving backing to money, though 
of course we should note that the transactions agency is essentially modelled as 
an external body. 
An approach popular in the 1970's belonged to the temporary equilibrium 
literature. The models here established equilibrium for a current period only with 
expectations of the price level in the next period dependent upon the current price 
level. Grandmont (1983) shows that the key to solving the problem of existence of 
monetary equilibrium in these models lies in making the point price expectations 
relatively inelastic to current price changes. If the current nominal price level 
increases, the expected ffiture price level is prevented from rising too much, and 
the expected rate of return on money is sufficient to guarantee that a monetary 
equilibrium occurs. 
I now turn to models where the economy described has an infinite horizon and 
money is truly fiat in nature. Some of these are populated by a finite number of 
contemporaneous infinitely lived agents, and are the focus of the thesis, and some 
by an infinite sequence of agents with finite lives. The latter of course are known 
as overlapping generations models with finitely lived agents. It has been shown 
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however that the crucial element of such models is the arrival of new agents rather 
than the death of existing ones, as overlapping generations of infinitely lived agent 
models have shown, see for example Weil (1985,1991) 
Let us begin by considering an economy which is essentially an infinite hori- 
zon version of the Arrow Debreu model; markets are complete and there is no 
population growth. Assuming that money is dominated as a store of value with 
probability one because of the complete set of markets, then money will all be 
spent on goods and assets by all agents in the first period, so there is no money 
demand. As a formal expression we can again turn to inequality (2) shown above. 
If the individuals are not to violate their own transversality conditions, then the 
present value of their consumption must equal the present value of their income, 
and this must hold in the aggregate. To convert inequality (2) to an equality, a 
necessary condition for equilibrium, we have two possibilities. One is as in the 
finite horizon economy, by setting the money value of all goods equal to infin- 
ity whilst preserving their finite value in real terms. The second method is not 
applicable in this context of complete markets but we mention it here for future 
reference. This method again implies making both sides of the expression infinite. 
Here the money value of each good is finite but we allow the infinite sequence of 
goods to be priced in money terms in a way which allows their present value in 
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real terms to be unbounded. In the complete markets setting with no population 
growth this contradicts conditions necessary for existence of equilibrium. How the 
argument works with financial imperfections or the entry of new agents will be 
exposited in chapter 6, but I will proceed with an alternative style of exposition 
of the solution to the valuing flat money problem in this chapter, covering both 
overlapping generations models and debt constrained models. 
These results underline the notion that since fiat money is simply a piece of 
paper is not part of the net wealth of the economy. If the group of agents that 
constitute the economy treat it as net wealth and try to spend it instead of holding 
it, its value will disappear. 
What if we seek an equilibrium with money earning a return equal to that on 
the safe stores of value provided by the complete set of markets?. Assuming the 
economy is stationary that gross rate of return would be equal to one phis the 
pure rate of time preference (see the subsequent coverage of the Townsend model 
for instance). The transversality condition of the typical consumer is; 
lim)3t. MU(Ct). Wt =0 týoo 
Where Wt denotes real wealth at time t, and MU(ct) denotes the marginal 
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utility of consumption at time t (See e. g. Lucas and Stokey (1989)). Since the 
endowment of the economy's consumption goods is finite in all periods, and the 
utility fiinction is assumed to be monotonically increasing then MU (ct) is strictly 
positive in all periods. Since the gross return on real money balances is equal to 
1 by assumption and some agent must hold the large and growing real stock of 
money in the economy then this agent must violate their transversality condition, 
so that such a situation cannot be an equilibrium. If we stick to the assumption 
that agents are infinitely lived and there is no population growth then Nve must 
have some device to ensure that individuals will hold money instead of sPend- 
ing it. One of the first approaches to the problem was that of Patinkin (1965) 
and Sidrauski(1967) of putting real balances into the utility function; variations 
with utility as a function of beginning of period balances and end of period bal- 
ances have both been- used. Examples will be covered in chapter 5. Hahn (1965, 
1971,1973) criticised this approach on the grounds that it made money 'inessen- 
tial' to the model. By this he means that if money is removed from the model 
then the allocation of real resources is unaffected. According to Hahn the use of 
money should be closely tied to the way in which economic activity is determined. 
Hahn's criticism was influential and has to a large extent set the tone for the orig- 
inal contributions that will follow. In all the models in chapters 2 -6 inchisive, 
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omitting money changes the allocation of resources. 
In those models we will see that the inefficiency of the non monetary equilib- 
rium is crucial, since it leaves unexploited gains from trade, and that money can 
have value since it 'travels round' the system rather than being passed on to newly 
arriving agents. Such a scenario has been depicted by Beivley(1980,1983) and 
Levine(1989) for the endowment case but a gap exists for the case of productive 
capital as the generator of income in such models. 
The other main approaches expounded in the literature have been the cash 
in advance models of Lilcas(1980) Lucas and Stokey (1987), the debt constrained 
infinitely lived models of Bewley(1980) and Townsend (1980), the medium of 
exchange models of Romer (1986) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) phis the afore- 
mentioned overlapping generations models of Samuelson (1958), Cale (1973) etc. 
A review of some of these models and their conclusions follows. Particular atten- 
tion will be paid to aspects of the models that show the effects of multiple budget 
constraints, money as a record keeping device, money in a Pareto improving role, 
and the issue of the optimum quantity of money. 
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1.3. Economies with Financial Imperfections. 
These various approaches invoke primitive assumptions about time or spatial sep- 
aration of agents or the costs of transacting in the economy. Missing markets are 
the extreme form of costly transacting which is the focus of this thesis. They can 
all be contrasted with the trading structure of the Arrow Debreu model which 
has the features of; 
f 1} A single market at the start of time, on which all present and future 
commodities can be traded against each other. 
t2l Costless transacting. 
f 31 Agents meeting in the same place. 
In fact, 121 and f 31 are maj or requirements for 11 
F or instance if we relax 131 we arrive at either the communication cost or 'trad- 
ing process' models in which agents are separated spatially and so their meeting is 
restricted (though there is no reference to calendar time in many such models); or 
we can have finitely lived agents separated through time, restricting their meeting 
in that dimension; yielding the structure of overlapping generations models. 
Specifying a transactions technology or imposing incomplete markets is a less 
primitive approach, and leads to markets re-opening over time (contrast this with 
the inessential sequence economies discussed by Hahn (1973), where trading at 
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dates other than the initial one does not change the set of equilibria). Money 
is suggested in the trading process models because of its informational proper- 
ties, providing an important linkage across agents, tackling moral hazard related 
problems that hamper the working of inside assets; see for instance the work by 
Ostroy and Starr(1974) and Levine (1991). 
The key factor in all approaches of valuing money that seek to be 'essential' in 
some sense is that there must be some divergence in marginal rates of substitution 
at the non monetary equilibrium to allow potential gains from trade so that money 
can be valued in a trading role; money may be passed around the system in 
equilibrium, or passed on to new agents as in the overlapping generations case. 
General discussion of monetary models and the task facing monetary economists 
is contained in Karaken and Wallace(1980). In their introduction to the book the 
authors voice their concern over the implications of macroeconomic models of 
money. Such concerns form the motivation for much of the thesis. They forward 
two main criticisms. Firstly, cash in advance models and money in the utility 
function models tend to "assume the conclusions "of important monetary ques- 
tions: in particular; why fiat money is valued. Secondly, the models tend to be 
inconsistent. That is, they specify forms of demand for money which implicitly 
appeal to some underlying model. However, it is common for the implicit under- 
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lying model to be inconsistent with the model into which the demand for money 
is then embedded (recall Hahn's comments on Patinkin's inessential money). For 
instance, the standard portfolio specification of asset choice under uncertainty is 
sometimes embedded in macro models which are used to determine a non stochas- 
tic equilibritun. (such a challenge will be met in chapter 2). This standard example 
also has implications for the question of explaining theyaluation of intrinsically 
useless fiat money. The intrinsic uselessness of any asset says that it is wanted 
only for the consumption stream it supports upon its liquidation. Since welfare 
analysis of alternative monetary and fiscal policies is about their effects on con- 
sumption allocations, to assume the demand function for money in advance is to 
remove any hope of performing an adequate welfare analysis of monetary policy. 
The welfare theme is the focus of much of the thesis. To analyze the concepts 
of different kinds of assets a primitive approach based on intrinsic uselessness is 
also required. For instance to put all forms of money and financial assets in the 
utility function would lead to a very general specifications, with little restriction 
on results. Chapter four will show implications of addressing such an issue. Simi- 
lar criticisms apply to the Clower constraint models. For instance, Lucas appeals 
to the obvious conclusion that exchange is really more difficult than the Arrow 
Debreu model implies, but to impose the Clower constraint is 'starting too far 
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along, ' according to Karaken and Wallace. 
I commence this part of the survey with a look at models that are very prim- 
itive in a 'fundamental' sense and look to show in a very detailed way how flat 
money is essential for efficiency in trade. The key relevance of these models for 
the thesis is in showing the role of money as a decentralised record keeping device, 
which can costlessly keep track of the value of individual's total value of purchases 
and sales, and its abilities to overcome inefficiencies created by extra budget con- 
straints in addition to the one that the value of expenditure and income should 
match over an agent's lifetime. The lack of inside assets is the cause of these. 
Exactly ho-kv well money can work to overcome these problems is a major theme 
of the thesis; the efficiency of a monetary equilibrium. 
1.3.1. Money as a De-centralised Record Keeping Device, and the En- 
forcement of Budget Constraints. 
The model described below examines the process of decentralized trading and 
the record keeping fimetion of money in very general terms, and examine where 
trading in pairs (hence, subject to obvious physical, informational and incentive 
compatibility limitations) leads to in terms of allocations for society as a whole. 
Though quite old, the paper still stand as true 'originals' that give a clear expo- 
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sition of the issues. 
Although my thesis does not concern itself with pairwise trading the issues 
of how extra budget constraints can cause inefficiencies and how money might 
overcome these by acting as a record of purchases are of great relevance for the 
rest of the thesis. its record keeping role as exposited by Ostroy will in particular 
provide a usefid backdrop to the idea I present in chapter 3. 
Starr (1972) and Ostroy (1973) consider the difficulty of decentralized trading 
when it is carried out in pairwise fashion and how money can ease problems, by 
acting as a record keeping device. These two articles, (and the one of Ostroy and 
Starr (1974)) have the structure of a Walrasian economy where equilibrium prices 
have already been determined, and traders know their own excess demands, but 
the problem is how can they be cleared without the intervention of the auctioneer. 
The chief difficulties of this coordination problem are information and motivation 
(incentive compatibility); knowing what trades to make, and ensuring that agents 
do not break their budget constraints. This last point is the most interesting 
one for us, since pairwise trading is not the focus of the thesis. Only Ostroy is 
considered in detail, as the methods of the two are very similar. 
Ostroy's model consists of a sequence of simultaneous bilateral trades, such 
that each individual meets only one other in a given unit interval of time. The 
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criterion for the efficiency of the exchange process is the number of periods it 
takes to go from state (W), where the Walrasian equilibrium prices are set, and 
agents hold their endowments, to state (A) where individual excess demands are 
zero 
The feiver periods taken, the more efficient is the process. 
Ostroy focuses on 3 properties of trading sequences;, 
(i) Technical feasibility - i. e. based on physical restrictions that trades are 
bilateral and not multilateral. 
(ii) Informational feasibility - requires (i) and the restriction that the trading 
sequence is not dependent on information available to other pairs. 
(iii)'Equilibrium' or 'behavioral' feasibility - that the sequence is incentive 
compatible - i. e. individuals have no incentive to depart from it (this is the part 
of most interest to us)- 
This is later manifested in the need for '1313' - bilateral balance with purchase 
and sale values by an individual equal in any exchange. 
'BB' becomes the focus of the paper, since Ostroy shows that trades satisfying 
(i) and (ii) and minimizing the munber of periods for (W-4A) do not satisfy BB. 
Hence, with BB the process takes longer. If the concern is to make sure that 
individuals balance their budgets over all trades taken together, BB is of course 
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one way to do this, but money's use is another, which hence allows the saving of 
time, as it allows the imbalance of trades in terms of real goods. 
The economy consists of n individuals, m goods, and for a typical agent i, jyj is 
his endowment vector and ai his utility maximizing choice of consumption, where 
p'gi = p'wi and for each commodity c; 
Z ai, =Z wic 
ii 
i. e. market equilibrium. 
(4) 
Ostroy derives the minimum munber of periods for which the allocation is 
technically feasible (i. e. such that the sum of a pairs 'goods holdings' before and 
after a pair's bilateral trade is the same). This number is K == log n where K is 
the minimum munber of periods for n agents (for n: ý 2', a slight modification is 
required). 
Ostroy's next proposition is that if the BB requirement is imposed on trades 
then the 'A' allocation is not technically feasible for the above indirect exchange 
model (i. e. defined as one that uses log n periods) this is really just the same as 
saying that imposing BB will mean the allocation 'A' takes longer to achieve. 
In terms of direct meetings, i. e. for everyone to meet each other once, meetings 
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are required which take a minimum number of (n-1) periods. This is termed a 
direct exchange economy. 
Ostroy then turns his attention to the informational feasibility of trades - 
i. e. how trades are actually made between individuals, when they have limited 
information, (i. e. as opposed to the presence of an 'all-knowing' broker) for both 
direct and indirect exchange economies. The implications of a pair (or a broker 
coordination-coordinating them) not knowing the excess demand of other agents 
is contained in Ostroy's propositions 5-7. 
Proposition 5 is that the competitive equilibrium allocation (CE) is not in- 
formationally feasible in the indirect exchange model. Intuitively this is quite 
obvious, as agents will not know the 'needs' of future trading partners (direct or 
indirect) and hence do not know what they need to give/receive now. (This is 
even without imposing BB. ) 
Proposition 6 is that if trades must satisfy BB the CE allocation is not infor- 
mationally feasible in the direct exchange model. 
The basic reason for this is that since we assume there isn't a good present in 
sufficient supply to act as a balancing item, what is accepted in payment has to be 
what one is able to sell in the ftiture. This is a strong informational requirement. 
Ostroy then notes that the use of money instead of IOU's betrays that the 
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parties lack information about where and when the debt will be settled. 
Proposition 7 is that when BB is not imposed, the CE allocation is informa- 
tionally feasible in the direct exchange model. This can be proved by the use, of a 
rule developed in Starr (1972), that of excess demand diminishing trades (E. D. D. 
trades). These are such that agents never engage in trades which change the 
sign of their excess demands. That this should cause the allocations to converge 
towards the CE allocation is obvious. 
Intuitively, this rule only requires the 'bilateral' knowledge of excess demands. (Of 
course, it is impossible to use E. D. D. trades in the context of an indirect exchange 
model. ) 
Ostroy, in looking towards the behavioral feasibility of exchange sequences 
notes 
(i) E. D. D. trades are unlikely to satisfy BB. To do this would in fact require 
a double coincidence of wants. 
(ii) E. D. D. trades will not form a utility increasing sequence. Obviously, the 
total effect of the sequence is to increase utility. But (by the same lack of double 
coincidence as above) it will not be increasing at each step. 
Ostroy then looks at the question of whether a sequence of trades, technically 
and informationally feasible, which reaches 'A' is in fact an equilibrium i. e. is it 
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compatible with individual incentives. He tackles this by noting that the trade se- 
quence (organized by a broker) is to be based only upon the information 'revealed' 
by a trader. Here we have the incentive to default - individuals can overstate their 
position and hope to get extra goods, breaking their budget balance position. 
Of course, if BB over all trades together (BUB) is imposed somehow (without 
the requirement of BB on each individual trade) then obyioiisly individuals cannot 
default, and hence we arrive at Proposition 8; If the CE allocation is information- 
ally feasible, and if BUB is imposed, the CE allocation is an equilibrium. 
However, dile to the informational restrictions, we know that the only way this 
can be satisfied is if B-B is imposed. 
Hence we have proposition 9 which is that the CE allocation (A) is not an 
equilibrium for the direct exchange model. (From proposition 6 and the need to 
have BB for equilibrium). 
Ostroy then proposes an alternative to keep BUB satisfied. This is by the use 
of 'money' in the form of credits given by the purchaser to the seller and monitored 
by a central monetary authority. This treatment of money as a balancing item of 
course ignores any notion of liquidity constraints; the occurrence of these through 
an insufficient quantity of money in the economy is of course a major theme of 
this thesis. 
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Hence we arrive at proposition ten which is that in the monetary version of 
the direct exchange model, the CE allocation is an equilibrium. 
In summary, Ostroy draws attention to the fact that the role of money he 
wishes to concentrate on is its record keeping property (hence his cheque book 
approach) to avoid the usual approach of simply saying money is distinguished 
from other commodities by its durability, portability, etc. However he acknowl- 
edges that to equally carry out the record keeping, it would obviously be prudent 
to select a medium with those desirable quantities, rather than a higher cost cen- 
tral book-keeping method, or a cumbersome commodity money. The advantages 
over a book keeping system were also mentioned by Levine (1991) and will be 
touched on in again in chapter 3. 
The set up of Ostroy et al. points the way towards the introduction of money 
as a method of overcoming restrictions yielded by extra budget constraints. In 
later parts of the thesis ive shall see that such restrictions equate to the absence of 
inside assets, which create a non monetary equilibrimn that is non Pareto optimal 
and allows money to be valued. 
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1.3.2. Overlapping Generations Models. 
An important class of models that points out the relation of inefficiency of a non 
monetary equilibrium and the existence of a monetary equilibrium, (a topic which 
will be approached in chapter 2) are Overlapping Generations Models which began 
with the contributions of Allais (1947) and Samuelson (1958). Deeper analysis 
of this class of models and their relation to models wiffinfinitely lived agents is 
reserved until chapter 6. Here we content ourselves by expostulating some of the 
basic results of the simpler kind of overlapping generations models that conveys 
the basic notions. The role of money in improving welfare is an important point 
that these models bring out and one that will be addressed and countered in 
chapter four. 
To these ends we now review an important paper by Cass, Okuno, and Zilcha(1979) 
that exposits Samuelson's basic model, generalizes it and examines its two central 
conclusions, which are 
(1) Existence Proposition 
There is a monetary equilibrium if and only if there is no barter equilibrium 
which is Pareto optimal. 
(2) Optimally Proposition 
If there is a monetary equilibrium then there is a monetary equilibrium which 
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is Pareto optimal. 
Cass, Okuno and Zilcha (COZ) find that quite plausible alterations in the 
taste and endowment patterns (notably heterogeneous households, non convexities 
and non stationarities) of Samuelson's basic model change the above conclusions 
dramatically. We shall not go into these variations in this survey. Instead we shall 
simply cover some basic results and intuition in the standard Samuelson model. 
Further detailed consideration of this model will be presented in the final chapter, 
particularly as to why the equilibria may be indeterminate. 
The terminology of a 'barter economy' is borrowed from Samuelson and Cass, 
Okuno and Zilcha for consistency and simply refers to a non monetary economy. 
The story traced out below looks at when the absence of assets that allow the 
transfer of goods across generations will allow money to have positive value in 
equilibrium. The absence of the assets is usually motivated by noting that one 
cannot strike a debt contract with someone who will not be around the following 
period. Alternative structures that allow for a social security system, a sequen- 
tially complete asset market or a complete asset market that allows agents to meet 
and trade before they are even born are however sometimes used by theorists in 
the field of overlapping generations. 
I now review the familiar O-G framework in its simplest form. It consists of 
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one type of consurners in every generation, (hence in a representative agent style; 
just, 1 consumer), each generation living for just 2 periods, with a new generation 
born each period. The model is started at time zero with the initial old generation 
(born at time -1 and having no-one to trade with when young)given one unit of 
money between them. The initial old consumer will obviously consume his second 
period endowment and supply his money inelastically. For other generations the 
problem is for the generation born in period t; in which consumer li maximizes; 
h( 
ýq 
h) 
Subject to; 
(5) 
hh< Vtyh + pt+lyh ptct + Pt+lct+l -t t+l 
Hence equivalently; 
h h) Ah Pt 
(Yt 
ct >M t (7) 
Pt+lCt+l :5 MIL + pt lyh t+ t+l 
A competitive equilibrium in this model is a set of prices, and optimal con- 
sumption plans that satisfy the constraints for a feasible allocation: 
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h<h 
t-E Yt hEGt-, uGt hcGt-, UGt 
Where Gt denotes the generation born at time t. The generation subscripts 
are dropped in situations where no confusion is created. 
A useful diagrammatic tool in this analysis is the reflected generational offer 
curve shown overleaf Looking at the curve for Generation t, we define it as a plot 
of zt+l against zt where zt is the excess supply of the (single) consumption good 
in the first period of life, and zt+l is the excess demand in the second period of 
life, by the same set of agents (i. e. within the same generation). Since the COZ 
paper considers only scenarios of zero population growth, the use of the reflected 
generational offer curve to characterize the equilibrium is very simple, as we shall 
see. 
Since we require that the excess goods demand of old = excess goods supply 
of young, then competitive equilibrium requires that G, -, zt --, z Gtzt. 
As will be elu- 
cidated later, the situation in figure one depicts a case where stationary monetary 
equilibrium exists. Diagrammatically, Nve impose the equilibrium condition in the 
spot market by selecting the point on the vertical axis to represent; 
Ct-lzt (10) 
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and then tracing across to the 45 degree line to find the excess supply of the 
following generation that will yield equilibrium, namely; 
Ct Zt (11) 
Other points to note about the offer curve in general are that at the origin (the 
endowment point), its slope will be equal to that of the relevant indifference curve. 
Secondly, as we change the price ratio to sketch out the reflected offer curve, we 
have that the slope of the line from the origin to the relevant point on the offer 
curve is equal to the price ratio. This is obvious when one remembers that zt and 
zt+l are derived from the agent's constrained optimization (see equation 6). 
COZ then go forward to examine the central story of Samuelson's original 
model using these techniques. In this case, with strictly quasi-concave utility, the 
offer curve will cross the 45 degree line just once. Hence a unique barter equilib- 
rium will exist (G, zt = ctzt =0 which implies autarchy, with each generation 
consuming its endowment). Note that will occur for a range of price ratios below 
a critical value and although above we define pt, pt+l in money terms, the price 
of money is in fact zero (pt, pt+l infinite) in an autarchic equilibrium. A key result 
is that there will exist a unique stationary monetary equilibrium only if the offer 
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curve, g intersects the 45 degree line in the positive quadrant. This will only occur 
if the slope of the offer curve at the origin (endowment point) is less than one. 
Define this slope as r, where 
49U(Yl, Y2) 
19cl < 
19U(Yl, Y2) 
OC2 
(12) 
If this quantity is greater than unity no competitive monetary equilibrium will 
exist. The essence of the key condition necessary for the existence of monetary 
equilibrium is that we need to find a rate of return on money as provided by the 
path of prices so that people will be willing to hold it over one period and that 
this rate of return is compatible with the rate of arrival of new resources into the 
economy. The key point on this was highlighted by Tirole (1985) in noting that 
the value of money is essentially a bubble since it is intrinsically worthless, and 
that its value grows at the rate of return, which hence must be supportable by 
the real resources of the economy. The higher is the rate of population growth 
the higher is the feasible rate of return. 
In addition to the unique monetary equilibrium (with r< 1) we can sketch 
multiple non-stationary monetary equilibria. An example is shown in figure 2. 
Note: as we follow the path down the offer curve, we effectively trace out 
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IF(C-, Uef-- '2. 
situations in which the excess supply of the young equals the excess demand of 
the old with the price ratio falling each time, as does the equilibrium level of 
trade in each round, with the non-stationary equilibria converging asymptotically 
to autarchy. The occurrence of such equilibria will be analysed in chapter 6. 
We now look at the welfare implications of these cases. In the case where 
we have just a single possible equilibrium - barter, with ýthe marginal utility ratio 
(r) > 1, then this barter equilibrium is Pareto optimal. The basis for this statement 
is that tinder such arrangements of endowments and preferences (giving r> 1) then 
we might suspect that a passing of goods from old to yoting is required to improve 
welfare. However, it is common to assume in consumption-loan models that the 
economy has a definite starting date. Hence the existence of the initial generation 
who is 'old' in the first period of the model. (This feature is discussed by Starrett 
('72) and Shell ('72)). It means that to try and make Pareto improvements by 
the passing of goods from the old to young will unambiguously make the initial 
generation worse off. In effect, as Shell notes, this is really symptomatic of the 
fact that we pass some of the good forward into infinity. In contrast, the passing 
of goods from young to old accomplishes the opposite - i. e. we have some of the 
good brought forward from infinity. If we allowed a doubly infinite period, the 
old to young transfers would be Pareto improving (if r >1). 
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In the case where the marginal utility ratio is r<I at the endowment point, 
then the barter equilibrium is not Pareto efficient (nor are the non-stationary 
monetary equilibria). The role of the efficiency or otherwise of the non monetary 
equilibrium in determining the existence of a monetary equilibrium is intuitively 
simple. The process of looking to see if we can reallocate goods across generations 
by bringing goods back from infinity is analogous to seeing if we can find a rate 
of return on money so that agents are willing to transfer goods from young to old 
age, and that rate of return is compatible with equilibrium, in the same vein as 
the Tirole argument. 
In summary these result of course demonstrates the propositions of Samuel- 
son's model, concerning the efficiency/otherwise of the barter equilibrium and the 
existence of the monetary equilibrium and its efficiency. In particular the role 
of money in a Pareto improving role is demonstrated in an 'essential monetary 
model'. Indeed the stationary monetary equilibrium is Pareto optimal, though we 
shall see that non-interventionist monetary equilibrium in overlapping generations 
models and non-interventionist monetary equilibria in models with contempora- 
neously and infinitely lived agents have different welfare properties. 
AVe shall see that in other respects there are some similarities between these 
two classes of models however, for instance on the issue of the number of equi- 
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libria in the model. However the latter class of models, consisting of infinitely 
and contemporaneously lived agents has the advantage of modelling money as 
something other than a purely intergenerational phenomenon and highlights the 
role of market imPerfections in generating a role for money. It is to this class of 
models that I now turn. 
1.3.3. Models of Money with Contemporaneously and Infinitely Lived 
Agents. 
This section of the thesis considers models where agents who live contemporaneous 
and infinite lives operate under an imperfect non-monetary financial system so 
that the possibility of a monetary equilibrium is created. The models covered set 
the scene for the original contributions examined later and particularly introduce 
the notion of inefficient monetary equilibria and the optimum quantity of money. 
Other models of this class will however be covered later in the thesis, in order to 
facilitate understanding of particular points of interest. 
The model covered here in detail is the most basic of this 'class' and was pro- 
posed by Townsend (1980). This is mathematically equivalent to a special case of 
the model presented by BeNvley (1980,1983) and the issues addressed are again 
trading, optimality, the valuation of fiat money and the optimum quantity of 
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money. Studying this model will enable us to see the relation between a model in 
which agents are contemporaneously and infinitely lived when the financial strue- 
ture is 'perfect', and secondly the same set of agents when money is the only asset 
and thirdly the overlapping generations models of fiat money. The relation of an 
inefficient non monetary equilibrium and the existence of a monetary equilibrium 
is highlighted again. Another important issue addresseo is the efficiency or oth- 
erwise of the monetary equilibrium; i. e. the ability of money to overcome the 
incompleteness of markets. This in turn leads on to consideration of the optimum 
quantity of money. 
The model is one in which agents wish to smooth their consumption in the 
face of uneven income streams. The optimal feasible allocations, the competitive 
allocation under loans and the allocation with money when we have an interven- 
tionist and non-interventionist monetary authority are addressed. The exclusion 
of inside debt can be imposed exogenously as in the Bewley model or endogenously 
as in the Townsend version. 
The physical set-up of the model is of N agents each living for T periods (A 
horizon later taken to be unbounded) whose only heterogeneity is their endowment 
streams of the single perishable good. There are two types of agents (equal in 
number) such that for 'Type A' the endowment pattern is; 
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1 when t even (0,2 ) 
0 when t odd (1,3 ) 
and yB =I_ yA. 
Restricting attention to those allocations treating all agents within a given 
type identically, the social planner's problem is to maximise; 
TT 
E ptU (CA) + (1 _ A) 
EatU B) 
t=O 
t 
t=O 
(Ct (22) 
Subject to; 
cA+cB<1 vt tt-) 
Yielding first order conditions 
(23) 
i (CA Ul 
(CB 
u ýt+ t+l) 
iA 
vt (24) 
u (Ct U, (ct') 
Optimal allocations are then characterised by; 
TA, Vt (25) t 
B= IýB)vt (26) ct 
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(WhereiýA = 1--aB, the split between the two being dependent on the planner's 
weights) - 
We now examine competitive equilibrium with loans. 
The problem for an agent is to maximise; 
T 
ptu (ct) (27) 
t=O 
Subject to; 
ct + It :ý yt + It-, (1 + rt-1) (28) 
Co + lo <- Yo (29) 
Where lt denotes the outstanding stock of assets at the end of period t (they begin 
the model with no debt). 1+rt-I denotes the gross real interest rate on period t-I 
assets. Clearly It <0 indicates borrowing. 
For the last period we impose the condition that IT must be zero. This nat- 
urally imposes the solvency condition on agents and the flow form of the budget 
constraint can be easily transformed into its lifetime or 'present value' form: 
PV (consumption) = PV (income) 
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The first order conditions yield, for any type of agent; 
U'(ct+i) 1 
U, (ct) + rt) 
Hence, in equilibrium, imposing either goods or loan market conditions for 
equilibrium; 
(CA 
CA t+ 
-t+l) (32) uW A) t ul ct + rt) 
ClearlY; 
+ rt) =1 
13 
yields an equilibrium. 
(33) 
It is obvious that the equilibrium will be Pareto optimal. The equations above 
can represent either the special case of Bewley's model or Townsend's Ttirnpike 
model. Townsend's model specifies the environment in which agents can meet 
each other and then derives the asset structure endogenously. The set-up is one 
in which there is an infinite number of West heading agents and an infinite number 
of East heading agents travelling along a 'himpike of infinite length consisting of a 
countably infinite number of trading posts. Each set of agents sli-ifts along by one 
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post on the lAirnpike each time period, and each time trades with the agent on 
the opposite side of the Mirnpike. The crucial point about the structure is that no 
pair of agents will meet together again. Hence private loan markets are infeasible. 
'Iýrade can only be facilitated by money. Again, the need for trade is created by 
the pattern of endowments over time, which is such that an East-heading agent is 
endowed with one unit of the consumption good at an odd-mimbered trading post 
and zero units at an even numbered trading post. The opposite pattern prevails 
for the West-heading agent. Hence the opportunity to transfer the consumption 
good across agents is created. As before, we term agents endowed at even time 
points (including zero) as type A and the others B, who have MO units of the 
currency at time zero. Type A agents have no currency endowment initially. 
Each agent maximizes; 
00 E ßtu (ct) 
t=O 
Subject to; 
(34) 
ptct + Mt+l :! ý ptyt +A (35) 
And; 
Mt+l >- 0 (36) 
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Forming the optimization problem into a Lagrangian, with At as the lagrange 
multiplier on the constraint at time t, then the F. O. C. are; 
, 
8'(u' (ct) - Atpt) < 0, if Ct =0 (37) 
= 
01 if ct >0 
-, 8'At +, 8'--'At+l < 0, if Mt =0 (38) 
= O)ifmt>O 
The transversality condition is; 
iim, e, Atmt =o (39) týoo 
Since we require, for Pareto optimality, that; 
I (CA Ul 
(CB 
t+ t+ (40) -ýT-(CA 
t U'(C'B) 
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For a steady consumption stream, we desire; 
A 
Pt+l 
As was noted in the discussion of the Bernhardt paper, having this rate of 
deflation is incompatible with having a constant money stock, and we again choose 
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an equilibrium with a constant price level. 
We shall here, as Townsend and Bewley do, restrict attention to the deter- 
ministic steady state of the model. Non-stationary equilibria in this model as 
well as stochastic equilibria may occur as in the overlapping generations models 
of fiat money. As I have noted before, this topic is ftirther covered in the final 
chapter of the thesis. In the meantime we should note that the presence of the 
liquidity constraint truncates the planning horizon of the consumers. The first 
order conditions below, since the liquidity constraint binds can hence be seen 
as equivalent to those of a sequence of 2 period lived generations, although the 
welfare implications of such models are different. 
Since we have established above that the liquidity constraint must bite (con- 
firmed by the argument below also), the total money stock will be passed across 
the 'Eirnpike each period, in alternate directions. 
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Returning to the first order conditions we guess naturally that agents endowed 
with the good in period t will carry money balances over, and be liquidity con- 
strained in the following period. In the unconstrained. period; 
UI(Ct+l) At+lpt+l At+, 
U, (ct) - Atp, 
= At 
(42) 
(Since the price level is constant) 
For these unconstrained agents it must be that; 
At+j 
At 
(43) 
If we denote consumption of the agents who are endowed with a unit of the good 
in a given period as c* and consumption when not endowed as c** then; 
ul (C**) (44) 
U, (C*) 
With C** + C* = 1. 
In the following period for this same agent; 
ul (C*) (45) 
1 (c**) u, 
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So, with 0<1, we have that the marginal rate of substitution fluctuates either side 
of the unit value required for Pareto efficiency. If we treated agents symmetrically, 
then of course c* = C**=0.5 is the desired smoothing outcome. 
The intuition behind this is that the friction of time preference (impatience) 
causes agents to carry over too little money to smooth consumption in the follow- 
ing period i. e. the liquidity constraint bites as a result of last period's optimiza- 
tion; or equivalently viewed in a general equilibrium context, that the side of the 
market that is supplying goods supplies too little, since the return on savings is 
too IONV 
Looking back to the first order conditions, we see that (assunling ct > 0); 
U, (ct) ý Atpt (46) 
i. e. At is the extra utility of an increment of money devoted to consumption in 
the current period t. 
Also we can see that if Mt+l >0 (i. e. when agents are selling and the liquidity 
constraint does not bite) then; 
, xt ý At+10 (47) 
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Agents are able to optimize in their choice of money balances at that point. 
However, when money holdings are run clown to zero (i. e. when spending 
money) then; 
At+2 
< 
At+, 
(48) 
i. e. - agents would in fact like to devote more of their resources to consiunption 
in (t+I). However the non negative constraint on money holdings stops them. 
i. e. the liquidity constraint bites. We now turn to the question of interventions 
that need to be used to correct the inefficiency, a major theme for the rest of the 
thesis. 
The interventions that are performed are to engineer a deflation of the price 
level over time to parallel the Friedman (1969) proposal of bringing private and 
social opportunity sets into line; the optimum quantity of money proposal. In an 
economy such as this one a social planner has the opportunity to redistribute goods 
within a period across agents who are endowed and not endowed respectively. 
The opportunity that faces agents however is an intertemporal one and their 
calculations in redistributing goods across periods when endowed and not endowed 
involves taking into account their rate of time preference and the rate of return 
on the means of storage. Impatience thus provides a friction. To see this we 
J 
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can note that the fluctuations in consumption as described above disappear if 
we have 8=1. The task of the monetary authority, according to Friedman, 
is to pay interest on money equal to the rate of time preference to correct the 
market failure of money and create opportunities identical to those that the debt 
mechanism provides. An alternative method is to deflate the money supply over 
time to make the price level fall at the same rate, which, is the method we follow 
below. 
In computing the equilibrium by anticipating the constant rate of deflation 
we seek, we expect that agents will carry positive amounts of money when they 
are sellers and spend all their cash when they are buyers (this will be seen to be 
still valid even though they are strictly speaking unconstrained when buyers in an 
efficient equilibrium). Given that we assume a velocity of circulation of one then 
a quantity type equation would be expected; 
pt = kMt (49) 
Proportional money taxes are levied such that; 
Nominal Tax = Tt = Mt - Mt+j = (1 -, 0) Mt (50) 
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The taxes must be himp sum, and note also that a contrast with the second 
welfare theorem is implied, with continuous redistribution required, rather than 
simply one distribution at the initial date. 
An interesting footnote to these efficiency issiles is provided by Townsend. If 
we look back to our stationary overlapping generations models, in a steady state 
we had a constant money stock and a constant price. leyel and agents optin-lised 
according to; 
U, (ct) = 6u' (ct+i) 
(this is with a fixed money stock). This gives us a Pareto optimal solution. 
However, in a model such as the 'Dirnpike, a steady money stock and price level 
giving; 
U, (ct) = Ou' (ct+i) (52) 
is sub Pareto optimal. 
This puzzle is explained by Townsend by noting that the Ttirnpike model 
pairs agents of the same age. The overlapping generations models, in contrast, 
pair agents of different ages. Hence, when we pass goods between young and old 
(assuming, for symmetries' sake, thatwe do it for all generations) we effectively 
carry out a redistribution of goods across time periods for all agents. Hence 
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the equality expressed above indicates a situation that is Pareto optimal in an 
overlapping generations model. 
The analogy to production is pertinent here as we can trade off the amounts 
of consumption for young and old in an overlapping generations model. This is 
to be contrasted with the re-allocation carried out in the Mirnpike model, where 
we cannot change the total consumption of a certain agq group, and the optimilm 
re-distribution requires that; 
U, (ct) = U, (ct+i) (53) 
Of course, in the nirnpike model, if we could achieve equality(52) for both 
agents (whilst in all periods using all the economy's endowment) - that allocation 
would be Pareto optimal, but could only be achieved if we had total resources 
available in period (t) greater than those in period (t+l) enough to allow the 
above equality for both. 
The Townsend model and its equivalent, a special case of the Bewley model 
both have deterministic endowments. Bewley's (1980,1983) model is the more 
general case and has endowments generated by a stochastic process, and will 
be covered in detail in the next chapter. Other variants of this framework are 
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developed by Levine (1991), Kehoe, Levine and Woodford (1992) and Scheinkman 
and Weiss (1986), whose work is extended by Dutta and Polemarchakis (1990). 
These will be mentioned again in the final chapter. Other liquidity distribution 
models are developed by Rierst (1990) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). 
These latter two look at liquidity distribution of a more temporary nature; a 
representative household is split into sectors and then re-united at the end of a 
period. The former set of models mentioned in this section allow an evolving 
distribution of liquidity through time. 
In the Scheinkman. and Weiss model there are 2 agents whose positions as buyer 
and seller of the economy's single consumption good are prone to reverse as in the 
Townsend model. Here however, the change in positions is random and determined 
by a Poisson process, which determines the allocation of the opportunity to work 
and sell the output. In the case of even an inefficient equilibrium of the Townsend 
model, where the total level of liquidity is too low, what liquidity is there is 
always 'conveniently' held by the buyer. In Scheinkman and Weiss the random 
changes in position of the 2 agents means that in cases where the level of liquidity 
is too low then a long period of time with the buyers and sellers in the same 
position causes problems. Scheinkman and Weiss and Dutta and Polemarchakis 
(1990) show that this factor can yield persistence in output after a single shock. 
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The mechanism is that previous shocks cause the agent who is now a buyer to 
have low real money balances, and the seller/worker has high balances that yield 
a low incentive to work. Contrary to the Friedman notion of the benefits of 
anticipated deflation, Scheinkman and Weiss focus on the benefits of a once and for 
all unexpected injection of money into the economy in a 'helicopter' drop fashion. 
This is symmetrically distributed to all agents and has the effects of redistributing 
liquidity towards the 'poor' buyer who holds low real money balances. The crucial 
extra factor of liquidity distribution as opposed to simply its quantity is thus 
highlighted. This issue is then taken up by Levine (1991) and Kehoe, Levine and 
C 
Woodford (1992) who look at the effects of anticipated money injections. Levine 
looks at the extreme case of linear utility so that corner solutions in consumption 
occur and so only the distribution of liquidity is important, not its quantity (clue to 
bang-bang behavior) so that in that case inflation is always the best policy. KLW 
examine the balance between the 2 policies using concave utility functions. The 
optimal policy balances the redistribution of liquidity towards previously unlucky 
agents who are hence low money holders now with the Friedman type gains from 
increasing the quantity of real money balances. As in Scheinkman and Weiss, 
aggregate fluctuations occur in the KLW model since there are only two types of 
agents in the model; and the authors note that the class of models is evocative 
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of the Leijonhufvudd (1973) concept of a classical corridor. The economy has 
sufficient buffer stocks of liquidity to deal with small shocks but not large ones, 
where the size of the shock here corresponds to the duration of the time that 
buyers and sellers stay in the same configuration without reversing. 
Melirling (1995)shows that even in the case of a model with a continuum 
of random variables that yields a deterministic steady §tate, the distribution of 
liquidity can play a role when its quantity is finite. 
The models that follow in the original chapters have the common factor 
of being non representative agent models where money changes hands between 
agents through time, hence contributing to the field of study of Bewley, Levine, 
Townsend, et al. We might hence even also put the models alongside the overlap- 
ping generations framework, clue to some similarities that have been highlighted; 
chapter 6 will bring out similarities also. 
I have exposited models in the survey which cover a number of issues. Not all 
of these are uniquely related to models of infinitely and contemporaneously lived 
agents but the models examined provided useful insights and contrasts. We saxv 
how an inefficient non-monetary equilibrium created the opportunity for a mon- 
etary equilibrium, in the overlapping generations framework and the Townsend 
model, and more suggestively in other models (e. g. the work of Ostroy). The 
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record keeping role of money in enforcing budget constraints was also noted, most 
particularly by Ostroy. Money's Pareto improving role was also noted. The ques- 
tion of whether money's Pareto improving role extended to make the monetary 
equilibrium Pareto efficient was then addressed, introducing the notion of the op- 
timum quantity of money. All these issues are addressed in the original chapters 
that follow but many of the issues that specifically pertain to models of non- 
representative agents have not been emphasised in this initial 'general' survey, 
and will be covered in later chapters as necessary. 
1.4. Issues to be Addressed 
Despite the common theme we can identify each chapter with different issues in 
the field. As I have said, not all of these topics have been covered in the survey 
so far and some of the chapters commence with some survey material which will 
aid understanding of the particular model presented. Below I repeat an outline 
of the issues addressed in each chapter. 
Chapter 2 addresses the issue of the valuation of fiat money in a scenario of 
uninsured idiosyncratic production risk for a continuum of contemporaneously and 
infinitely lived agents, since such a gap in the literature currently exists. I then 
examine the issue of the existence of equilibrium under the regime of himp sum 
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taxation that is traditionally associated with the implementation of the optimum 
quantity of money proposal, since this is an area in which Bewley found a problem. 
Such an issue is of interest in the field of non representative liquidity distribution 
models, since it is closely tied up with the way in which money is modelled as 
changing hands between individuals, and so far no model has examined the issue 
with productive capital instead of endowments. The. chapter commences with a 
non technical exposition of the important parts of Bewley's 1980 and 1983 papers 
since the originals are somewhat opaque in their presentation. 
Chapter 3 takes an alternative approach to the issue of the tax system required 
to implement the optimum quantity of money proposal. Instead of restricting 
attention to himp surn taxation as other authors do, I set up a model with the same 
basic mathematical structure as the model of chapter 2 but this time specifying 
an information structure that restricts the type of state contingent taxes and 
redistribution schemes that are available to the government to reallocate resources. 
In the context of this model I then address a conjecture of Hellwig (1982) and 
Woodford (1990) that if taxes could be levied on individuals in a way that avoided 
the 'Bewley difficulty' then the information structure would be such as to make 
money inessential in the sense of Hahn (1965,1973); that is, that money's value 
would vanish since it is replaced by a complete set of markets. Their conjecture 
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was made in the context of a pure exchange model but my analysis will be seen 
to carry over easily. 
As part of the analysis I am able to shed light on the way in which the im- 
plementation of the optimum quantity of money proposal operates, by noting fiat 
money's essential properties of anonymity and common usage. Paying out the 
proceeds of taxation by raising the value of real balances is seen to be superior to 
an insurance scheme. 
Chapter 4 examines a basic notion about money on which the optimum quan- 
tity of money literature is based; that more money is a good thing, as we have 
seen in its Pareto improving role. More particularly I will question if it is possible 
to have an equilibrium in which money has too much value in a model of infinitely 
and contemporaneously lived agents. I answer the question by appealing to a fun- 
damental shortcoming of money as an asset. The roles of assets in changing the 
distribution of liquidity across the agents in the economy is essential to the story 
and demands the non representative agent framework used. 
Chapter 5 presents a model which addresses the issue of the superneutrality or 
otherwise of fiat money. I investigate the implications of the underlying cause of 
Bewley's difficulty for the effects of monetary policy in a case where that problem 
does not lead to non existence of monetary equilibrium under deflationary policy; 
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namely an economy with a finite horizon. 
Chapter 6 addresses a set of issues different to those of 'pure' monetary theory 
by examining the effects of the distribution of liquidity in the economy on economic 
fluctuations, as opposed to looking purely at deterministic steady states and their 
welfare characteristics as in previous chapters. I present two models, one where 
a non convexity in investment opportunities leads to mýiltiple equilibria and also 
the possibility of an endogenously generated investment cycle, and a second model 
where the distribution of liquidity over time is endogenised and interacts with 
the non-convexity of investment opportunities to cause persistence of IoNv output 
levels; the distribution of liquidity between agents of differing risk attitudes is 
important here. 
Before I commence chapter 2 it will be useful to stop and think about what the 
important functions of money are that we might wish to capture, the best ways 
to model them and what various models represent in terms of monetary factors. 
As mentioned earlier, the point of departure of the thesis was seen to be the 
Arrow-Debreu model rather than 'practical' monetary theory, and the deletion 
of markets might leave us wondering what role money is supposed to play in the 
models of the type of Townsend and Bewley which form the basis of the thesis. The 
obvious answer would be to say that they show the role of fiat money as a financial 
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asset in guarding agents against the risk of low income. A critic of the model might 
say that since money is not dominated in rate of return with probability one in 
any of the models I present (with the exception of the first model of chapter 6) 
then its properties as a medium of exchange are not represented; namely that 
adding another alternative store of value would cause money to disappear from 
the model. We can answer such a criticism by splitting it into two parts, so to 
speak. We might firstly ask if a model such as Townsend's captures some of the 
essential aspects of money as a medium of exchange as well as being a value store 
model, even if it is in a less than literal sense. The key factor in the models 
such as Townsend and the ones that will be encountered below is that money 
changes hands in equilibrium, and we can note the defence by Wallace (1980) 
of overlapping generations models that this captures an essential property of the 
exchange process. Indeed we note that money in such a context does overcome a 
lack of double coincidence of wants, even if it is only temporal. The key difference 
between the exchange property and a value store that allows self sufficiency in the 
Robinson Crusoe sense is then depicted. The 'acceptability' of money by agents 
that is crucial to its value and which is often quoted in the medium of exchange 
literature is also captured. 
However, addressing the second part of our suggested split of the issue means 
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asking if the model is a good literal representation of the role of money, particularly 
in regard to its rate of return dominance. We need to explain why there are no 
other safe assets in the model. In models that do have money dominated in rate of 
return, for instance the model adapted from Filerst (1992) in chapter 6, the rate of 
return dominance comes from money's liquidity property. A Nvay to defend models 
such as Townsend and Bewley is thus to say that the hýlcling period of money is 
short and that the modeler has simply chosen to abstract from consideration of 
'lower frequency' activity. However, an alternative way is to question the concept 
of rate of return dominance by other assets. If we looked behind inside assets that 
dominate money we might ask what backs them and suggest that money is doing 
this job. If people did not feel that their balances at a financial intermediary were 
not convertible into cash, then their view of these assets as safe might not be so 
obvious. If we search for a real store of value that dominates money then we might 
even be driven to look at something such as land. The land versus money debate 
is of course evocative of the overlapping generations literature, and on this note 
we can counter the competition from land by noting that its transactions costs are 
too large for anything but a very long term store of value role. We might view this 
second line of defence as a 'Keynesian' one that pushed tile role of money as the 
only available safe asset in the portfolio. This is a particularly strong argument 
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if Nve invoke the notion of sticky prices over the business cycle. 
The arguments above are disparate but I tend to side with Wallace's view that 
distinctions between the differing roles of money as depicted in economic models 
are sometimes overplayed. Wallace notes that if the crucial characteristics of a 
medium of exchange function are in the way that it is actually exchanged between 
agents then the role is adequately covered by an overlapping generations model, 
and therefore certainly also for models infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. 
I will also mention briefly different possible interpretations of models with 
regard to what the money of the models in all parts of the thesis can be taken 
to represent, with relevance to what insights the models can yield. A literal 
interpretation of course would be of flat money literally passing round a system, 
which is what the models puport to show. Alternatively, a more metaphorical 
approach might view the fiat money as playing a role in backing inside assets, of 
either short or long maturity, but influencing economic activity in all cases. 
In conclusion of this short discussion, I would say a very strict interpretation 
of the models is not necessary for them to have a meaning. This goes for models 
both surveyed and original. Whatever individual opinions are about the 
role given to money in the various models, we can say that the field 
does indeed yield interesting macroeconomic insights into economies 
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with insufficient liquidity; the models are more than purely monetary. 
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Chapter 2 
Money and Risky Production 
2. Money and Risky Production. 
This chapter picks up on aspects of two topics covered in the literature survey; the 
existence of an equilibrium with intrinsically useless fiat money and the optimum 
quantity of money with idiosyncratic income or outpuf risk. The chapter splits 
into two parts. The first part contains a detailed survey of the work of BeNvley 
and Levine which was briefly touched on in the literature survey. The second 
part exposits an original model that approaches the issues from a different angle 
by including risky capital instead of risky endowments, hence filling a gap in 
the monetary equilibrium existence literature, since no non representative agent 
models with risky production exist. Money's common usage among agents is 
important here, since it yields a constant price level in the face of idiosyncratic 
shocks. In the conditions for existence I find a role for the rate of time preference 
different to the role it plays in the work of Bewley and Levine. I then examine 
the issue of existence of equilibrium under the regime of taxation and interest 
payments on money. I find a problem that echoes a difficulty Bewley found but 
has a fundamentally different cause which is endemic to the nature of the model. I 
show that no monetary equilibrium exists with a strictly positive rate of interest on 
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money if we restrict attention to the case where all agents carry strictly positive 
precautionary balances at ,,, ill points in time. The result arises in spite of the 
presence of an alternative value store to money such that no individual ever has 
to hold an amount in money equal to the per capita money stock to meet his tax 
bill with probability one, so that the cause of the difficulty in Bewley's model is 
eliminated. nirthermore I manage to dra-%v on the insights gained in the model to 
suggest a problem that might occur in Bewley's model even if Bewley's original 
difficulty does not occur. 
An important point to clear up at this stage is the difference between two 
different ways of implementing the optimum quantity of money proposal. One 
method, as outlined in the Townsend model covered in the literature survey, is 
to deflate the money stock so that the price level will fall at the same rate. 
Another is to pay interest on money and keep the nominal money stock constant 
by taxing individuals and using the proceeds to withdraw money from circulation. 
to subsequently pay the interest on money. The latter method is used in this 
chapter, to achieve continuity of presentation with Bewley's paper. In many senses 
the difference between the two schemes is unimportant. As Woodford(1990) points 
out the only difference arises when attention changes away from steady states, and 
we allow per capita real money balances to change over time. If the money stock 
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is deflated then a glance at the transversality condition covered in the literature 
survey reveals that a wider range of equilibria may be possible. Chapter three 
however uncovers another difference. 
2.1. Bewley's Contributions. 
Bewley(1980) develops a model of individual endowment risk to address the issue 
raised by Friedman's Optimum Quantity of Money, and like Riedman considers 
an economy where agents live infinite and contemporaneous lives. Fiat money is 
the only asset and is used to offset short run income and taste fluctuations. 
BeNvley defines a monetary equilibrium to be an infinite sequence of random 
spot market equilibria where all prices in terms of money are bounded away from 
zero and infinity. Inflationary and deflationary equilibria are hence ruled out by 
construction. Bewley then investigates the existence and optimality of monetary 
equilibrium under various conditions. He shows (incorrectly) that if the state 
dependent utility functions and preferences are such that consumers might need to 
arrange self insurance by holding money then a monetary equilibrium can exist if 
the interest rate on money is less than the rate of time preference of all consumers. 
In such a case the low interest rate on money leads consumers to economise on 
money balances and the resulting equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. nill insurance 
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would require an interest rate equal to the rate of time preference (see Schectman. 
and Escudero (1977)). However in such a case no monetary equilibrium exists 
as long as the stochastic process that generates endowments and preferences is 
sufficiently random. Bewley is referring to cases where the optimum quantity of 
money is infinite and full insurance would mean a zero price level for all goods 
and unbounded consumption sets. Monetary equilibriurn only exists with r =0 
in these types of models in the case of periodic endowments, where r denotes the 
rate interest on money and 0 is the pure per period rate of time preference. The 
specific case Nve can consider is that of Townsend (1980) -Miich I reviewed in the 
survey chapter. 
Bewley cements the concept of an optimum quantity of money in his model 
by considering the notion of stationary equilibrium where the only constraint on 
consumers is their long run average income (insurance is available) so that con- 
sumers can allocate their income according to what Bewley calls the permanent 
income hypothesis, where the marginal utility of money or nominal expenditure 
is constant across time and states, even in the face of price fluctuations. The 
almost equivalent situation that Bewley seeks in the monetary economy is a sit- 
iiation of incomplete markets, no borrowing but large real money balances so 
that the marginal utility of money is almost constant, and cash rarely constrains 
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consumers. He conjectures that it might be possible to make the equilibrium allo- 
cation of such a monetary economy arbitrarily close to a Pareto oPtimal allocation 
by paying interest on money, but he is unable to Prove this. As he subsequently 
showed in his 1983 paper, there is a problem with this statement beyond that of 
burden of proof. 
Bewley makes the point that the optimum quantity pf money is infinite since 
agents live forever and have risk in all periods of their life. However, efficiency is 
not gained in an economy of consumers with finite lives since the incentives for 
precautionary saving are too low (see Schectman and Escudero (1977)) to generate 
the high real balances required, even though the optimum quantity is finite. 
Bewley's economy is populated by I consurners and contains L commodities 
plus fiat money. Consumer i's endowment for period n is governed by a stationary 
Markov process with no transient states. The total fiat money stock is normalised 
to 1 and interest payments on money are financed by lump surn taxes which are 
used to keep the total money stock constant. Hence; 
I 
=r (1) 
Period utility functions, like endowments are generically state dependent, but 
70 
we will suppress the notation (so .......... st) used by Bewley to denote the history of 
states and hope that state dependence is clear. At time t consumer i maximises; 
00 
Et E bi'-'Ui. (ji. ) 
n=t 
(2) 
(Where xi,, denotes his vector of consumption of the L goods in time period 
n. ) 
Subject to Mio given, and; 
Mi. = (1 + r)Mi,. -i +p 
Wi. - li. ) n 
Mi > 0, Vn 
So that borrowing is prohibited. 
(4) 
Mi,, denotes the nominal money balances held at the end of period n by con- 
sumer i, ýýj,, is his endowment vector over the L goods in time period n. 
The first order conditions that arise from this problem and in particular the 
marginal utilities of money will be discussed when we come to Bewley's 1983 
paper. 
A monetary equilibrium is defined to be a vector (p, (Iýj)) consisting of a price 
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system and an allocation such that (g: i)is a feasible allocation, xi is optimal given 
(2), (3) and (4) above and the price system p must be such that all its components 
are bounded away from zero and infinity in all time periods and states. 
Bewley states and proves five theorems of which three are of particular interest 
to us. Firstly he shows, incorrectly, that a monetary equilibrium will exist if 
6i < (1 + r)-1 for all i, and the 6i are all sufficiently largp. We will here adopt the 
chronological approach of describing Bewley's 1980 'proof' and giving his 1983 
correction later, since the ideas and method of his 1980 paper are instructive. 
Bewley's technique essentially contains three steps. He firstly shows the existence 
of monetary equilibrium in a finite horizon economy. Secondly lie shows money 
prices of the goods are bounded both above and away from zero by a-priori values. 
Finally he shows that this holds in the infinite horizon case. 
Bewley constructs a general finite horizon economy lasting N periods that has 
the same basic structure as the infinite horizon model described above. In order 
for money to be valued in the face of a finite horizon, Bewley modifies an N 
period horizon version of the utility function in (2) by giving end of period N 
balances one unit of utility per unit of money. Existence for this economy is then 
established by a standard fixed point argument. Monotonicity of utility in all L+1 
goods is sufficient to guarantee strict positivity of their prices, including money. 
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In periods prior to the last one, monotonicity again guarantees strict positivity 
of prices of the real goods. Money yields no direct utility in these periods, but 
arbitrage yields a strictly positive value. Existence of a monetary equilibrium for 
the finite horizon is lience established. 
However, since Bewley's final target is a strictly positive value of money in 
an infinite horizon economy, the final period utility approach will ultimately not 
suffice to give money value since such a device is by definition no longer present in 
that case. Bewley solves the problem by invoking three important assumptions. 
These assumptions ensure that the consumers have income fluctuating relative 
to their consumption needs sufficient to generate a demand for self insurance. 
This he does in the process of establishing that the money prices of goods in 
an N period equilibrium are bounded above byýp* and below by p, The crucial 
assumptions for his proof of boundedness above are assumptions 4,8 and 9 of 
his paper. Intuitively, assumption 4 says that in each state the economy's total 
endowment of each good is bounded below by a positive quantity. Assumption 
8 says that each consumer has a positive probability of having an endowment 
of every good less than a sufficiently small positive constant, which is below the 
average of the relevant bound defined in assumption 4. The notion of some degree 
of individual uncertainty exceeding aggregate uncertainty is hence established 
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and so the opportunity for money mediated Pareto improving trades is created. 
Assumption 9 gives us that in the states of bad hick defined above, marginal 
utility of expenditure on each of the goods is bounded below and will exceed 
the marginal utility of expenditure when consumption is at the level of the lower 
bound on the per capita average endowment of the respective goods. 
Bewley uses these facts to establish that p,, and p*. eýist for the finite horizon 
monetary economy. His existence proof for the infinite horizon economy then 
consists of showing that these bounds are valid for the infinite horizon economy. 
Bewley's second theorem is that with an interest rate strictly less than the 
rate of time preference, no equilibrium is Pareto optimal as long as all consumers 
consume something in all states and time periods, since agents economise on 
money balances. I will shortly provide a sketch of the proof of this for an example 
given in his 1983 paper. 
Bewley's third theorem is that no monetary equilibrium exists in an economy 
where all agents have an identical rate of time preference, and the rate of return 
on money is equal to this rate. The exception to this is the Townsend model. 
(This result of Bewley's is of course rendered redundant by his 1983 paper's re- 
sult. ) The intuition behind this result is (as Sellectman and Escudero have shown) 
that the willingness to accumulate real balances increases without bound as 1+r 
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approaches from below. This implies a zero price in equilibrium for all real 
goods and hence unbounded consumption sets if the limiting situation is reached. 
A counter-example to this result is provided by Mehrling (1995) whose choice of 
a piecewise linear utility function with a kink point at the average endowment 
means that I+r =6 yields a finite money demand. 
A complement to the work of Bewley is provided by Levine (1989). As in the 
work of Bewley, the rate of time preference plays a crucial role in the conditions 
for existence of monetary equilibrium; that the consumers must be sufficiently 
interested in the future to Nvant to hold money. Levine's contribution is to make 
the restrictions on endowments and preferences more elegant. Levine's condition 
is simply that there be a unique Pareto inefficient barter equilibrium. Hence 'a 
little' diversity in marginal rates of substitution at the barter allocation instead 
of 'sufficient' diversity will suffice. Levine considers real rates of return on money 
in his model that are greater than or equal to zero, hence avoiding the problems 
discussed below. 
Simultaneously, Bewley (1983) and Hellwig (1982) discovered a difficulty with 
Bewley's first theorem one of his 1980 paper. Bewley was forced to amend this to 
say that a monetary equilibrium will exist only if the rate of interest on money 
is sufficiently small. The essence of Bewley's result can be seen if we consider 
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the case where each agent has a positive probability of income equal to zero for 
an arbitrarily large number of periods, hence his minimum non interest income 
is zero. If for instance all consumers have initial nominal money balances of V 
and the same tax liabilities, then each agent faces a tax bill of rM per period. 
Due to our assumption on endowment incomes the balances of M are the only 
certain resource that the consumer has to meet his taxes,, Nvhicli must be paid -%vith 
probability one. The consumer thus has to hold balances of M each and every 
period and use the interest payment to meet his tax bill. It is easy to calculate that 
if he ever runs; down his balances below M then there is a positive probability that 
lie will fail to meet his tax bill. The problem that arises in this case will be that no 
monetary equilibrium exists with a strictly positive rate of interest. There will be 
a demand for precautionary balances which will be insatiable, since the money is 
already used up totally by agents holding it to pay taxes. These balances cannot 
serve simultaneously as precautionary balances since precautionary balances must 
be available for liquidation in the face of a bad income shock. The fact that the 
balances cannot serve two purposes at once is symptomatic of the model's non 
representative agent form. Ex post heterogeneity means that money circulates 
in equilibrium. This is an essential part of my original model also, which follows 
shortly. If the minimum endowment income is bounded away from zero, Bewley 
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shows that equilibria may exist for positive rates of interest on money, provided 
that these rates are sufficiently low. A relatively low interest rate means a price 
level that is relatively high. The higher the price level is the higher is the nominal 
value of the lower bound on income. As long as this quantity is greater than or 
equal to tax bill in each period, no autonomous tax demand is created, and the 
Bewley problem is avoided. However, an upper bound oR the feasible interest rate 
will still exist. As Taub's 1988 paper shows, even with the case of deterministic 
endowments an upper limit exists. 
Bewley presents a simple special case of his model where all agents have an 
identical rate of time preference. He uses this to illustrate the result that no 
monetary equilibrium exists with a rate of interest too close to the rate of time 
preference. The economy described in the example consists of two agents indexed 
by I and 2. Each agent has an identical rate of time preference equal to 0.1 
per period and identical period utility function In(xit + 1). There is a single non 
storable consumption good. The random variable at is identically and indepen- 
dently distributed across time and takes on values a or b with equal probability. 
In state a, consumer 1 has an endowment of ý' and consumer 2 has an endowment 
of 1 ý. In state b the positions reverse. The stock of money is normalised to unity 4 
and taxes are equally distributed across agents and hence equal to ! I. Bewley's 2 
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notation emphasises how the equilibrium values of variables in any period depend 
on the whole history of at values realised, but I suppress this notion wherever 
possible. 
Mit denotes nominal money balances held by consumer i at the end of period 
t 
xit is the consumption by consumer i in period t 
Consumer i will maximise at time j; 
00 (, ) t-i 
Eij Z- In(xit + 1) (5) 
t=j 1.1 
Subject to; 
Mit = (1 + r)Mit-, -r+ ptwit - ptxit (6) 
First order conditions give us; 
Ait > 
dui (xit) 
_1 dx Pit (Xit + 
This holds with equality if xit >0. 
Ait > (1 + r) (1.1)-'Eit(Ait+, ) 
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This holds with equality if Mit > M. 
M is the minimum level of money balances a consumer can hold and still ensure 
solvency, and is key to Bewley's argument. 
To show that no monetary equilibrium of the model is Pareto optimal Bewley 
firstly shows that no monetary equilibrium is Pareto optimal with r<0.1. Bew- 
ley's proof is by contradiction and proceeds as follows. He firstly shows that if the 
interest rate is strictly less than the rate of time preference then at some point 
the liquidity constraint must bind (i. e. given the relatively low rate of return on 
money the agent will optimally plan to run out of money balances at some point 
in equilibrium). Formally proving this shows by contradiction that if not then we 
have a first order condition for each agent (choose 1 w. l. g. ); 
Ait = (1 + r) (1.1)-' EtAit+l 
An interest rate less than 0.1 then implies an expected marginal utility of 
money that will grow without bound through time. At least one consumer must 
also have a consumption level each period greater than or equal to one (let this be 
consumer I w. l. g. ). We must also note that Bewley's definition of monetary equi- 
librium precludes the price level going to zero asymptotically. From the definition 
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of Ait in (7) we can then see that these two facts preclude a monetary equilibrium 
where the expected marginal utility of money grows without bound. 
Having established that the constraint must bind in equilibrium at least at 
some point in time, Bewley considers a scenario where the ensuing period's en- 
dowment realisation is a bad one, namely w, = 1. If the Pareto optimal allocation 4 
described is to be continued then consumer 1's nominal, net outflow for that pe- 
riod is at least money balances were equal to M going into the period, an 4 PI'If 
outflow of will push Mt+l below M, which is impossible in equilibrium. This Vt 
is so by definition of M, since entering a period with this amount of money, and a 
bad endowment realisation occurring, only consumption equal to zero will suffice 
to ensure solvency. 
Given this, to show that no equilibrium of the monetary economy is Pareto 
optimal, Bewley simply has to use his second result which is that there exists an 
a-priori upper bound (determined by the parameters of the model and not by any 
particular equilibrium or state) on the rate of interest that will yield a monetary 
equilibrium. This also yields the result that no monetary equilibrium can be made 
arbitrarily close to a Pareto optimal allocation. 
Bewley first proves that no monetary equilibrium exists with r >0.1. Recursive 
application of (8) with r>O. l yields the result that expected marginal utility of 
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money falls throughout time such that; 
lim EAit 
týoo 
(10) 
However, Bewley's definition of monetary equilibrium in his model precludes 
the possibility that the price of money Nvill go asymptotically to zero (p* is an 
a-priori upper bound as in the 1980 paper) and since the real endowment of the 
economy is bounded, such a situation is infeasible. 
Bewley's next task is to prove the existence of an a-priori bound r, O<r<O. l 
such that no monetary equilibrium exists if 0.1> r>r. 
The thrust of Bewley's proof is to note that if the interest rate is close to the 
rate of time preference, the depletion of an individual's money holdings necessary 
to finance the consumption stream of an agent facing such an interest rate will 
cause the individual's holdings to fall below those necessary to ensure solvency. 
In other words, Nve have the excess money demand problem alluded to earlier; the 
money needed to finance a consumption stream close to full insurance (in a sense 
clarified later) in the face of a run of bad hick is more than the given money stock 
can provide. 
Bewley begins by defining a bound on the marginal utility of money: A is 
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defined as the infirnum of all possible values of A for all consumers in all possible 
time periods and states in equilibrium. This of course corresponds to a supreminn 
on the set of all possible consumption values, given the bounds put on p. Since 
Xlt+X2t =2 for all t, then the supremum of consumptions is at least one, then 
since U(x)=Iog(x+l) Bewley obtains an upper bound on the price level in terms 
of A. This is his equation 4.6; .I 
pt < (2A)-l (11) 
Bewley then establishes M, the minimum money balances that an agent can 
hold if he is to stay solvent. To do this he simply uses the budget constraint 
(6) with x=0 and w= -1 to obtain a transition equation for the agent's money 4 
balances in the face of a continued run. of bad hick. Since he has shown that 
the price level is bounded above as shown, for all t, then at most (8A)-'can be 
earned by endowment sale. Unless the consumer holds at least 1- (8A)-1 he will 2- 
hold negative balances with positive probability. (Similar manipulation with the 
transition equation will later yield the non-existence result). Bewley's next step is 
to examine values of variables in the economy in a situation where the value of A is 
sufficiently close to A, specifically he selects a state and time period for consumer 
I (w. l. g) such that All < A(I + E), where f: >0 and has a meaning that will become 
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clear later. Given this he demonstrates that if r is sufficiently high then Ait will 
stay close toA for a number of periods sufficient to yield money balances that fall 
below M, contradicting the conditions for existence. More specifically, he shows 
that there exists an c and an r such that Ait :! ý (1 + 6)A if l< t< 41. Note that in 
this case 6 does not denote the time preference factor. The integer 41 is a partly 
arbitrary choice by Bewley which is a length of time sufficient to prove the result 
in his model. Putting together (Bewley 4.2) and (Bewley 4.9) yields; 
+rtIt12 A(i + Ali 1-1 
) ((2 Alt + (i - 
(I)t )A) 
The right hand part of the above expression comes from the fact that all 
the other possible values of Alt other than the 'general' one chosen are >A by 
definition. Clearly upon rearranging the above equation (4.10 in Bewley), if c is 
sufficiently small, r sufficiently high and t sufficiently small then we can establish 
that Ait :! ý (1 + 6)A, for any 6 >0. Bewley then uses this result to derive a lower 
bound on the level of nominal expenditure as a function of A The bound is given 
by Bewley's equation (4.11); 
ptxlt > 3(8A)-l for t=1....... 41 (13) 
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All Bewley's 'preliminary' calculations for the proof of his result are therefore 
complete and he uses the consumer's intertemporal budget constraint combined 
with these calculations to do so. In deriving the result Bewley assumes r >-L; 20 
such a simplification is permissible for the style of his proof using a munerical 
example. 
If we assume that consumer 2, according to his no bankruptcy condition, has 
money balance at least equal to M= ý' - (8rA)-l, then we have that (normalising 
the period date to one); 
mil :ý1+ (8rA)-l 2 
Using this inequality and substituting the upper bound on pw and the lower 
bound on px (the crucial inequality that arises from the sufficiently high interest 
rate) into the budget constraint or transition equation (6) allows Bewley by to 
demonstrate by induction the effects of a run of bad luck of 40 periods low income 
on the money balances of consumer 1. By continued recursion on the transition 
equation; 
1 
(8rA)-l - 40(Q-1 2 
(8rA)-l (16) 
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As Bewley states, the second inequality follows if r> r>-! -. If we follow 20 
Bewley's proof through then we can see the contribution of a high r is two-fold; 
in creating a large tax demand, and in providing a lower bound in the proof for 
pxlt - 
2.2. Valuing Fiat Money with Idiosyncratic Production Risk. 
I now exposit an original model which establishes two major propositions. 
From the literature survey on the valuation of money in general equilibrium 
models we have identified a gap exists in the current body of research in this area 
and also in the examination of the optimum quantity of money under conditions 
of idiosyncratic risky production. This second half of the chapter fills a gap in 
the general equilibrium monetary models literature by showing that money can 
be valued by contemporaneously and infinitely lived agents as insurance against 
idiosyncratic production uncertainty, hence putting Tobin's (1958) liquidity pref- 
erence demand for money into a general equilibritun setting. The importance 
of money as a safe portfolio asset is well known in 'Keynesian' circles, and was 
expounded upon at the end of the literature survey. Common usage of money 
among agents is important here in yielding a constant price level with idiosyn- 
cratic shocks and the safety of money. In the conclusion to the thesis I make 
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conjectures about the possibility of constructing a model where money remains a 
safe asset in the face of aggregate fluctuations. 
For comparison we may view the paper as endogenising output in the class 
of pure exchange models of Bewley(1980,1983) and Levine (1989) that we have 
discussed in this chapter already (hence making the field more general equilib- 
rium based) and contrasting with representative agent money and capital models 
such as DenHaan (1990) and Danthine, Donaldson and Smith (1987), where there 
is aggregate uncertainty but putting real balances in the utility function is the 
source of money's value. We might also wish to contrast the result here with the 
proof of Kitigaiva (1994) for the overlapping generations model with risky capital. 
It is interesting to note that KitigaNva's model has idiosyncratic production uncer- 
tainty, but all the mathematics of his model would be unchanged with aggregate 
uncertainty, since the realisation of the output process only affects ex-post utility, 
not the actions of the old. 
In the absence of inside assets I show that a non interventionist (zero interest 
rate) monetary equilibrium can exist if agents are sufficiently patient. Though 
similar to the conclusions derived by Bewley and Levine, the role of the rate of 
time preference is more complicated in my model. The rate of time preference, for 
the simple log case examined, is the sole determinant of the rate of saving. A finite 
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rate of time preference will suffice to give positive savings of some sort, which will 
include some money if the return on money is high enough, given the variance 
of the production process. However since capital accumulation and hence output 
and inflation are endogenous in my economy, the rate of time preference has an 
extra role to play by endogenously determining inflation, given a constant nominal 
money stock. I also show that no non - interventionist monetary equilibrium can 
be Pareto optimal. This lends some support to the claim of Hahn (1973) that 
the conditions necessary for the existence of valued fiat money will be such as to 
make the monetary equilibrium inefficient. The next chapter tries to counter this 
claim however. 
In essence money is valued in the model as it is passed about amongst existing 
agents, travelling between those experiencing good shocks and bad shocks, much 
as in the Townsend and Bewley models. Again the lack of aggregate uncertainty 
is crucial. 
An interesting result comes about when we look at the issue of the optimum 
quantity of money as addressed by Bewley. 1 show that if we attempt to pay 
a positive rate of interest on money, no equilibrium with circulating fiat money 
will exist tinder the necessary himp, sum taxation regime. This mimics a problem 
discovered by Bewley (1983). However, the cause of the problem uncovered in 
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the model below is different to that of Bewley's, since the holding of money for 
payment of taxes is here a matter of choice rather than necessity to meet his 
solvency constraint with probability one. No strictly solvent consumer is ever 
implicitly forced to hold money balances equal to the per capita money supply to 
pay his tax bill, yet the agents in this model still choose to do so. The difficulty is 
shown to be endemic to the type of money demand that arises in the model. I prove 
that the result is essentially different to Bewley's by the following argument. One 
would conjecture that if an alternative store of value existed such that agents had 
no need to hold money equal to the per capita money supply to ensure solvency 
with probability one then equilibria with a positive rate of interest on money could 
exist. I show that indeed no such Bewley style tax demand is present and yet if 
we concentrate attention upon equilibria in which all agents hold strictly positive 
precautionary balances at all times then no such monetary equilibrium can exist 
with a strictly positive rate of interest on money. I then make some conjectures 
about cases in which the problem I have highlighted may be mitigated to allow 
monetary equilibria with circulating fiat money and a positive rate of return on 
money to exist. 
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2.2.1. The Model 
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived consumer/producer 
agents, indexed; 
iE [0, l] 
who engage in the production of the economy's single homogenous consump- 
.I 
tion/production good. Each agent has an identical linear stochastic production 
function to which capital is the only input. Production takes place according to 
the geometric Brownian motion process; 
yit = kitrdt + kitudzit (1) 
Where yit is the flow of output per unit time at time t, kit is the capital stock 
held by individual i at time t, r is the average marginal product of capital per 
unit time which is constant across individuals and time. I assume; 
-00 <r< 00 (la) 
89 
c' is the variance of the marginal product of capital per unit time. I assume; 
< 00 (ib) 
dzit is a Wiener process. These shocks to productivity are Li. d. across agents. 
We can invoke a strong law of large numbers argument to yield a deterministic 
.I 
price level. 
Agents derive iltility from consumption as follows; 
Vit = Eit 
or 
e-Ps ln(cit+s)ds 
Where cit is the rate of consumption per unit time at time t by agent i, and p, 
the rate of time preference, is the same for all agents. The unique ex-ante first best 
Pareto optimal allocation that assigns equal welfare weights to all agents is one 
of zero variance in the consumption stream of each individual, which depletes the 
capital stock at the instantaneous proportionate rate of p per unit time period. 
This result can simply be derived by maximising (2) subject to (1) with a set 
equal to zero (see chapter 3 for a full derivation). The setting of o- equal to zero 
arises from the lack of per capita aggregate uncertainty facing an omnipotent 
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social planner. See Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985) for discussion of 
the technicalities of this. 
In the absence of any financial assets, inside or outside, the barter equilibrium 
will be autarchic. Each individual will consume from his own capital stock and 
the continuum of individuals allows no opportunity for reducing the variance of 
consumption streams below their physical fundamental I- evel. 
Each agent will maximise (2) subject to (1). The proof of the validity of the 
consumption policy below can be inferred from the analysis that follows for the 
monetary economy, but standard results yield; 
cit = pkit (2a) 
dkit = k-it ((r - p) dt + udzit) (2b) 
Averaging (2b) across all agents yields; 
dk--t = T-t (r - p) dt (2c) 
To consider the question of existence of monetarY equilibrium each agent is 
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lowed with an equal amount, M of fiat money at time zero. (A bar above a 
ter will denote a per-capita average). I assume the existence of a spot market 
each date tE [O, oo) on which money can be traded against the real good whose 
oney price at time t is pt. Agent i's real Nvealth at time t is; 
wit = mit + kit (2d) 
denotes -A-f-L, real money holdings and kit capital holdings at time t, wit evolves Pt 
.r time according to the stochastic differential equation; 
dwit = kit (rdt + udzit) + mit (x - 7r) dt - eit dt -T dt (3) Pt 
x is the rate of interest on money per unit time, financed by a himp surn tax 
the rate of T units of money per unit time interval. This rate is constant across 
dpt 
ie and agents. 7r is 11 the rate of inflation at time t. Attention is restricted to Pt 
istant 7r, without prejudicing the analysis. 
There are the additional constraint on agents of; 
mit >- 0 (3a) 
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wit (3b) 
Maximising(2) subject to(3), (3a) and (3b) is a standard problem of the form 
studied by Merton (1971). The optimal policies are; 
Cit ýp it -] 
1W 
ptx 
(4) 
TT 
mit a) [wit _ ptx 
+ 
ptx 
Where a is the proportion of the net present value of wealth held in capital 
and is given by; 
r+7r -x 
a=u2 (6) 
I will now show the derivation of Merton's solutions since the detail does not 
appear in the literature. Although solving the problem with the constraints 3a 
and 3b explicitly considered I deliberately ornit them and then subsequently show 
this procedure is valid, for purposes which will become apparent later. I shall 
set the problem up in a general form to begin with and then specialise to the 
logarithmic utility function. 
We begin by defining V* the maximum value function (dropping the i subscript 
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without loss of clarity) as; 
(wt,,, to) = max E (to) e-Psu (c, ) ds + V* (wt, t)] (6a) C"as 
Where c,, and a, are the rate of consumption and portfolio share of capital at 
time s. 
Application of the Dynkin differential operator yields the Bellman-Dreyfus 
fundamental equation of optimality; 
I a2V* vv*t 
0= max e-ptu (ct) +0t+at Qat (r + 7r - x) - 7r+x]wt - T- ct) + at awt u2a2w2 
-5-ZV-2 tt 2t 
(6b) 
Since the consumers have an infinite time horizon, and the underlying stochas- 
tic process is stationary we can remove unnecessary time subscripts and also an- 
ticipate stationary policies (the validity will be seen later). We define; 
J(wt) = eptv* (wt) (6c) 
If we evaluate O-Vý- according to this new definition, and then multiply through by at 
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ePI we have (now letting dashes denote partial derivatives); 
0= max 
(u (ct) - pJ (wt) + J'(wt) [(ce [r + 7r - x] - ir + x) wt - ct - T] +1 
jl, (Wt ) Or2a2W2 
ct, a t) 
(6d) 
We now solve for the optimum policies in 2 stages, in a manner that will be seen 
not to prejudice the final outcome. A portion of Nvealth is set aside into money, 
equal to the present value of the tax bill, discounted by the rate of return on 
money. The rest of the wealth is divided between money and capital, and then 
consumption proceeds on the basis of the net wealth stock with the tax 'already 
taken care of'. Define; 
IT wt =wt -- (6e) ptx 
The optimisation problem then becomes; 
max 
(u (ct) - pJ (w') +X (w') [(a (r + 7r - x) - 7r 
+ x)w' - ct] +1 
jil (W/) Or2 a2 
(W/)2 
ct'a ttt2tt) 
(6f) 
First order conditions in ct and a are then; 
U, (ct) - J, (W') (6g) t 
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_ X) Wiji 
(Wt) + jit (Wi) Ce (Wt)2 or2 0 == (r +ztttt (6h) 
Adding the transversality condition then completes the sufficient conditions for 
optimality; 
ptj I) lim E (c- (w, 0 (6i) 
týoo 
This general case above can then be specialised to our case of log utility and solved 
for optimal consumption and portfolio policies if we make a guess for J(wt) of; 
In (w') 
+Bt (6j) 
Substituting into the first order conditions above, we can obtain solutions for ct 
in terms of wt and B, and a in terms of r, 7r, x and o, ' (independent of B and A). 
Substituting these into the Bellman-Dreyffis Equation yields values for A and B 
which confirm that the value function is correct, and gives us the final form of the 
policies 
We should note at this point that tinder the optimum policies, the constraint 
wt >0 does not bind. The constraint Mt >0 will be shown not to bite under the 
conditions we derive below, for the type of equilibrium we define. 
How do we know that the non negativity constraint on wealth will not bite? 
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Shimko(1993, plO) and Merton(1990, p. 546) show that a Geometric Brownian 
Motion process 0, say, hits the zero barrier with probability zero. By looking at 
the optimal policies derived above we can see that since the consumer sets aside 
-I- of his wealth and then consumes at a rate give n by a constant (defined in (4)) ptx 
proportion of the remainder (Nv), then if ive look at (3) Nve can see that his net 
wealth w' will follow a geometric Brownian motion proqess. Hence w' is strictly 
greater than zero with probability one forever. An important part of this which 
we will use later is that no upper bound on a has been used in this argument; it 
may be above unity if desired. 
As in Bewley's model the government uses the proceeds of taxation to pay 
interest on money, in such a way to leave the total money stock unchanged; 
T=xR 
2.2.2. Monetary Equilibrium. 
A monetary equilibrimn is a set of goods prices; pt, te [0, oo) such that; 
(A) The price of money is strictly positive at all points in time; 
1>0, 
vt G [0, oo) Pt 
(7) 
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(B) agents maximise(2) subject to (3), (3a) and (3b), given the set of spot market 
prices defined above 
(C) (Social feasibility) Each of the spot markets clears such that; 
- Mit Oit =23 vt c [0, oo) 
10 
Pt Pt 
Where Oit is the density ftinction for agent i's money holdings at time t condi- 
tional on time zero information (since the strong law of large numbers allows us to 
say that with probability one the mean of the distribution of real money balances 
across individuals will be equal to the mean of the individual distribution condi- 
tional on time zero information). A non-interventionist monetary eqailibrium is 
one that satisfies the above conditions phis the additional requirement that the 
rate of interest on money is zero. 
Proposition (1). A non - interventionist monetary equilibrium exists if; 
-ý, fp- <a 
Proof. 
(8a) 
For the typical agent iI propose a path of money holdings, capital holdings 
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and consumption and show it satisfies the conditions for a monetary equilibrium 
defined above; 
(a)Individual capital holdings are described by the stochastic differential equa- 
tion; 
dkit = hit (r - ufi-) dt + k-itlp- dzit (9) 
The aggregate capital stock is described almost surelý by the differential equa- 
tion 
dkt = h-t(r - u-ýfp-)dt 
(note the absence of aggregate uncertainty). 
(b) Consumption as a ffinction of the individual's capital holdings is given by; 
cit = oVp- k-it (11) 
(c) Money holdings as a function of the individual's capital holdings are given 
by; 
or 
mit =( 
%fp- 
- 1)kit (12) 
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(d) I propose a path of prices given by; 
-7r = uvfp- - r, po =- ko 
It is simple to show that (a)-(d) describes an equilibrium as defined, and the proof 
is as follows; 
With T and x set equal to zero, (4) gives: 
cit =p [kit + mit] (13a) 
(5) gives: 
Mit 
r+ 7r 
-it + mit) (13b) u2 
) 
(k 
From (13) substituting 7r = u-ý, fp- -r into (12) and rearranging yields 
kit + mit = 
ukit (13c) 
vfp- 
substituting this into (13a) yields 
cit = ovlp-kit (13d) 
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hence (11) is confirmed. Rearranging (13c) also confirms (12). 
Since we have; 
kit == awit (13e) 
then we also have 
dkit = adwit (13f) 
Substitution of (3) into (13f) and further simplification using (13d) and (11) con- 
firms (9) as the equation describing the path of individual capital holdings. Given 
this, averaging over all agents yields (10) as the equation for the path of the per 
capita capital stock. 
To confirm social feasibility we firstly show that given a level of the per capita 
capital stock Kt at time t, the money market clears, then that the proposed path 
of prices is compatible with money market equilibrium at all points in time given 
the path of the per capita capital stock determined in (10) by equilibrium con- 
sumption. 
Step I 
Given Kt and the proposed inflation rate average money demand is (from 12 ); 
1 (13g) 
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We have proposed a price level formula of; 
(1311) 
kt 
and lience per capita real money supply is; 
or 1) VT 
Hence given Kt money market equilibrium holds at time t. 
Step 2 
Examining (13i), since the per capita nominal money stock is constant, we 
require that if the price path in (13) is to be compatible with equilibrium, then it 
must be that; 
k- 
=r- UvIp- k (13j) 
Miming to equation (10) we can see that this is the case for the proposed 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 2: No non interventionist monetary equilibrium can be Pareto 
optimal 
Proof. 
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NVe have noted that a necessary condition for ex-ante Pareto optimality is that 
the individual consumption stream must have zero variance. Rom equations (9) 
and (3) we can see that such an allocation is possible either if kt=O for all agents 
wWch is clearly not an equilibrium given our parameter restrictions (a finite rate 
of time preference), or if pt = 0, for all t. In this latter case, an agent's real wealth 
will be insensitive to realisations; of his production proqess. This is just another 
way to say that the optimum quantity of money is infinite. As Brock (1975) and 
Bewley found, such an equilibrium will be infeasible, since the budget set will be 
unbounded. An obvious corollary is that non - interventionist monetary equilibria 
are Pareto inefficient. 
m 
Comparison of the barter equilibrium and the non-interventionist monetary 
equilibrium reveals that the path of individual and average consumption and 
capital stocks respectively differ across regimes. Comparison of (2a) and (11) 
shows that the rate of consumption is higher in the monetary economy than in 
the barter economy. Comparison of (2b) and (9) shows that as a result individual 
capital is eroded on average more quickly in the monetary economy and the same 
result holds for the aggregate capital stock as comparison of (2c) and (10) will 
show. The reason for the differing rates of consumption across the regimes is the 
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role of money as a buffer stock in reducing the variance of the consumption stream 
(compare (2b) and (9)) and changing the precautionary incentive for saving. 
2.2.3. A New Type of Equilibrium 
An equilibrium with circulating fiat money is an equilibrium as defined in section 
2.2.2 with the additional qualification. that the parameter a, as defined in (6) is 
i 
strictly less than one. 
The economic interpretation of this is that agents hold money to guard against 
fluctuations caused by output shocks and not just to pay taxes. This money held 
for precautionary purposes changes hands between agents in equilibrium. The 
equilibrium described above in the proof of proposition (1) is of this kind. How- 
ever, with a tax level of zero in that case, the 'circulating' caveat was unnecessary 
Proposition (3.1) 
If o, < Vp- no non-interventionist monetary equilibrium exists. 
Proof. This is a direct corollary of proposition one. 
m 
Proposition (3.2) 
If o, < ,, 
fp- a monetary equilibrium exists at a critical positive rate of interest 
but at no other interest rate. The allocation in the equilibrium is the same as 
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the barter equilibrium. The monetary equilibrium is not a circulating monetary 
equilibrium. 
Proof. We must locate a unique value of x (as a function of p and or) so that the 
conditions for a monetary equilibrium, previously given in (A), (B) and (C) are 
satisfied. The method is to apply the conditions for equilibrium to find the value 
of x that will be consistent with equilibrium. 
Rom (8), the social feasibility condition for money, (5), the equation for money 
demand and (7) the government budget constraint, ive must have that; 
kitoit +m=m (13k) 
AA 
Note that this holds since a corollary of proposition (3.1) is that a positive rate 
of interest on money must be paid for monetary equilibrium to exist. 
Given (13k) a requirement is then that a=1. Adapting a per capita aggregate 
version of (13b) to the case of a positive rate of interest on money yields; 
r+7r-x), 
U2 
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Totally differentiating Nvith respect to time and dividing through by (131)yields; 
r+7F (13m) 
The right hand side of (13m) is derived from a per capita average version of 
(4) 
Substitution of (13m) into (6) yields an expression for the equilibrium a; 
OZ px (13n) 
(_T 
2 
The only value of x consistent with monetary equilibrium is then; 
2 (13o) 
That money does not circulate in this equilibrium can be seen from (5). Individu- 
als money demand will be the same independent of their wealth level when a=1. 
To see that consequently the allocation and consumption is the same as in the 
antarchic equilibrium, Nve can note that essentially individuals consume only from 
their capital stock and hold money to pay taxes. That the rate of consumption 
expressed as a function of the individual's capital stock will be the same as in the 
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autarchic equilibrium can be seen from (4) if (2a) and (7) are substituted in. 
0 
Proposition (3.3) 
If o, > ,, fp- no monetary equilibrium with x >0 exists . 
Proof. It will be sufficient to note that from (5), the requirement of a 
1, along with the government budget constraint meansthat money demand will 
exceed supply and no such equilibrium will exist. 
Substituting (7) into (5) and averaging (5) over all consumers, per capita 
money demand at time t is; 
-MMM (1-a)[k+---]+-- (14) 
Pt Pt Pt 
Since kt >0 is an implicit requirement of a monetary equilibrium (recall that 
the price of money must be positive) we have that per capita money demand 
exceeds per capita money supply almost surely; 
ag +R>R 
AA 
m 
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Recall that Bewley (1983) showed that in a model of infinitely lived agents 
with enclowment risk such that the probability of an arbitrarily long run of zero 
income is positive, no equilibrium with a strictly positive interest rate on money 
exists. If for instance the taxes are levied symmetrically across agents then each 
agent must hold per capita balances equal to the per capita money stock if he is 
to stay solvent with probability one. A desire to hold precautionary balances in 
addition to this means that money demand will exceed money supply. 
The problem of non - existence sketched in our model above echoes this. HoNv- 
ever, the tax component of money demand, namely appears in the "; Pt Pt 
solution to the consumer problem without the need to invoke the constraint of 
solvency as we noted. This motivated the method of derivation that omitted the 
solvency constraint. The source of the non - existence problem in my model is 
endemic to its nature and how money is valued in the model. The positive com- 
ponent of each agent's wealth (initial productive capital and money holdings) is 
totally capitalised. In planning to meet the tax liability he faces, (and as long as 
a< 1) a solvent agent optimally chooses to set aside a portion of his capitalised 
wealth in a safe asset equal to the present value of the tax liability. Referring back 
to equation (3) we see that such a policy is motivated by a desire to 'repair the 
damage' to the deterministic drift component of his wealth process that the tax 
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causes. In the model above money is the only safe asset and hence this is where 
the burden of meeting the tax payment falls, as motivated by individual's pref- 
erences. In a Sidrauski type model (see e. g. Cohen (1985)) wealth is capitalised 
but money is dominated in rate of return with probability one, and hence such a 
tax demand does not occur. In a pure exchange model such as Bewley's in cases 
where a positive interest equilibrium does exist, namely, where rainimum income 
is strictly positive the non capitalisation of wealth stops the problem highlighted 
in this paper occurring. 
We can remind ourselves that the source of the result in this model is different 
to that of Bewley's if we consider a perfectly general one period utility maximi- 
sation problem, separated out from the consumption decision (as is valid in the 
model above, since utility is time separable). Assume a consumer has wealth W, 
a differentiable utility function U and faces a tax t after returns are realised, and 
can invest in either a safe asset with return r or a risky asset (no further restric- 
tions). Under such general terms, it can be easily shown that the optimiun policy 
can be solved in 2 stages. The consumer first sets aside; 
t 
+ 
(16) 
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in the safe asset and then solves the problem of allocating; 
IV/=W- t 
I+r 
between the safe and risky assets. This is the intuition that underlies the portfolio 
rule of Merton and that of Hakannson (1971) for the discrete time case, and hence 
.I 
for my result above. I have clearly restricted the scope of analysis so far in the 
sense of saying that solutions to the second stage of the problem with none of 
the safe asset are uninteresting. The motivation for that statement is a desire to 
look at equilibria where money performs a Pareto improving role. In the model I 
derived where all agents are identical we can envisage a case where the parameters 
are such that no non-interventionist monetary equilibrium exists. If a sufficiently 
small rate of interest is paid on money, then still no monetary equilibrium will 
exist. However, if the rate of interest on money reaches some critical point, where 
we obtain a parameter a=l then a monetary equilibrium exists where money is 
held only to pay taxes. Beyond that value of oz, of course no monetary equilibrium 
will exist. 
We can further cement the notion that the problem derived in the model above 
is different to the Bewley problem by showing the Bewley problem is not in fact 
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present in the model. If we return to the discussion of why individual's net wealth 
is strictly greater than zero at all points in time, we noted that there was no need 
to have a<1 to ensure solvency, so an agent can hold balances such that; 
Mt < M, for all t 
and yet stay solvent with probability one. The intuition is that if the agent suffers 
a rim of bad hick then the negative shocks to wealth will become progressively 
smaller, which can be seen from the very essence of the geometric stochastic 
process that governs wealth. 
2.2.4. Discussion and Conclusions. 
What would happen if we extended the model by adding some kind of heterogene- 
ity to the set of agents? I think it is fair to say that ive could potentially cover 
the major factors of interest by increasing the 'ex-post heterogeneity' of agents in 
the form of non constant relative risk aversion, so that agents with differing shock 
histories and hence wealth levels would have demands for money as a proportion 
of wealth that were now a function of wealth. From our analysis so far it should be 
fairly clear that we cannot have a monetary equilibrium with interest on money 
ill 
in which all agents hold a positive quantity of precautionary money balances at 
all times, whatever utility function generated the results. However the kind of 
economy we have just tried to imagine might be such as to allow a monetary 
equilibrium in wlidch money circulates in the economy so that at any point in 
time some agents are holding a positive precautionary component and lience also 
a positive tax component whilst others allow their money balances to fall below 
the tax bill level. Stich cases would be somewhat analogous to choices in our 
model where a>I is the portfolio choice. Hence in the kind of model I have only 
conjectured, that of non constant relative risk aversion utility functions, we can 
hence conjecture that a monetary equilibrium with taxation and interest might 
then exist with money truly circulating, though clearly an upper bound would 
exist on the rate of interest, as money became more attractive. It would certainly 
be an interesting exercise to try to obtain such results for a capital economy, since 
they would re-enforce the point that capital can serve as an alternative value store 
to money and in some circumstances allow an equilibrium with interest on money. 
Quite reasonably I suggested that the result I obtained for the non existence 
of a circulating fiat money equilibrium with taxation where all agents hold pos- 
itive balances at all times would be quite general. I also showed as part of the 
existence proof in the model that without taxation, a monetary equilibrium would 
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exist where all agents do hold positive balances at all times. I feel we can make 
some interesting comparisons with the Bewley model on these points. Firstly, if 
we look at the equation in Bewley's 1983 paper which is reproduced as equation 
(9) in this chapter we see that no monetary equilibrium can exist where the liq- 
ilidity constraint never binds, if the rate of interest is strictly less than the rate of 
time preference; average marginal utility of money would increase without boimd 
through time which is ruled out in Bewley's model. Liquidity constraints not bind- 
ing is of course a necessary condition for holding strictly positive balances at all 
times. The difference between the results for existence of such equilibria between 
my work and Bewley's is the fact that all wealth is capitalised in my model, (i. e. 
rising marginal utility through time with a with low r is hence possible). However, 
when we come to the respective results on non existence under taxation, we can 
make a conjecture about imposing a result of my model onto the framework of 
a non-capitalised wealth model such as Bewley's. Imagine a situation where the 
minimum income in each period was strictly positive, at y say. Would it be true 
to say that a monetary equilibrium can then exist with interest and taxation as 
long as the Bewley problem does not come into play? I suggest that if we hypoth- 
esised a utility ftinction of the form ln(c-x) where O<x<y, then we can envisage an 
economy where non-interventionist monetary equilibria may exist (i. e. Bewley's 
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corner solutions are permissible), but attempts to tax and pay interest don't lead 
to the Bewley difficulty if the tax is small enough but they do prevent existence if 
the period tax demand is >x. Foley and Hellwig (1975) showed that if consumers 
have an infinite marginal utility of income at the minimum possible income then 
they will arrange their assets such that the liquidity constraint never binds. In 
this case that means holding money at least equal to thq per capita money stock 
as soon as the tax demand hits x. We can hence suggest a kind of "preference 
endogenised" Bewley problem. This is clearly similar to the kind of result I have 
suggested above in the model of this chapter, though we should note whilst infi- 
nite marginal utility at minimum wealth is sufficient to generate the result of my 
capital model it is in principle not necessary. All we require is that the agents 
choose a strictly positive proportion of wealth in money in their portfolios at all 
points in time. 
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Chapter 3 
The Optimum Quantity of Money with 
Imperfect Information 
3. The Optimum Quantity of Money with Imperfect Infor- 
mation. 
In the work contained in this chapter I shed new light on the optimum quantity of 
.I 
money proposal viewed in an environment where information availability is con- 
sidered. I show that a scheme of using the proceeds of taxation to retire nominal 
money balances and raise the value of money is less informationally demanding 
than a scheme of paying out the proceeds of taxation in the form of insurance and 
also less demanding than paying interest directly on money balances .I 
base this 
on the notion that verification of a transfer can only be carried out costlessly by 
the receiver of the transfer, and raising the value of money avoids such problems 
since fiat money has essential properties of common usage, anonymity and homo- 
geneity; an informational advantage is hence demonstrated. I apply this to refute 
a conjecture about the optimum quantity of money made by Hellwig(1982) and 
Woodford (1990). 
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3.1. Introduction. 
Hellwig (1982) and Woodford (1990) conjecture that in a pure exchange model 
of the type of Bewley (1980,1983) if taxes could be correlated with endowment 
realisations so as to avoid the Bewley difficulty then money would be inessential in 
the sense of Hahn (1973). In other words no economy with idiosyncratic income 
risk could be made arbitrarily close to Pareto optimaliiy if money is to be an 
essential part of the economy. Or expressed in a further different way, the authors 
claim that the information required to achieve the perfect correlation of the taxes 
with the endowment stream would. be such as to allow the replacement of money by 
a complete set of markets (recall the issue of the inefficiency of the non monetary 
equilibrium and the existence of a monetary equilibrium) . Below I address this 
notion in the context of the model I developed in chapter 2.1 hence test to see 
if such a notion is valid in a stochastic production economy rather than the pure 
exchange models of Bewley et al, but the analysis will be seen to be equally valid 
for an endowment model. I find that I am able to construct an environment where 
the information required to apply the deflationary policy in a style that avoids 
the problem I uncovered in chapter 2 is not sufficient to yield full. insurance that 
would drive money's value to zero. 
ln the envirom-nent I describe information is 'manipulable' by the agents, but 
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taxes are used which in effect lead to sufficient revelation of information (although 
some redistribution schemes will not). The taxes the government uses, though non 
himp sum in nature, do not cause any distortion when the effects of the high real 
balances generated is taken into account, hence avoiding problems pointed out by 
Phelps(1973) who noted that the gains from a Friedman style policy may have to 
be weighed against distortions created if non himp sum taxes are used to finance 
the deflation or interest payment on money. 
I shall later conjecture about the operation of the optimum quantity of money 
proposal in a framework when the information about an individual's income real- 
isation is public knowledge and not manipulable, so that taxes may be lump sum 
in nature and state dependent. 1 conjecture that if ive separate out the issue of 
the observation of the exogenous state of nature from verification of whether a 
payment has been received then the result will also be a refutation of the Hellwig- 
Woodford conjecture. This also has implications for whether it is easier to imple- 
ment the Friedman proposal by paying interest on money or by using the proceeds 
of taxation to deflate the price level over time. 
I find some interesting differences between a scheme of taxation and a scheme 
of insurance when record keeping is costly, that favours fiat money and changes 
in its value as a way of paying out insurance, due to its essentially anonymous 
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nature and common usage. This will show the benefits of raising the value of fiat 
money as a method of making insurance payouts from an angle not yet covered 
in the literature. The method of analysis used in the argument is informal but 
adequate to tell the required story. The original conjecture of Woodford and 
Hellwig related to the endowment stream models of Bewley et al, but I have 
taken the liberty of superimposing their conjecture onto, my model of chapter 2. 
I feel this is justified especially since the essence of the residts presented below is 
not connected to any difference between pure exchange and production models; 
the comments made about information and detectability can easily carry over to 
the endowment model and the issue of the attainability of an allocation arbitrarily 
close to a Pareto optimal one is essentially contained in the discussion of Bewley's 
1980 paper, since that paper ignores the tax problem. 
I will suggest an information structure such that the consumption purchases 
of agents are observable and hence the government can apply a consumption tax 
sufficient to raise the resources to achieve an allocation sufficiently close to Pareto 
optimality. I also investigate the possibility that an incentive compatible redistri- 
bution scheme could carry out such a job. I find there would be problems with 
such a scheme and hence we can stake a case for money's positive vahle consistent 
with an allocation arbitrarily close to Pareto optimality, since no incentive com- 
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patible redistribution scheme exists. As I have said the argument used to back 
up such a suggestion contains no formal analysis of the incentives involved simply 
because of the limited scope of the thesis, but the argument given is sufficient 
to rule out a scheme of perfect insurance that would eliminate money's value. 
What would be interesting for filture research is an analysis of such an economy 
where the information structure allowed some mixture of insurance, inside money, 
outside money and non lump sum tax policies. 
3.2. The Economy. 
The basic mathematical structure of the model is the same as that exposited 
in chapter 2; namely a continuum of ex-ante identical consumer/ producers en- 
gaging in the production and consumption of the economy's single homogenous 
consumption/investment good, according to the geometric Brownian motion pro- 
cess of equation (1) of chapter 2. This time we will expand the set of possible 
economies by considering general isoelastic utility, not just the logarithmic form. 
This appears here for the sake of generality but does not add anything essen- 
tial to the results. The essential changes I make concern the specification of an 
information structure and an analysis of its implications. 
The structure of the economy that I assume can be described by the following 
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story. If the economy is such that assets other than capital are available then any 
portfolio adjustment between assets that is desired can be carried out on the spot 
market open at that date. If agents wish to consume however, they must obtain 
the good in a consumable form which is different to its basic capital form. They 
can only obtain the good in a consumable form from the government who acts as 
a kind of giant producer/shopkeeper. The government takes in the good from the 
agents in its capital form and processes it into its consumable form using a 1: 1 
production function. In an economy with assets other than capital, where agents 
can purchase consumption with assets other than 'raNv' capital, the feasibility of 
the production process is ensured by the ability of the government to trade on 
the spot market for money and capital. 
The information structure I assume is that the government as shopkeeper is 
able to observe the consumption of agents but not establish their identity in any 
effective sense, so that their intrinsic need as determined by the state of nature 
and any transfers they have received in the past remain hidden; i. e. the true state 
of nature as it pertains to the individual remains hidden. In other words there 
is a lack of centralised record keeping in the form of a name together with detail 
of the amount, of their transaction. Each time an agent visits the 'shop' lie is 
effectively a stranger. 
ft 
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The key factor that I have assumed is costly effective observation and storage 
of information in common with Levine (1991). Levine's model is made up of two 
types of agents -who experience random taste shocks such that in any one period 
one has a high consumption need and one a low consumption need. These taste 
shocks are private information and any redistribution scheme must cope with this 
fact. Levine shows that if the observation and storage of information in a simple 
pure exchange economy is prohibitively costly, then the use of money is motivated 
as a decentralised record keeping device ( in the spirit of Ostroy (1973)). The same 
result occurs in my model. This can be interpreted as an (extremely) imperfect 
financial system. Tailb(1994) examines the workings of money and credit as re- 
placements for an absent insurance mechanism. He derives the equivalence of 
money and credit as record keeping devices and enforcers of budget constraints, 
which enable some insurance to take place in the sense that individuals who hold 
finite credit or cash balances will optimally allocate them to times of greatest need. 
He makes no distinction between centralised and decentralised record keeping, in 
contrast to Levine and myself and consequently derives equivalence of credit and 
currency mechanisms. 
In deciding upon his rate of consumption the agent chooses two things, his rate 
of consumption purchases per trip to the shop(to obtain the consumable form of 
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the good with his wealth) and secondly his rate of trips to the shops. In a discrete 
time model his choice variables would be the munber of trips to the shops in any 
given period and his consumption purchases in any given trip. The key distinction 
between trips to the shops and what they do at each trip will soon become clear. 
We shall now examine possible redistribution schemes and see if the informa- 
tion structure we have suggested will permit them. First of all imagine that the 
government tries to implement an insurance scheme where it looks at the instan- 
taneous consumption rate of each agent as it comes to the shop(which is all it 
can detect) and adjusts it via a transfer so that it is at the per capita average 
consumption level (which the government hopes will also be at an optimal level). 
Since a consumption rate at the government's naive target level is guaranteed for 
each agent, is it the case that the agents have no incentive to cheat under such 
a scheme? The answer is no. Under this scheme simple underconsumption now 
at any given rate of trips to the shops in a given time period (to gain a positive 
transfer above that which the agent's production outcome fairly merits) means 
that any benefits now will simply be dissipated later since consumption of Zý t the 
per capita average at that time point is always guaranteed, i. e. the excess will be 
taken away from him when he attempts to spend his gains. However the agent 
can gain unfair insurance payouts by increasing his rate of trips to the shops and 
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making a low (pre-adjustment) consumption claim each time. In fact the optimal 
policy will be a rate of visits as fast as he can manage with zero imadjusted con- 
sumption each time, to maximise his insurance payouts. The key factor is that the 
identity of agents and their payouts cannot be effectively recorded by the govern- 
ment, each new shopping trip may as well be by a different person. This describes 
problems with a system that aimed for full insurance, and is clearly sufficient to 
eliminate the first best redistribution scheme that would drive money's value to 
zero. A second best system would have to address the difficulty of the frequent 
trips factor. Compensating individuals for a proportion of their loss (i. e. a low 
coinsurance rate) would clearly provide no solution. Consumers would simply col- 
lect a smaller payout each time but the same incentive as before; a high frequency 
of trips with zero consumption each time would still be the optimal policy. The 
government may well have to resort to a system where only consumers consuming 
above a certain threshold level are compensated. The second best nature of the 
arrangement is hence illustrated and so we have cleared the way for money to be 
valued in equilibrium, since some variance in the consumption stream would have 
to be retained. The analysis remains partly suggestive however since I proceed 
under the assumption that no insurance at all is provided, and the government 
instead relies upon a monetary system of insurance. A full analysis of partial 
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insurance together with money and taxation Nvould of course be interesting. 
Since the optimurn quantity of money schemes involve taxing and redistribut- 
ing the proceeds, one might ask what would happen if the government tried such 
a scheme with this economy just containing the single physical good; i. e. a non 
monetary economy, in which all redistribution is done in terms of the physical 
good. The problem with such a scheme is in achievinga socially efficient distri- 
bution of the proceeds of the tax essential to the idea of insurance. The problem 
arises since identification of genuinely needy individuals is impossible. Those who 
turned up more often would get more shareouts and the payout would be driven 
to zero. In fact such a scheme is identical to the insurance model; attempting to 
take from the lucky and give to the unlucky, yet of course failing to do so in this 
situation. 
The problem can basically said to be occur on the paying out side rather 
than the tax side. Consumers cannot escape the tax or the component of the 
insurance scheme that is equivalent to the tax, unless they suboptimally lower 
their consumption forever. Frequent trips to the shops with lower iuladjusted 
consumption each time however means that consumers can claim more and more 
of the payout part of the insurance. What is needed is either identifying record 
keeping, which we assurne to be too costly, or a way of distributing the tax revemie 
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to the needy. Such a way is present in the presence of fiat money. When the 
government deflates the money supply with its tax revenues it raises the value 
of money in equilibrium by making its return larger and raising money demand. 
Since fiat money is essentially anonymous then the distribution of the gains will 
be towards those holding the money, whose distribution is determined by total 
consumption of each agent over time as opposed to the number of shopping trips. 
The essence of fiat money in such a decentralised. record keeping role is exactly the 
same as in the Nvork of Levine (1991), and Ostroy and Starr (1974). However, 
the 'dynamic' process of taxing individuals and changing the money 
supply as a method of paying out the proceeds as insurance is an angle 
which is new to the literature, and is the main contribution of this 
chapter. The contrast between the record keeping and paying out aspects can 
be emphasised if we look at a system of paying out the proceeds from taxation 
directly to the agents in the form of fiat money. They can spend this money 
only once as Levine (1991) points out but can claim extra payments from the 
government in this environment of imperfect information. We can hence also say 
that such a scenario favours the implementation of the Friedman proposal by 
reducing the rate of inflation rather than paying interest on the money. 
Must the money be fiat in nature? We might imagine another institution such 
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as a bank which can identify the individuals and debit an inside money account 
for them when they purchase and also the value of their balances would be raised 
by the negative seignorage. We can simply assume this is impossible however, in 
the spirit of keeping with the assumptions of my model and also with Levine's 
(1991) comments on record keeping, for instance. 
Two essential points need to be summarised from this discussion then. The 
first concerns a difference between tax and insurance which is an essential one 
if record keeping is costly. The difference arises from the fact that receipt of a 
payment under these circumstances can only be verified by the receiver. Since the 
government is benevolent this does not cause a problem with taxation. (Of course 
given the Nvay that this model is set up it is not clear that the government even 
has the ability to cheat in the collection of consumption tax revenues). But with 
state contingent payouts to agents, the self motivated agents can effectivelY claim 
to have never received payment; problems hence result. This is the essence of the 
contribution of this chapter although the way the model I propose functions leads 
to a partial merging with the notion of the concealment of the original state of 
nature 
The second major point concerns essential properties of fiat money; those of 
anonymity and common usage. Appreciation in its value can potentially benefit 
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all agents, as a method of paying out insurance, as we shall see. 
One final point we should note is that it is possible that Hellwig and Woodford 
implicitly assumed scenarios in which information was passively observed by the 
government and then used to apply state dependent himp sum taxation. The 
kind of scenario I have sketched here is with information potentially manipulable 
by agents, and the situation within the monetary economy reduces to consider- 
ation of whether the taxes used to 'track' the information were distortionary or 
not. However the kind of situation that Hellivig and Woodford seemed to imply 
deserves consideration. To make the refutation of the conjecture carry over to 
this case, we need to assume that the observation of an individual's income re- 
alisation is separate from the observation of whether they have actually received 
an insurance payout. Problems with the second stage would make the argument 
carry over. We might assume that the ceiitral authority has a finite quantity of 
resources with which to observe economic activity, and this will not stretch to the 
procurement of both pieces of information. 
Having given an argument that is sufficient to ensure we will have a Pareto 
inefficient non-monetary equilibrium, we now move to examine the operation of a 
monetary economy where no usage of imperfect insurance is made. 
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3.3. Derivation of the Agent's Consumption and Portfolio Policies with 
a Consumption Tax. 
The technology describing the agent's production opportimities, is as in equation. 
(1) of chapter 2. His objective function is now generalised to the general case of 
isoelastic utility; 
where -y <1 
It 
Now that a consumption tax is to be applied to agents -%ve must define a 
kind of 'net' consumption which will enter the utility function, rather than the 
gross consumption level which will enter the budget constraint. Net consumption, 
denoted by c* is; 
Ci*t = (i - t) cit (2) 
where t is the constant rate of taxation per unit of gross consumption, which 
is denoted by cit. 
cit and ci*, t are both measured in units of the good per unit time. 
(Hopefully the 
time subscript and the tax rate utilising the same letter will not cause confusion). 
The objective function can be written as; 
Vio = Ejo e-Pt 
c'*t 7 dt 
or y 
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Inflation is denoted by -, T (restricting attention to the steady state); 
dp 
-4-t-, and is constant over time p 
Real wealth at time t is given by; 
wit = kit + mit (5) 
a will denote the proportion of wealth held in capital. 
The stochastic differential equation that describes the evolution of real wealth 
for the typical agent is; 
dwit =a (rdt + odzit) wit - (1 - a)7rwitdt - citdt (6) 
We shall henceforth simplify the analysis by assuming a mean rate of return 
on capital equal to zero, (r =0). 
In keeping with what I said earlier about the difference between paying out 
interest on money directly and allowing the price level to fall over time I will follow 
the later method for its 'informational efficiency, i. e. the proceeds of taxation 
will be used to retire nominal money from circulation over time. 
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It is simple to show that since the consumption. tax takes away a constant 
fraction of gross consumption each period it is optimal for the agent to consume 
at a gross rate of consumption at the same rate as in the absence of a tax. The 
simplest way to see this is to substitute for net consumption in the objective 
function and factor out the tax component; it is simply a linear transformation. 
Hence note that (3) can be written as 
Vio = (1 - t)" Eio . -It 
(c't)' 
dt (6a) 10 
11 
The resultant gross consumption policy is; 
Cit :: -: Wit 
p (7) 
-Y 2U2 (1 Y)2 
-Y 
and; 
a- 
7r 
See Merton (1969) p. 253 eqn. 42 for proof. 
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3.4. Calculating Equilibrium. 
Calculating equilibrium follows the same basic principles as in the proof of ex- 
istence in the model of chapter 2. The first step is to state an equation for 
equilibrium in the money market at time t given the capital stock and the per 
capita nominal money supply. We then differentiate the equilibrium condition 
with respect to time to obtain an expression that will'yield equilibrium at all 
points in time. We can then use expressions for tax revenue and optimal con- 
sumption to gain an expression for the endogenous variables of the system in 
terms of monetary policy. 
Application of money market equilibrium at time t (using the fact that a is 
common to all agents) yields; 
a)T (9) 
Where Vt is the per capita money supply at time t and -k-t is the per capita 
capital stock at time t 
Differentiating this totally with respect to time, dividing each side by the 
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relevant side of equation (9) and noting that inflation, 7r, is constant yields; 
dpt dAf t At 
dt + dt - 
dt 
A mt kt 
Changing notation we hence have; 
dkt 
dt 7r -- ý kt 
Where; 
dAft 
dt 
mt 
(11) 
We must now derive an expression for the right hand side of this equation; 
the proportional rate of change of the per capita capital stock at time t. A little 
thought should reveal that is equal to the difference between per capita output dt 
and per capita net consumption. We have of course simplified this by setting the 
mean return to capital, net of depreciation equal to zero. 
Before we simplify the above expression I define some consumption fractions or 
propensities. The propensity for net consumption from total real wealth, (which 
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is constant over time) is given by; 
Cn - 
Cit 
- 
cit(l 0 (12) 
Wit Wit 
The propensity for net consumption from real capital is; 
Ck = 
ci*t 
= 
C. 
kit a 
This is the propensity that Nve shall pay most attention to in the analysis 
since it relates the real physical consumption that takes place to the per capita 
capital stock, given that all agents have the same consumption propensities. The 
key notational point to remember is that c subscripted with w, n and k denote 
propensities for gross consumption from total real wealth, net consumption from 
real wealth and net consumption from capital, respectively. The expression cit 
denotes total consumption per unit time interval by i without any ffirther divisor. 
We can hence note that by averaging over all agents at time t; (consumption 
propensities are stationary) 
dkt 
dt 
Ckkt (14) 
The equation that relates the rate of inflation to the rate of money growth 
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and the rate of consumption is then; 
/I -7ý- Ck (15) 
Our task is now to use tMs equation and the expressions for individual con- 
sumption propensities to derive a reduced form expression for Ck in terms of the 
nominal rate of money growth. To do this we require one last piece of information. 
This is the government budget constraint that shows the rate of taxation required 
to bring about a given rate of contraction of the money supply. This relationship 
will depend upon the agent's consiunption behavior, since we are considering the 
revenue from consumption taxation. 
Since the government pursues a policy of using the proceeds of taxation to 
retire money balances we have that; 
dMt 
- pt (real value of the tax revenue) dt 
= -ptt(gross per capita consumption per unit time) 
= -Ptt? ýt 
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Defining tt Nve have; 
dA-I- 
IL = 
dt 
m 
From (18 and 19) Nve have; 
-Ptt'ýt (19a) Ht 
From a per capita counterpart of (8) we can substitute for per capita real balances 
as a function of per capita wealth to obtain; 
-t-Et (19b) 
- a) u7t 
We define; 
Cit 
= 
'et (19c) 
Wit Tt 
(Recall that consumption propensities are the same for all agents) 
Which gives us; 
a) p (20) 
CW 
The interpretation of this equation is simple. For a given rate of monetary 
contraction (/t < 0) a high level of 1-a means a high demand for money and a low 
price level. A high real tax will therefore be needed to obtain the rate of change 
135 
of the nominal money supply desired. The higher is c, the lower will be the tax 
on consumption needed to bring about a given p. This is obviouslY because higher 
consumption means a higher tax base and a IoNver rate of tax is required. 
Combining (20) with (15), (8), (7), (12) and (13) we have; 
(+ /_1)2 + 
'Y )_ 
Yor2 (t, +)_ PU2 /I Ck 
2 (1 
Ck '172 -Y) 
The proof is as follows; 
We have from (12) and (13) that; 
Ck 
t) 
cw 
From (20) ive can substitute for (I - t) into this to obtain; 
Ck = (C. + a) 1-1) 
a 
Substituting for c,,, from (7) , and 
for a from (8) yields; 
Ck --` 
or2 
7r U2 
y7r 2+ '77r 
2U2 (1 - y) 1-7 
) 
(21) 
(21a) 
(21b) 
(21c) 
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Substitution from (15) for 7-, and algebraic simplification will yield (21). 
Jumping ahead to equation 44, we will see that if we have 7<0 then we have 
a unique strictly positive solution for 7r if (22) below holds. 
IL +1 : ý, (22) 
If >0 then condition (22) is sufficient for a unique strictly positive solution. for 
-7r. However condition (22a) yields 2 possible solutions for 7r which are strictly 
positive. 
/-t +1 -Y (22a) 
Despite the multiplicity in that case ive shall later note that the existence of 
one of the solutions is enough to yield the answer we seek. 
3.5. Welfare and Optimal Monetary Policy under a Consumption Tax 
Regime 
Our datilm will be a Pareto optimal allocation in which each of the contimium. of 
ex-ante identical agents is treated symmetrically. Hence such an allocation will 
correspond to the maximisation of the lifetime expected utility of one of these 
agents subject to the per- capita economy wide feasibility constraint, that yields 
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the absence of aggregate uncertainty. 
We now restate the value function and develop it in a way that will allow us 
to study the roles of intertemporal. allocation and risk bearing in welfare more 
clearly than does a naive expression. It is possible to derive the value function 
by a guess and verify procedure as used in the derivation of the agent's optimal 
policies, but the method used below will allow us to see the source of the different 
components of the formula. Expected lifetime utility conditional on time zero 
information, remembering that all individuals are ex-ante identical; E(Vio) is; 
00 Eio e-l' 
(C*)t 
dt (23) jo 
ly 
or by definition of c,,; 
07 
Ejo (Vio) 
(i t) 
c-ý'tEjo (wit)". dt (24) 
-t 0 
Equation (6) tells us that wealth follows a stochastic differential equation. For 
ease of manipulation Nve can relabel its components as; 
ar - (1 - a) 7r - c,, -= a 
(25) 
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And; 
au =- 
We then have that; 
(25a) 
dwit = wit (adt + bdzit) (26) 
From such an equation it is well known (e. g. Dixit (1992) p8) that In(wit) will 
I 
be normally distributed with mean; 
Inwo+ a- 
1b2t 
(27) 
2) 
And variance b't, when conditioned on time zero information. If we let yit = 
In wit then we have; 
Ejo (wit)' == Ejo (e-lyit) (28) 
Since yt is normally distributed as described above, we can use the formula 
for the moment generating function of a normal variable to obtain; 
a- -I b2) t)-y+ -I 
(b2t). 
y2 E0 (elyyit) = 
(Inwo+( 
22 (29) 
-1 In wo+at-y+71 b2t-t =e (30) 
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So that the value fiinction becomes; 
0 
(cw) ly (i 
- 
41 loo 
pt yInwo+aty+ýlýb2t-I E (Vio) = e- .c2 
(c. wo)' (I - 
07 F 
-(p-a-y-Xb2-y(-y-1)) 
n2'. 
dt (32) 
ly 0 
(c,, wo)-f t), y 
py (a + 42 
(33) 
2 
Substituting back for a and b (noting that r=O) we have; 
(c. wo)' (i - 0' 1 (34) 
p-y Ce) 7r - Cw + 
la2or2 (, y 2 
This formulation uses c, the agent's propensity to consume from total real 
wealth, composed of an individual's capital and real money holdings. We can re- 
express this to better reflect the equilibrium of the model in terms of real capital 
alone. In the mimerator ive can use; 
t) CwWO CkkO (35) 
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In the denominator, we can use an expression previously derived; 
Ck C', + I't a)) (36) 
to re-express (37) as (38) ; 
- (I - 7r - (37) 
(1 - a) (M - 7r) - aCk (38) 
Substituting for /t - ir from (15) gives us; 
- (1 - a) Ck - CeCk : -- -Ck (39) 
This expresses Ew in terms of the path of the capital stock as it is eroded 
(! iw-) 
by consumption (remember that r= 0). The substitutions made account for the 
erosion of the value of money caused by the inflation that results from consumption 
depleting the capital stock. This reflects the notion again that money is not net 
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wealth. Making the substitutions described then yields; 
(k-o)" (Ck Y 
20,2) 
(40) 
7 P-Y(-Ck+1(7-I)Ce 2 
If we carefidly follow through the derivation of this equation -we can intilitively 
see the role of the two endogenous parameters in the value function. The a2a2 
term relates to the variance of the consumption stream which is increasing in 
the proportion of capital in the portfolio. The level Of Ck determines the rate of 
decumulation of the capital stock. The term ck in the munerator reflects the effect 
on instantaneous utility of the propensity to consume from the current stock of 
capital. The -Ck term in the denominator reflects how consumption depletes the 
capital stock over time. Hence it is obvious that a rise in Ck now, for a given level 
of the capital stock, will raise utility for the moment but will mean the economy 
has less capital to consume from in the future. The optimum level Of Ck to be 
derived below reflects the trade off between these two considerations. 
3.5.1. Social Planning Optimum. 
We now carry out the maximisation of (40) subject to the constraints Ck ý! 0) 
and O< a<1. We assume that the social planner can manipulate these two 
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variables independently of each other. This is the scenario that would face a social 
planner if he could freely re-distribute the consumption/capital good and control 
the rate of consumption, restricted only by the initial capital stock and physical 
production process which is deterministic in the per capita aggregate. Notice 
that we carry out this operation ignoring the information constraints we talked 
of in the introduction that gave a justification for money's value. We are hence 
looking at an artificial first best situation for the social planner, simply to provide 
a benchmark for the monetary case. We shall see that the monetary authority's 
problem is different to the social planner's since a and Ck are interrelated as the 
previous analysis has shown. 
In looking at (40), manipulation of a is not a portfolio problem for the social 
planner, but is merely a method of controlling the variance of the consumption 
stream. Differentiating (40) partially with respect to a yields; 
a vo 
- 
(k-o)" (Ck) -f 
--y(-y - 1)2ao, (41) a0z -f (p - -Y 
(-Ck + '21 (, y a2or2) )2 
Not surprisingly this is negative for all values Of Ck > 0. Risk aversion (-y < 1) 
determines that the variance should be driven to zero. 
Setting a=0, and differentiating Vo partially with respect tO Ck and setting 
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the resultant expression equal to zero yields; 
a vo a1 (Ck ko)" 
0 (42) 
19Ck OCk 
( 
't (P + Wk) 
) 
This yields; 
Ck (43) 
3.5.2. The Monetary Authority's Problem. 
This is to maximise (40) subject to the restrictions on possible values of a and Ck 
imposed by (21) which relates Ck to I-L, (15) which relates IL to 7r and Ck and (8) 
which relates a to -7r, ( these of course come from the restrictions that monetary 
equilibrium impose). There is of course one further constraint that we must add 
which is that a>0, which ensures that the existence problem with a zero nominal 
interest rate is not encountered. This obviously means that no monetary equilib- 
rium can be made Pareto optimal, but ive can make allocations arbitrarily close 
to Pareto optimality as we shall see. The first question is; under a consumption 
tax regime can we make 7r and hence a arbitrarily close to zero ? Referring back 
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to equation (40), Nve can substitute Ck ý 7r - I-L to get; 
, yu 2 :L0,2U2 +2 
(2-'Y) 
p+ 21L(2 - -y)- 
7 (44) 
By inspection we can note the following; for -y :: ý 0, if (22) holds, (45) holds by 
taking the positive solution of the above equation; 
lim (7r) 
ttý 1py 
(45) 
Hence it is clear that an allocation that displays arbitrarily small variance can 
be achieved for those parameter values. If -y >0 and if (22a) holds then selecting 
the negative solution above yields (45). An interesting difference between the 2 
sets of parameter values is that if -y :! ý 0 then the limiting value of [i is approached 
from above. In the case of y >0 the limiting value of y is approached from below. 
We must now address the question of efficient intertemporal allocation. We 
need to know what making 7 arbitrarily close to zero means for consumption. 
Referring back to (40) we know that; 
I- 
-ya 2 +o, 2U2 +2 
(2-'Y) p+ 2/-t(2 - 7) 
Ck (2--y) (46) 
1-y 
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We can see by inspection that if we take the appropriate roots for the -y values 
as defined above then; 
lim (Ck) 
.. 
p 
(47) 
jlý I-pt - -Y 
We have confirmed that the desired allocation can hence be approached asymp- 
totically, for all values of 
I We now need to gain some intuition as to why we can obtain such a result. In 
particular we might ask how it is that real wealth becomes arbitrarily large but 
the Ck value approaches I 
P-y 
The reason for this is that the wealth effect of the tax required to bring about 
the deflation exactly cancels out the positive Nvealth effect of the large real money 
balances. This is of course just a restatement of the notion that money is not net 
wealth with infinitely lived agents. Money is passed around the system between 
agents in this model and hence we can amend the statement that money is not net 
wealth to be money is not net wealth 'on average'. nirthermore, the tax usable 
in this model given the information structure itself creates no distortion in the 
life-cycle allocation of resources; as the relation of the optimal net consiunption 
policy in relation to the optimal gross consumption policy shows (equation (2)). 
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These notions can be clarified if we note the formulation Of Ck as follows; 
Ck 
t) C', (48) 
oz 
Formal application of L'Hopital's rule to find the limit of this expression is not 
necessary since we already have the answer in (47), but we can note that; 
.I 
lim (C,, ) =p (49) 7ý0 1-7 
lim 
a 
(50) 
7r--O 
()= 
C)o 
lim (I - t) 7r-+O 
As a final point in this section we can note some equations which further de- 
scribe the allocation of real resources over time. The stochastic differential equa- 
tion that describes the path of an individual's capital holdings in the monetary 
economy, noting that the mean return on capital is zero, is as follows; 
dk-it ý-- -Ckkitdt + auk-itdzit (52) 
147 
The stochastic integral (see Merton (1990)) that yields kiT is then; 
TT 
k-iT 
--z k-O - 
10 
Ckkit. dt + 
fo 
auk-itdzit (53) 
consumption at time t is then; 
TT 
CT --` Ck 
[ko 
- 
10 
Ckk-it. dt + fo aukitdzit] (54) 
The right hand integral reflects the cinnulative effects of the shocks to the pro- 
duction process over time. Clearly if a is equal to zero, the effects will disappear. 
3.6. Conclusions. 
What are the contributions of this chapter ? We have shown that with the sug- 
gested information structure that taxes can be arranged in a fashion that enables 
the deflationary policy to achieve an allocation arbitrarily close to a Pareto opti- 
mal one, without being so as to yield an economy in which money is inessential. 
An obvious criticism might be that we have considered only one type of possible 
information set up. A response to this is to say that we have at least broken an 
implied 1: 1 relation between the information necessary for a Friedman. deflation 
and the information required for complete markets. What about the particu- 
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lar information assumption I have used to break the link ? To enable the use 
of non-distortionary taxes on consumption we must obviously have consumption 
purchases observable. There is surely nothing particularly objectionable about 
this, and the lack of ability to effectively record the identity of an agent and the 
details of his transaction are used in models such as Levine (1991), Townsend 
(1980) etc. to justify the usage of money as a decentralised record keeping device. 
In the model 1 exposited the key factor was the inescapability of taxation but 
possible abuse of insurance by private agents. The important point was that only 
the recipient could verify receipt of a transfer. Added to the asymmetry between 
the private interest of agents and the social welfare maximising goal of the gov- 
ernment, this means an asymmetry between the operation of the two schemes; 
the government has no incentive to impose 'extra' income tax. 
The essential property of money that solved the problem was seen to be its 
anonymity and common usage, as raising its value did not cause any problems of 
claiming payments for a second time. This shed new light on the way in which the 
optimum quantity of money proposal might work in such a 'primitive' situation 
The role of money as an information efficient record keeping device is well known, 
but the advantages of raising its value through allowing the price level to fall over 
time as opposed to paying out insurance to those who appear to be the needy 
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and paying out interest on money as highlighted in this chapter are new to the 
literature. 
In the model just considered, we had a situation where information was ma- 
nipulable, but the taxes used were non distortionary and so caused no problems 
despite their non-lump sum nature required by the manipulability of information. 
The inability of the authorities to verify an insurance payout was based essen- 
tially on the anonymity of agents; their economic activity in consumption terms 
could be observed but the frequency of their visits to the shops could not, so that 
effectively bad luck could be falsified. We also assumed that the government was 
benevolent and would not abuse its ability to cheat if it had one; alternatively, we 
could describe its opportunities merely by the publicly known rate of taxation. 
Can we carry over such an idea to a scenario where information on the exoge- 
nous state of nature is not manipulable and is known fully to all agents. I shall 
sketch an argument that suggests we can do so. 
I firstly add a dimension to the story that separates out the tax/monetary 
authority from the 'law enforcement' authority. I will assume that endowment 
realisations are public knowledge to all but whether a tax/transfer has taken place 
is private knowledge between an individual and the taxation/monetary authority. 
I may also make the initial state of nature private knowledge to them also, but 
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this does not affect the argument. I assurne that the receiver. or intended receiver 
of a transfer can costlessly verify to the laxv enforcers whether a transfer has taken 
place. I assume that they may also lie however (i. e. say that they have not received 
a transfer), and if the body/agent who actually made the transfer wishes to verify 
this to the laxv enforcers then it must pay a verification cost. lf we model the 
costs as once and for all and 'lump sum' in the sense of investment in some kind of 
costly verification technology say, then the system of taxing individuals and using 
the proceeds to raise the value of money means that only private agents need to 
invest in verification technology, not the government, showing the information cost 
advantage of the monetary economy. Alternatively we might tell a story where 
the legal authorities always demand verification of a transfer upon appeal by a 
supposed non-receiver, but the agents know that the government has no incentive 
to cheat and so does not bother with investment in verification technology. The 
key point being made however is the informational advantage of paying out the 
proceeds of taxation via the change in money's value over paying out insurance 
directly which would entail costly verification, and is a separate issue to that of 
the observability of the original state. 
The analysis above is of course speculative and requires formal analysis before 
we could make any final definite judgement about the Hellwig/Woodford conjec- 
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ture. We have however at least broken the certainty of a solid link between the 
necessary information for taxes to avoid the Bewley/chapter 2 difficulties and the 
information necessary for full insurance. This rested upon an application of a 
new insight into the optimum quantity of money proposal as an advantageous 
way of distributing insurance payments. As Ostroy(1973), Levine (1991) and 
Taub (1994) show the role of money as a record keeping device in enforcing bud- 
get constraints is not new to the literature. It leaves a record of past expenditures 
by its 'absence'. However, this can be separated from the channel of providing 
insurance by raising money's value instead of directly handing out money as in- 
surance payouts. The latter method would allow individuals to spend the transfer 
and claim another transfer, unless costly registering is carried out. An advantage 
of allowing the price level to fall over time instead of Paying out interest on money 
is also indicated. 
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Chapter 4 
An Economy with too much Money 
4. An Economy with too much Money. 
4.1. Introduction 
In the literature on the optimum quantity of money, the unanimous view is of 
fiat money in a welfare improving role. Market incompleteness leaves potential 
gains to trade which are facilitated by the addition of money. The only qualifica- 
tions to 'more money' come from potential problems with administering the tax 
system required to implement the policy as highlighted by BeNvley(1983), Levine 
(1991), chapter two of the thesis and Phelps(1973). Otherwise money is a 'good 
thing' and following the essence of this means reducing the opportunity cost of 
holding money to as low a level as possible. It would also seem that maximising 
per capita real balances is a good thing to do. It would be an interesting question 
to pose if we asked "is it possible that there is an upper limit to the amount of 
real balances that we might wish to create? " A more taxing and hence even more 
interesting question would be "can we construct an equilibrium in which money 
has too much value? ". I shall suggest that such an event is relatively easy to 
envisage in an overlapping generations model but harder to do in a model Nvith 
153 
contemporaneously and infinitely lived agents, which is the context of this thesis. 
Even under an "extreme" monetary policy, the way in which the AValrasian auc- 
tioneer prices money implies a limit to the amount of money that can be created, 
as I will subsequently demonstrate. Moreover it is hard to see too much money 
being created. My response to this challenge is to create "extra" inefficiency in the 
barter economy beyond that needed to create conditions for money's existence. 
I 
nirther, the type of model I present builds on an essential property of fiat money 
as a financial asset. Purely in terms of a method of insurance that redistributes 
wealth across states, it is useless. its payoff is the same in all states, and its role in 
providing self insurance analysed in the work of Bewley, Levine and my chapter 2 
is as a buffer stock, to be traded against goods on the sequence of spot markets, 
rather than directly redeemed. 
Firstly, to demonstrate the essence of my idea, I construct a model based on 
the model of Taub(1988) that incorporates linear utility and taste shocks. An 
inside insurance asset is incorporated into the model in a way that in some sense 
makes it carry 'too low' a rate of return. If we follow a second best version of 
Riedman's rule of the sort proposed by Taub, namely making the rate of return 
on money as close to the rate of time preference as the Bewley difficulty will allow, 
we investigate under what conditions such a rule is a bad one to follow. Due to 
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the extreme structure of preferences in the model, namely linear utility, the choice 
agents make is to hold either insurance alone or money alone, not both. (For the 
sake of simplicity, we ignore the case of indifference based on equally attractive 
returns on the assets). 1 will show that if agents are sufficiently patient then 
the equilibrium with fiat money is Pareto dominated by the one without it. In 
this example, I am hence able to address a conjecture qf Levine (1985), which 1 
shall describe later. I then show a model with strictly concave utility where the 
warning against too much money is less extreme, but we still obtain the result 
that pushing the return on money too close to the rate of time preference in the 
sort of second best situation I described, is a sub optimal policy. 1 will use the 
intuition behind Riedman's original result where more money is a good thing 
to modify the proposition when assets intrinsically better suited to insurance are 
present 
As we have seen, amongst the literature examining the optimum quantity of 
money issue have been papers where money is the only asset and is used for self 
insurance in the face of income and taste fluctuations. Amongst these papers are 
Bewley (1980,1983) and Taub(r988). In such models they point out that a neces- 
sary condition for a monetary equilibrium to be Pareto efficient is that the gross 
rate of return on money, 1+r, is equal to -1 where 6 is equal to 
1, a being the 0 1+a 
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pure rate of time preference common to all consumers. As we have seen elsewhere 
in the thesis, in the first of these papers Bewley pointed out that no monetary 
equilibrium would exist if 1+r is equal to if the endowments/preferences were 
sufficiently random, and hence no monetary equilibrium can be Pareto optimal. 
He conjectured that if I+r was made arbitrarily close to then an equilibrium 
arbitrarily close to a Pareto optimal one would exist. In my analysis I shall refer 
to such an arrangement as first best for the sake of simplicity though of course 
such a term is, rigorously speaking, inaccurate. 
Bewley's 1983 paper then pointed out that such an arrangement is infeasible 
under certain conditions (which hold in my model also), since the value of the 
taxes necessary to finance such a deflation Nvould exceed the nominal value of 
resources available. A definite limit exists on the rate of return on money that 
can be achieved in equilibrium and the allocation will be clearly second best. 
Such a second best environment becomes the background of my model. Following 
Lucas and Taub I will consider an economy with a continuum of agents suffering 
idiosyncratic taste shocks. These agents are infinitely lived and can use either 
money or an insurance asset to help fhem tailor their consumption stream to 
their taste shocks as desired. The insurance asset is a security that pays off 
one unit of the economy's single non storable consumption good in the following 
156 
period contingent on the realisation of a taste shock in the highest proportion p 
of possible shocks. I shall initially conduct the analysis for p exogenously given 
and then consider an information structure that may justify it. 
The first task will be to examine portfolio choice and consumption behavior 
when agents are faced with a choice of these two assets. Due to the linearity of 
the state dependent instantaneous utility function, agents will exWbit 'bang-bang' 
behavior. Because of -this our analysis of the optimum quantity of money in this 
model will be reduced to a discussion of whether welfare is higher in an equilibrium 
with money than without it. However the basic underlying question of in what 
circumstances more money is a good thing remains the central issue. The question 
of comparing two such equilibria was raised by Levine(1985). Levine presented 
a model in which money would be valued if the gains to trade using money are 
sufficiently great. On page 2 of his paper lie goes on to say 'unless money is 
the only asset and the only alternative to a monetary equilibrium is autarchy, 
a subtle second best issue, which we do not explore is whether an inefficient 
monetary equilibrium will Pareto dominate an equilibrium in which money has 
no value. The model I present in this paperý allows us to address this question. Of 
course, if we were to compare two equilibria achieved using exogenously imposed 
asset structures(by physically prohibiting the use of each of the assets in turn) the 
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analysis would be relatively uninteresting. What makes the model presented here 
interesting is the endogenous asset selection. We shall see that if the monetary 
authority pays a return on the currency that is sufficiently high then individual 
agents will choose to hold money instead of the insurance asset. However if the 
agents are sufficiently patient and the set of realisations in which the insurance 
asset pays off sufficiently small, then the monetary equilibrium will yield a lower 
level of ex-ante per capita welfare than the equilibrium in which money is not 
valued. In such circumstances a monetary equilibrium would be third best as 
opposed to the second best insurance asset equilibrium. 
The parameter restrictions discussed above on p are needed to ensure that 
insurance is a superior asset to money in the second best scenario of this model. 
The need for these restrictions is not surprising since we have made no other 
restrictions as yet on the nature of the insurance asset. One would not in general 
expect money to be always and everywhere inferior to any other single arbitrary 
asset. 
The reason why we are able to obtain results converse to those of a stylised 
second best Friedman style deflation/interest rule (see e. g. Taub (1988) p. 581) 
can be seen by reflecting on the intuition of Friedman's original paper. On page 
15 of his paper he explains that the welfare loss in his model is clue to too low 
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a rate of return on money presenting opportunities to agents that do not match 
the opportunities faced by society. The target for a welfare improving policy is 
then obviously to bring these two opportunity sets closer together. However in my 
model with the insurance alternative present the target of bringing individual and 
social opportunities closer together will be hampered if the financial instrument 
that the price taking utility maxintising agents choose to hold is not the best 
for this task. The essence of the task in this economy is to make sure that the 
current aggregate endowment of the consumption good is consumed only by the 
most hungry agents. In terms of actual asset payoffs, the insurance asset I have 
described is clearly superior to money in this aspect since it redistributes income 
towards hungry agents. Purely in terms of asset payoffs money is clearly useless 
in this respect since it pays the same return in all states of the Nvorld(note the 
economy here lacks aggregate uncertainty). Money's usefulness comes in its use as 
a buffer stock. In equilibrium hungry agents can liquidate their money balances 
and buy the consumption good because of the willingness of the non-hungry agents 
to save in money for such future contingencies. Stich saving behavior is influenced 
by 3 and r, the rate of interest on money. As we shall see these values Nvill 
determine the maximum level of welfare in a monetary economy, which will always 
be below the first best level since we assume that agents have a strictly positive 
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rate of time preference. 
When agents choose the insurance asset, per capita utility will again be below 
the level yielded by the symmetric Pareto optimal allocation, where only the 
hungriest agents consume. As we shall see the welfare obtainable with this asset 
will depend i1pon, 8 and p. The desirability of a low p in diverting resources more 
accurately towards only the most hungry agents is obvious. The role of 3 in the 
determination of welfare with this asset is basically the same as in the monetary 
regime. It so happens that a very low 
-, 
8 reduces the efficacy of the insurance 
mechanism more severely than it does the monetary mechanism. Hence such 
values would confirm the second best Riedman rule. However we find that if 8 
lies outside this region (i. e. if agents are sufficiently patient), then the "intended" 
second best counterpart of the Friedman rule will fail to be the actual second best 
policy. 
4.2. Structure of the Economy. 
Endowments and preferences are identical to a specialised version of Taub's (1988) 
model, where the distribution function of multiplicative shocks to individual pref- 
erences is uniform. The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived 
agents with instantaneous linear utility of consumptioi;, which is buffeted by 
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stochastic multiplicative shocks which are Li. d. across agents, hence there is no 
aggregate uncertainty. Agents discount instantaneous utility with a pure rate of 
time preference which is strictly positive. If we define; 
ß= 1 1 ei 
then the typical agent solves the problem in period t; 
00 
max Et E, 6'0t+, ct+, 
S=o 
where Ot+, is the random multiplicative utility shock in period t+s. The ran- 
dom variable Ot+, has a uniform distribution on [0, ý ]. Note that this is indepen- 
dent of t and s. The budget constraint faced by individuals Nvill depend upon the 
financial asset they choose to hold, and will be examined in the next section. It 
is also assumed that each agent will have an endowment stream of the economy's 
single consumption good equal to y each period. Note that unlike the Taub model 
there is no cash in advance constraint here. 
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4.3. Agent's Consumption Policy if Money is the Chosen Asset. 
I shall begin by examining the consumption policy of the typical agent taking the 
choice of asset as given and then go on to examine the asset choice problem. I 
commence by assuming that the agent has chosen to hold money. 
I assume the economy is in a steady state, so that the price of the consumption 
good is stationary through time. I assume that the moiietary authority conducts 
its monetary policy by paying interest on money balances. The interest payments 
are financed totally by taxing all agents in a symmetrical lump surn fashion and 
using the proceeds to retire money from circulation. (This means that the nominal 
money stock in the economy will be constant also). These taxes will be fixed across 
time also. If we denote the gross rate of return on money, I+r, as p, and y-t, the 
real post tax endowment as y (which is stationary given the policy variable p), 
then the individual maximises (1) subject to; 
ct + mt+i :! ý F+ Pmt 
Where mt+l denotes real money balances held at the end of period t. 
It is intuitively obvious that since agents have linear utility they will choose 
to either consume their current wealth which is the right hand side of (1) or save 
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it all in money balances (for the sake of simplicity I will assume that when agents 
are indifferent they will choose to consume). Determination of the optimLun con- 
sumption policy then reduces to finding the critical level of the consumption shock 
at which they are indifferent. I will call this value 0*, which will be stationary in 
the steady state of the model. This will occur when the marginal utility of present 
consumption equals the discounted expected marginal utility of saving (conditional 
on tlie optimilm valiie 0*) 
This value is then determined by equation (3); 
0*=, 6p [ (prob. consume) x (expected m. u. if do consume) I 
+ 02p2[ (prob. did not consume last period) x (prob cons. this period) x (ex- 
pected. m. u. if do consume)] . ............. 
Given a level of 0*, we can make some substitutions into the above equation 
(3) using the following; 
o* 
prob. consume = x* =1-= (3a) 0 
(remember that 0 is uniformly distributed) 
The value x* is simply the probability that 0> 0* 
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Expected m. u. if do consurne in a period is given by; 
o* +0 (3b) 
2 
(i. e. conditional on consumption taking place). 
Substituting (3b) into (3) above, and using the formula for the infinite sum of 
a geometric progression, we have an equation for 0*; 
(ßpx*) 
0* +ý (4) 
21- ßp(1 - x*) ( 
We shall see that 6p <1 holds and so convergence will occur. 
If we then substitute for x* from (3a) into (4) and use implicit differentiation 
we can obtain the result that; 
dO* 
->0 dp 
i. e. that a higher return money encourages saving. Also we have that; 
lim 0* =ý 
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4.4. Consumption Policy if Insurance is the Chosen Asset. 
We will assume that the probability of an agent receiving an insurance payout is 
less than the probability that he will consume (in equilibrium), which greatly aids 
simplicity. When we calculate the equilibrium we will derive parameter restric- 
tions such that this assumption will be valid. We shall see that such an assumption 
is necessary if the second best form of the Friedman stýle rule is to be 'locally' 
inferior to the insurance asset. However, such conditions will be encompassed by 
the conditions necessary to achieve a global inferiority of money as we shall see 
later 
We assume a form of financial asset that yields a payout only to the top 
proportion p of most hungry individuals(p is given exogenously). The asset can 
be bought at date t and one unit yields a return of R units of the consumption 
good at date t+I, if the event of extreme hunger (with probability p) occurs. 
I assume that the payout on the asset does not discriminate between different 
levels of hunger within that group p. We can hence note if p was set equal to 1 
the return structure would be the same as fiat money. (Note that short sales are 
prohibited). If we define Op as the mininuun hunger level at which the asset will 
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pay out then the probability of receiving an insurance payout is; 
P=J- 
OP 
(4a) 
Hence we can now calculate the level of 0 at which the agent is indifferent between 
saving all his income and consuming it all. We denote this by 0, and calculate it 
from the following F. 0. C (5); 
0, =3 [prob. insurance pays out] x [Gross return on insurance given that it pays out I 
x [expected m. u. given that payment occurs] 
Remember that we assume the probability of consuming is at least as great 
as the probability of receiving the insurance payout, hence the sole term on the 
right hand side of the above equation, in contrast to the money equation (3). 
If we denote the gross return to insurance conditional on payout as R, then 
(5) becomes; 
oc = 
8pR ro + op] 
(6) 
2 
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Substituting for Op, we have that 
oc = 
6pRO(2 - p) (6a) 
2 
By definition, the probability x, of consuming when holding insurance is equal 
to; 
or 
(6b) 
4.5. Optimal Portfolio Behavior. 
Thanks to the analysis of the above section our task in analysing the portfo- 
lio choice of agents is simple. Equations 4 and 5 above express the first order 
conditions for consumption behavior under the holding of the respective assets. 
However the right hand side of each equation is the discounted expected marginal 
utility of saving in each respective asset. Hence when the consumption policy 
is calculated optimally, as given by equations 4 and 6, the respective marginal 
utilities of saving in the assets are given by 0* for money and Oc for insurance. 
Hence if we have equilibrium values of R and p and exogenously given values for 
)3 and p, we can easily calculate which asset all identical agents will prefer. If 0* 
is the greater then money will be chosen. If 0, is the greater then insurance will 
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be chosen. For simplicity we will assume that if the values are equal then money 
will be chosen. 
4.6. Calculation of Monetary Equilibrium. 
We firstly calculate the unique steady state equilibrium. 
Since the underlying structure of the model is very similar to that of Taub 
(1988), our calculation of monetary equilibrium is all but identical to his, the only 
difference being that my monetary economy omits the cash in advance constraint 
and concentrates entirely on the precautionary motive for holding money, as in 
the models of Beivley(1980,1983). Due to the similarity of this section to Taub's 
analysis, the derivation of results will be kept relatively brief. 
The stationary state will be characterised by a stationary distribution of real 
money balances across individuals. its distribution function is denoted by 0. 
In common with Taub I ignore the path to the steady state by assuming that 
the economy begins in this steady state with the individuals' positions in this 
distribution allocated randomly. The welfare criterion we shall use later is that of 
expected lifetime utility evaluated at time zero before the outcome of the random 
allocation is known. This allows us to consider improvements in the mean level 
of welfare which will also be Pareto improving. 
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We saw earlier that the agents' threshold level of consumption was increasing 
in p, the gross nominal (and real, in the steady state) rate of return on money. 
The question to be addressed is exactlY the same as that addressed by Taub, 
which is to calculate the maximum feasible rate of interest that can be paid on 
money in a monetary equilibrium, which is the essence of the problem exposited 
by Bewley(1983). The problem in the economies of those two papers (and the 
one presented here)is that the infiniteness of the agents' horizon means that the 
optimum quantity of precautionary balances is infinite. As the monetary authority 
attempts to increase the level of money balances, the price level must necessarily 
fall and nominal income, other than the interest payments on money, falls to 
zero. This creates an autonomous demand for money, which agents hold purely 
to finance the tax. No equilibrium can exist since the demand for money for 
both tax and precautionary purposes will exceed the supply. As we have already 
documented at length and as Taub (1988) describes, the limit of the feasible return 
on money occurs when the agent's post tax non interest income becomes zero. If 
the auctioneer raises the return on money beyond the level that yields -y =0, he 
will raise the precautionary demand for money by agents. To satisfy this, the price 
level must fall, but this raises the demand for autonomous tax-financing balances, 
hence no equilibrium can exist beyond that point. Note also that this problem 
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occurs even when income is deterministic, as the results that follow show. 
(Taub produces a Pareto optimal equilibrium when the support of taste shock 
is discrete. Hence the continuity of support here is micial to us. ) 
The task in finding the maximum feasible return on money then rechices to 
finding the return that yields a level of F equal to zero. We now go forward to 
deduce this through calculating the monetary equilibrium. 
In the stationary distribution of agents according to their real money balances 
the following past histories(including the current period) of agents are possible. 
(i) The agent is hungry this period i. e. 0> 0*. End of period balances are 
hence zero. The probability of this event is x*. (See equation 3a) 
(ii) he was hungry last period but not this period. His end of period balances 
will then be g. The probability of this event is x*(l-x*) 
(iii) The agent was hungry two periods ago, but not in this period or the 
preceding period. His end of period money balances will then be Vp +F with 
probability x*(l-x*)' 
................ and so on. 
The support of the stationary distribution of money balances 0, is therefore; 
(6c) PP 
k= 0 
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with a probability ftinction; 
do 
19[1-pll 
= 
(1 
_ X*)k X* (6d) 
Per capita real balances can then be calculated as; 
] 
FFk (1 _ iii=E 1- 
F)' (7) 
k=O 
where we have substituted F= 1-x*, and 1-F = x*. Equation 7 then can be 
evaluated as; 
Fy- 
1- pF 
(8) 
Note that (8) effectively gives us per capita end of period real money balances. 
Our next task is to use this mean level of real money balances (given y and x*) 
to calculate the monetary equilibrium. Since only the hungry spend their cash 
balances (plus current period net income) Nve have that goods market equilibrium 
in per capita terms is given by 
F) Pl"Y +y (8a) 
[I 
pF 
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Hence 
(1 - pF) y (8b) 
1-F 
Note that y=0 when pF = 1. Since 1-F is the probability of consurning, and 
is equal to x*, we can show that pF=l is satisfied when; 
I 
Pmax 
2-ja 2 
(8c) 
1 
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We obtain this from equation 4 by substituting out 0* from equation 3a, yielding 
an equation in p and x*, substituting for x* with 1-F then setting pF =1. 
As long as agents are impatient so that 6 is strictly less than one, then Pmax 
will be greater than one, indicating that a positive return on money is possible, 
but will be strictl less than I the level that would yield per capita maximum y 07 
utility and a Pareto optimal outcome. (i. e. the first best Friedman rule). 
4.7. Calculation of Equilibrium if Insurance is the Chosen Asset. 
The unique stationary equilibrium of the model under the use of the insurance as- 
set is simple to calculate given the assumption of p< x. where x. is the probability 
that an agent consumes. This greatly simplifies the analysis since no agent will 
carry wealth in the form of the insurance asset over more than one period(note 
also how that simplified the calculation of 0, above. (see equations (5) and (6)) 
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Equilibrium in the goods market is then determined by equating per capita 
endowment y to per capita consumption. By definition a proportion x, of the 
population will consume in any given period. This proportion can be divided 
into 3 groups, (where proportions are defined relative to the whole population 
of agents): a proportion (x, -p) who are hungry enough to consume but not to 
receive an insurance payout, a proportion(l- x, )p who are hungry enough to be 
eligible for an insurance payout and who did buy insurance in the previous period 
(i. e. they were in the saving group last period), and a group x, p who are hungry 
enough to qualify for an insurance payout, but were also hungry last period and 
did not therefore buy insurance. lf R is the gross return on the insurance asset 
then goods market equilibrium is given by; 
y == (x - p)y + p(1 - x, ) (y + yR) + x. py (9a) 
hence we find that x, drops out of the equation to yield: 
pR =1 (9b) 
If we use equation (6b) to substitute out 0, in (6a) and then substitute pR=l 
into (6a) we find; 
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x, = 1- 
ß (2 - p) (10) 
Hence if our analysis with p< x, is to be valid, we desire that: 
3(2 - p) 
2 
Because of the intertemporal nature of the insurance asset we need a 'start 
tip' condition to be specified. I assume that the economy begins in the stationary 
state, hence analogously to the assumption for the monetary economy. We endow 
a fraction (I-x, ) of the top proportion p of agents according to htmger with assets 
equal to yR in addition to their initial endowment y. In equilibrium this matches 
purchases of the insurance asset by those who wish to save for the second period. 
We now ask under what circumstances will money be valued. From our cal- 
culation of agent's portfolio and consumption policies we know that money is 
valued when the threshold hunger level for constimption under the monetary as- 
set is greater than or equal to the threshold hunger level for the insurance asset. 
Since the question here is whether there exists a rate of return on money that is 
sufficient to induce agents to hold it instead of insurance it will suffice to do this 
comparison using the level Of Pmax- We hence seek to locate parameter values such 
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that Omax > 0, holds. Using equations 4,6 and 8c this desired inequality becomes; 
2 
ý[8 
1' 
ý_ 
ý, 6 (2 
2-, 8 2 
Or equivalently that; 
2 
(12) 
2-p - 
This inequality will be satisfied as long as p>O or, 6 <1. Hence we can say that 
in the model agents can always be induced to hold money by pushing its return 
to its highest feasible level. This is an important lemma for the welfare analysis 
of a later section. An interesting footnote to this section is that money will not be 
valued in an equilibrium if the monetary authority does not pay a strictly positive 
rate of interest on balances. This can be seen if we substitute p=1 into equation 
4 and consider inequality (11) for this value of p. We find that as long as p<I 
holds, then government intervention is needed for money to be valued. 
4.8. Welfare Evaluation and the Optimum Monetary Policy. 
We have established that the monetary authority can create a return on money 
balances such that money will be valued in equilibrium. We now ask whether such 
a policy is optimal in this second best environment. I answer this question in two 
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parts. Firstly I will show that under my maintained assumption that the prob- 
ability of consurning is strictly greater than the probability of receiving an asset 
payout, a particular local change in monetary policy will yield an unambiguous 
fall in ex ante per capita welfare (as evaluated at date zero). This local change is 
at the point of the attainment of the rate of return on money such that it becomes 
valued instead of insurance. I then derive conditions such that the presence of 
money is a bad thing for all feasible rates of return. In performing the first part 
of this analysis, we know the switch in the holding of the assets occurs when the 
respective values of the critical 0 levels are equal (remember that for simplicity 
we assumed that when indifferent the agents wotfld choose money). If we begin 
by taking an arbitrary value for this and call it 0, then we can easily derive an 
expression for V, the expected per capita lifetime utility of the economy under 
the monetary regime. We can do this by noting that the distribution of money 
balances and hence purchasing power is uncorrelated with the level of the taste 
shock suffered by the individuals within the group who choose to consume. Since 
per capita consumption in equilibrium is equal to y, we have that the ex-ante per 
capita expected utility in a monetary economy is; 
VI" -y 
Co+ 0. ) 
-i 1-ß 
) 
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To gain insight on how to calculate the per capita welfare yielded by the 
insurance asset we can recall our analysis of the three groups of consumers who 
consume in the insurance asset regime (refer back to our equation for the goods 
market equilibrium, (9a)) If we assign the appropriate expected marginal utilities 
(with expectations evaluated conditionallY on the event of being in the particular 
group), xve obtain (assurning e>p holds) 
p 
e) yR + y) 
0+ op 
+1 ((e - p) y) 
0,, +0, 
1-0 
(2) 
1-0 
( 
Where e is the probability of consuming, for our arbitrarily chosen 0, value. 
V,, and V, respectively can then be re-expressed as; 
- 
(2 
YO 2(1-, 8) 
(15) 
YO [((l e) +p) (2 -p) + (e -p) (2 p 2(1-, 6) 
Hence to obtain the partial result that the monetary equilibrium 'at the point 
of its introduction' brings a fall in welfare we desire to show that: 
[(l-e)+p](2-p)+(e-p)(2-p-e) > (2-e) 
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which reduces to: 
e (18) 
This is precisely the condition required for the validity of our insurance asset 
calculations. It should come as no surprise that this condition is also sufficient 
to yield the result that introducing money at its IoNvest rate of return compatible 
with the existence of monetary equilibrium will bring adunambiguous fall in the 
welfare measure we have used. Recall that the task in raising such a welfare 
measure is to divert consumption towards the most hungry agents. The efficacy 
of a particular asset in achieving this goal depends on two factors; its success 
in yielding a high willingness to save (by the less hungry agents) and how it 
redistributes income towards the more hungry agents. In the analysis performed 
above, Nve have effectively 'fixed' the first of these factors to be the same for both 
assets. In both asset regimes the top proportion e of agents in terms of himger 
consume. However, regarding the second factor, if p<e holds then insurance has 
an obvious advantage over money. Money yields the same return to an agent in all 
states (remeinber there is no aggregate uncertainty) and provides no redistribution 
within the group of agents who consume. Insurance on the other hand can perform 
this task and so in these circumstances has a distinct advantage. The 'victory' 
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of insurance in this limited case shows our argument that the essence behind 
Friedman's theory when carried over to a second best situation (as Taub p. 581 
does with money as the only asset) may mean that money is a bad thing and not 
a good thing. His argument that individual and social opportunities need to be 
brought closer together can be used in this example to overturn the Taub style 
second best form of the Friedman rule. 
The next task is to see how well the 'inversion' of ]Friedman's rule described 
above survives a more realistic but still second best situation, where we are less 
'artificially' harsh to money than in the above case. We do this by looking at 
the welfare achievable by the policy of setting p equal to p .. a,,. The final welfare 
outcome might be viewed as the outcome of competition between the advantage 
that (e-p) gives to insurance in the above case and the welfare gain within the 
monetary regime that accrues from allowing p to rise to Pmax. The two key 
parameters are p and 6. If we look at equation (8c) we can see that 8p,,, a,,, the 
discounted gross real return on money is increasing in 6, so lowering the value 
of 3 by considering more impatient agents will retard the workings of money. 
However, a low 6 also damages the workings of the insurance asset, so the trade 
off is complicated. The reason for the influence of 6 is of course that both money 
and insurance have to be lield intertemporally and a low valile of 8will mean a 
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distortion of 'individual' opportunities away from those faced by society. This is 
the argument for the usual Friedman style rule (as in Taub 1988) in trying to 
influence consumption/saving behavior by correcting this failure. 
From this situation we can derive a result to show that our basic intuition on 
the merits of two assets is basically correct. We compare the utility obtained in 
respective asset regimes when we let p, the probability of receiving an insurance 
payout go to zero (this of course is an artificial limiting value). In this case the 
condition for insurance to yield a per capita utility level higher than money is 
that; 
lim (VI) > vpýý. 
P--+O 
(19) 
Equation (14) gives an expression for V, as a function of p and an arbitrarily 
chosen value of x, , the probability of consuming 
(x, =e in that case). Equation 
(10) is an expression for x, in terms of p so upon substitution of (10) into (14) 
and taking the limit of the resulting expression we have the left hand side of (20). 
Equation (13) is an expression for V,, as a ftinction of 0, the level of marginal 
utility at w1licli agents will consume. Equation (8c) gives the maximum return 
on money that is feasible in equilibrium and substituting this into (4) and using 
(3a) to eliminate x, gives the maximum feasible value for 0* which can then be 
180 
substituted into (13) to give the right hand side of (20) . 
1+ 2# _ p2 + 
(2 -)6): (20) 
Hence we need to locate values of 3 such that; 
2,6 -, a2 > 
[2 -, 6 
,8 
Relabelling the left hand side of this expression as A, and the right hand side 
as A.. we hence require; 
A, >A (22) 
A, is a monotonically non decreasing fiinction over the interval [0,1]. It has a 
point of inflection at 6= -1 and is concave to the left of this point and convex to 2 
the right of it. 
A,, and A, are equal at three points in the interval [0,1] including the end- 
points zero and one. The two curves intersect internally at 8* which is approxi- 
mately equal to 0.16. To the left of this point A,,, lies above A, but the positions 
reverse to the right. We can therefore say that on the interval (0,1) to the left 
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of 8* money yields a higher level of per capita utility than insurance, whilst the 
converse holds for )3 > P*. Note that as )3 tends to I both assets' utility yields 
will approach the feasible per capita maximum, but in our model we retain the 
assumption of 8<1. 
We noted in equation (11) that certain parameter restrictions must be used 
to make the calculations with the insurance asset valid., It can be shown easily 
that rearrangement of (11) shows that 3<I is a sufficient condition for (11) to 
be valid when we let p become arbitrarily small. 
We can conclude that if 8> 8* holds there exists a strictly positive value of p, 
the size of the insurance payout region, such that a stylised second best Friedman 
policy (see Taub 1988 p 581) will yield a level of per capita utility lower than any 
monetary policy that causes money not to be valued. 
4.9. Conclusions. 
I have highlighted sufficient conditions in which a particular economy with indi- 
vidual risk but no aggregate imcertainty calls for a second best policy that ensures 
money will not be valued, rather than using a second best Friedman style policy. 
The sufficient conditions we have located reflect the intuition on the workings of 
the. 2 assets we have described. We have shown that if 3<1 then a monetary 
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equilibrium can exist in our model, with agents choosing money instead of insur- 
ance to save in. Yet if p is sufficiently small and 3 large enough then this choice 
of the monetary asset will yield a sub second best social outcome. The need for 
to be small is that the requirement that the insurance asset should be sufficiently 
superior to money (and sufficiently superior to make our style of proof work) in 
achieving the social welfare improving task of redistribilting wealth to the more 
hungry agents. The need for the restriction on 6 is from the fact that this af- 
fects the consumption/saving decision of agents no matter what asset they hold. 
The lower region of possible values does not yield our desired result because such 
values restrict the efficacy of insurance more than money. 
As we have seen qualifications to Riedman's result have not been uncommon 
in the literature. For instance, we have the results discussed above of Bewley 
(1983) and Taub (1988) that consider the restrictions on the feasible tax level 
and return on money (see chapter 2 also). Another example is the issue raised 
by Phelps (1973) that in the presence of distorting taxation a government might 
wish to finance some of its expenditure by the inflation tax (implying a return 
on money below that implied by the Friedman rule), rather than use just the dis- 
tortionary taxes. The counter example presented in this paper however is a more 
fundamental qualification to Friedman's result (or its second best counterpart, 
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more accurately). This is because it builds directly on a notion that Friedman 
raised himself, that of bringing individual and social opportunities closer together. 
In our model, under the circumstances highlighted this is something that insur- 
ance is clearly better at. Yet the return on money, if high enough will be such 
that agents are induced to hold the "inferior" asset, which is money, through their 
individually rational optimising behavior. 
We have two issues to be settled that arise from this model. The first concerns 
the issue of the form of the utility function. Although the basic argument of 
the idea is about budget constraints and matching private opportunities to social 
opportunities, we are in a second best situation where the poor insurance asset 
performance of money must be balanced against its function as a buffer stock. The 
following example I sketch is an illustration that the essence of my argument is 
retained with concave utility, that an equilibrium with too much money is possible 
but that the extreme conclusion of no money being optimal is not so robust. 
Consider an economy with two types of agents A and B. In odd periods, 
the type A agents have an endowment of one unit of the single good, and type 
B agents have an endowment of a with probability p and an endowment of b 
with probability I-p. I assume I>b>a and that a and b are stOciently close so 
that in the equilibrium the agents will always be liquidity constrained in these 
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poor states. This greatly simplifies calculations, since a complex state dependent 
evolution of real balance holdings does not now occur. All the money stock is 
held at the end of the period by agents who had the endowment of one unit 
of the good in that period. I will restrict attention to steady states again, and 
assume the same kind of insurance asset set up, so that with the insurance asset 
paying off only in the 'worst' state for agents, we hav6 that pR=1 yields the 
equilibrium return on the insurance asset. Given the restriction on parameters 
that will yield liquidity constraints in the poor states, then in equilibrium the 
relevant first order conditions will be as given below, where MU,, MU,, and MUb 
denote marginal utility in states with endowments 1, a and b respectively. 
The first order condition for insurance is; 
MU, =, 8pR MU,, (1) 
pR ==l in equilibrium hence gives; 
mul = pmu,, 
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In Money; 
Mul ý--: N (PMua + (1 - P)MUb) (3) 
Therefore; 
mul 6 (1 - P) 
MUb (1 - PI) 
And; 
mu" (1 - P) 
Mub PI) 
(4) 
(5) 
What do these equations reveal ? The crucial ones are (4) and (5) above. 
Equation (5) implies that to optimally balance the allocation of resources across 
states a and b, a gross return on money of one would be required. This would be a 
return that balanced correctly the choices of agents between insurance and money. 
its rationale in terms of equating individual and social opportunities can be seen 
in noting that the utility return to both assets is impeded by the factor 6 in both 
assets, hence the absence of 8 in equation (5). Agents can transfer funds out of 
state b and into state a at a rate of RII by buying more insurance and less money. 
The social marginal rate of transformation between those two states (treating all 
agents in an ex-ante identical fashion) is given by the ratio of the mimbers of 
agents in the two groups. This ratio is 1=1!. Since R=1 holds, equating private PP 
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and social opportunity costs means that 1=1 must hold. Note that on the grounds 
of allocation of wealth across assets the result implies that the return on money 
must equal the expected rate of return on the insurance asset. This sounds like 
a kind of "modified" optimum quantity of money rule. This is the first model 
to investigate the interaction of money and state contingent assets in 
this fashion and this result is hence a new contribution to the optimum 
quantity of money literature. 
Returning to the set of equations, (4) implies that if 1=1, then the return on 
money is too low, given the assumption )3<1, and hence needs to be raised to 
make the buffer stock mechanism work better. The clash between these two goals 
is hence clear. The optimum monetary policy in this case clearly lies in the open 
interval (1, (where is the maximum return permitted by the Bewley 
difficulty. Friedman could clearly lay claim to both ends of that interval. The 
structure of the model is such that the optimum quantity of money is infinite, 
but that demand for money with I will yield a finite money demand, and 
also that rate of return is feasible. To show the essence of the result I chose to 
ignore any consideration of the Bewley difficulty that may arise, and assume that 
1=-I is a feasible rate of return. I then examine under what conditions I is 
suboptimal. This is investigated below. 
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The method used is to use the equations above (one to five) to determine the 
equilibrium allocation as a function of the rate of return on money and to apply 
these results to derive conditions tinder which the derivative of the function that 
describes ex-ante per capita welfare with respect to the rate of return on money 
is negative 
Firstly we assume that the period utility function taýeS a logarithmic form, 
then assigning equal welfare weights to each consumer in the economy means the 
maximisation of the welfare function (in the stationary allocation); 
In cl +plnc,, +(I -p) In cb 
Using equations (4) and (5) to substitute out c, and c, yields; 
V=ln 
I-PI )+pln('-P')+2lnCb (16 
(1 -A 1-P 
Goods market equilibrium dictates; 
Cl +PCa+ (I -P)Cb =: I+ pa+ (1 -p)b=- x 
This relabelling simply aids notation. Use again of equations; (4) and (5) to 
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eliminate c, and c,, from the left hand side of this expression yields; 
Cb 
(I _PI) +p(1 _P. [)P+, 8( 1_ P)2 X 0 (1 - P) 
Hence; 
Cb : -- (1 
X'3 (1 - P) (10) 
_ P. 
T) +, 6 (1 _ PI) p +, 3 
(1 
_ P)2 
Maximisation of (7) then reduces to maximisation of; 
(1 +p) In (I -pI) -2 In 
((I 
_pl) 
(1 + pp) +p (I _ P)2) 
(11) 
Differentiation with respect to 1, setting I equal to -1 and rearranging yields condi- )3 
tions that must hold if we are to have the second best Friedman rule suboptimal; 
1+p 
>2 
(1 + pp) (12) 
1 P- 1 P- _ P)2 0 0)(, + #8p) +, 
6 (1 
Inspection will reveal that if 3 is sufficiently small (and less than p) then this 
inequality will hold. 
The final issue is to what extent to such "too much money " results in other 
models. Answering that question will help to distinguish my result. Reference to 
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such a notion is certainly hard to find in the literature, and if present at all it 
seems that such a possibility arises in the overlapping generations literature. If 
we imagine a simple Samuelson type overlapping generations with money the only 
asset, and a double continuum of agents to avoid clashes between definitions of 
symmetric Pareto optimal allocations and maximisation of welfare of the typical 
generation, then any deflation of the money supply will yield a level of welfare 
below that obtained in the non-interventionist monetary equilibrium. In such 
models, the marginal rate of transformation across generations is unity and the 
gross rate of return on money should equal this. With too high a rate of return 
on money in such a model, too much trade across generations is the problem. A 
natural question to ask is can we produce such a result in a model with contem- 
poraneously and infinitely lived agents? In a model such as Townsend(1980), a 
gross rate of return on money I>-1 would produce an inefficient situation of too 0 
much trade. However in this kind of model no equilibrium with I> is possible. 
If we trace out the first order conditions of agents in such an economy then we 
I can see that such an equilibrium could not occur since it would require endoNv- 
ments to increase over time in line with the desired path of consumption (see the 
coverage of this model in the literature survey). The finite lives in the overlapping 
generations models avoids such a problem; the pattern of consumption over time 
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and across generations will be 'sawtoothed' rather than continually growing as in 
the Townsend model. 
On the face of it then, such a difficulty of non-existence might occur in the 
model I have presented. To overcome such a difficulty in the model I have intro- 
duced a margin 'within' the model at which mis-allocation by money is possible 
without violating conditions for money's positive value in equilibrium, so taking 
an approach different to that of 'too much trade'. The necessary conditions were 
two fold. Firstly an asset that performed a role that money could not do within 
a second best environment had to be present, and secondly a way of pricing that 
asset that made it 'inefficiently' unattractive to agents. Might we envisage other 
similar results using the same approach ?A type of model we might look to for 
such a case is the model of Lucas and Stokey (1987), since Nve have an economy 
where cash buys some goods and credit others. If we kept the classification of 
goods rigid and made sure that credit had an imperfection making it unattractive 
then such a result of too much money could clearly be envisaged, leading to mis- 
allocation between cash and credit goods. However if the choice between the two 
media of exchange was endogenous then we would have a different conclusion. All 
exchange Nvould become monetised and the possibility of too much money disap- 
pears. We would have to make sure there is essentially something in the model 
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that money cannot do, which the Lucas/Stokey assumption imposes exogenously 
and artificially. 
Another type of model -%ve may consider is the Sidrauski/Brock model of money 
in the utility function. Too much money in this model means a return on money 
strictly greater than that on capital, and inefficiency would be implied by the lack 
of capital held to produce the output of the economy. The problem with such a 
situation however is of course that no such equilibrium can exist; money cannot 
have any real value at all if there is no output. A solution might be found however 
if we look at the stochastic form of the Sidrauski model, as examined by Danthine, 
Donaldson and Smith(1987) and DenHaan (1990). Due to the aggregate random 
return on capital the return on money is also random. Also note that money 
enters into the utility function, and so we might envisage an equilibrium in which 
the rate of return on money is pushed above the optimal level recommended by 
DenHaan and yet some capital is still held by the agents so that production is 
allowed. The yielding of an 'incorrect' level of consumption is the only possible 
fault in such a case, and since wealth effects are absent in such a representative 
agent framework (see chapter 5) a utility function separable in consumption and 
money would have to be assumed, and at this level of analysis the conclusions are 
unclear. 
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In summary of this discussion about possible alternative situations of 'too 
much money' we can make some comments about how likely such a scenario is in 
'various' macro models. The possibility in the overlapping generations framework 
is clear. In models of contemporaneously and infinitely lived agents the possibili- 
ties are less clear when we move outside of the case I have highlighted. A model 
such as the Townsend set tip where money is the only asset is certainly not a sit- 
uation where 'too much money' is possible. Models with artificial restrictions on 
the functioning of different assets (particularly inside assets) are clearly undesir- 
able, as my comments on the Lucas/Stokey model notes. We are lience forced to 
look at models with a real asset that has a function distinct from money; such as 
the money and growth models, although I noted that the conclusions are unclear. 
Alternatively we can turn again to inside assets, but in a situation where there 
clearly is 'something that money cannot do' , such as in the insurance example of 
this chapter. The poor insurance performance of money pointed out in this chap- 
ter is a case that seems to be 'essential' to money. In support of this chapter's 
result we can also again recall the comments of Karaken and Wallace (1980) who 
object to the way that some assets are simply placed into the utility function or 
their functions exogenously specified (e. g. the Lucas and Stokey set up). The ap- 
proach of this chapter has been to derive results for the equilibrium of the model 
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by showing the assets 'in operation', in regard to the consumption allocation they 
support. The model fits the tone of the whole thesis since the redistribution role 
of the assets is what is important here and a non-representative agent frameNvork 
is hence essential. 
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Chapter 5 
Superneutrality with RUy Income 
5. Superneutrality with Risky Income. 
The literature discussed in this chapter and the model that follows deal Nvith 
the issue of the superneutrality or otherwise of money in the type of dynamic 
optimising monetary models that form the basis of the study carried out in this 
thesis. 
I apply the configuration of endowments that Bewley uses to yield a problem 
with his existence proof to show that another potential difficulty with the optimum 
quantity of money can arise in models with endowment risk and money. This is 
that in a finite horizon model with a positive probability of zero income in each 
period, an attempt to improve economic welfare by implementing the optimum 
quantity of money proposal by deflation or paying interest on money will leave 
the set of equilibria of the model unchanged, if money is neutral, where neutrality 
is appropriately defined. We can hence say that in such circumstances neutrality 
is sufficient for superneutrality as long as attention is restricted to negative rates 
of money growth; a kind of one-sided superneutrality result. I shall furthermore 
suggest that if we have a situation where the probability of a reversal in the sense 
of Levine (1991) is high, in that a continued run of bad hick has a sufficiently small 
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probability then in principle the optimurn policy would be one of the Friedman 
kind, but because of the result outlined above, doing nothing yields just as high 
a level of welfare. 
Though I exposit the idea as an application of Bewley's result, I also suggest 
that a potentially even stronger result holds in a finite horizon version of my 
chapter 2 model with risky capital, such that the superneutrality result is fully 
two sided; the optimum policy of 'repairing' the consumption stream will hold for 
inflationary monetary policy also. 
When the supernentrality literature is reviewed below it will be seen that 
generally the results hinge on whether the real factors of the equilibrium are 
immune to changes in the rate of inflation and the level of real money balances. 
The implication of the Bewley/ chapter 2 factor applied to this question yields an 
essentially different cause of suPerneutrality. Here we find that the rate of inflation 
is independent of the rate of growth of the money supply. This is a conclusion. 
that is new to dynamic general equilibrium monetary models. The reason for 
this factor arising is that the timing of the withdrawals from the economy is 
unimportant. This has echoes of a Ricardian equivalence type result, but such 
a conclusion is new to the money superneutrality literature due to the role that 
fiat money takes in the models of Bewley and myself. In both types of model we 
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have money valued as a financial asset since it is not dominated in rate of return 
with probability equal to one. Contrast this for instance with models of money in 
the utility function and cash in advance models that have capital accumulation. 
There money is dominated in rate of return with probability one. When the tax 
is levied on individuals across the time periods in the model, then at least part of 
the saving to meet the tax liability(we assume all wealth, is capitalised) will be in 
the form of the dominating asset, capital. The demand for money at time zero will 
then change less than one for one with the present value of the total tax liability, 
discounted by the return on money. The demand for money will then not rise to 
cancel out the fall in the money supply as it does in the case shown below. A 
similar argument holds in all the subsequent time periods also, so that a gradual 
fall in the money supply over time yields a resulting fall in the price level over time 
also. As might be anticipated from the discussion in my chapter 2, faced with 
a tax liability arriving at various points in time, the agent whose Nvealth is fully 
capitalised must set aside enough wealth from his present wealth to meet the tax 
liability, as they do in the Sidrauski/Brock productive capital model. However 
in the models of Bewley and myself the wealth set aside goes into money; this 
yields non existence in the infinitely lived agent consumer case or superneutrality 
in the finite horizon case. If the Bewley model when the endowment stream has 
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a sufficiently large lower bound that the tax bill can be met with probability one, 
we can say that wealth is in a sense almost surely non capitalised so that the tax 
demand for money does not arise. In contrast where there is a positive probability 
of zero income forever then we can say that there is a positive probability that 
money phis income in the current period is the limit of their lifetime wealth, so 
we might call it capitalised in this probabilistic sense. 
The only other model in which money is not dominated in rate of return with 
probability one is in overlapping generations models. A consumer who has an 
endowment stream (1,0) will set aside a nominal amount equal to the nominal 
amount of the tax bill in the first period of life in money but the ineffectiveness of 
the timing of the taxes does not occur; the arrival of new generations is important 
here, as the rest of this survey will show. 
5.1. Review of the Literature. 
We firstly need to clarify some definitions/parameters of study. The issue of 
neutrality of money firstly needs to be defined. This relates to the effects of a 
once and for all change in the nominal stock of money. In this study we shall 
restrict the definition of monetary policy to injections/withdraivals of fiat money 
by means of himp sum transfers. This might seem at odds with a traditional 
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definition of monetary policy that separates monetary and fiscal policy, but it is 
as standard in the field of study that this thesis covers. Examining the usual form 
of the budget constraint; 
G-T+Br=AM+AB (1) 
Monetary policy in some circles is described as a change in the composition 
of the right hand side of the equation above. The transfers that operate in the 
models examined in this thesis have aT to accompany the change in M; i. e. 
helicopter drops for instance. 
Having clarified this we must flrstly address the issue of when money is neu- 
tral. If prices are Walrasian then clearly the only effect of any change in the 
money supply can be through distributional effects. If the himp sum transfers are 
levied across agents in proportion to their existing money holdings then money 
will be neutral. Note that the efficacy of money in the models of Levine (1991) 
and Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) depends on the uneven distribution of money 
balances before the injection. 
Superneutrality questions whether change in the rate of growth of the money 
supply will have real effects. We must of course demand a model in which real 
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effects might potentially occur. A pure exchange version of the Sidrauski/Brock 
model with a representative agent having an endowment stream of y per period 
cannot exhibit non superneutrality in the conventional sense. In this model the 
agent maximises; 
00 E, 81ut (ct"mt) 
t=O 
subject to; 
(2) 
ct + mt+l =y+ mt, mo given 
There is essentially no margin for reallocation or change in output to be af- 
fected in the equilibrium of this model, only the level of real money balances will 
change, as ct = yt is the goods market equilibrium condition, with yt exogenous 
for all t. Money is deemed to be superneutral in such a case, although Marty 
(1994) questions the definition since a change in the level of real money balances 
m has real effects; on the utility of agents. Marty's argument however is against 
the general tradition of the literature which tends to back the view of Halin (1965, 
1973) that money should be essential and have real effects on the allocation of 
resources if we are to say it is grounded in a good theoretical model. 
If we were to make the utility function into one of the form U(c, m) = min 
(c, m) where m here denotes the start of period money balances then, we will have 
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that money must be superneutral, even by Marty's definition. This is of course 
equivalent to the cash in advance constraint formulation of money's role. 
To study the issue properly we need a margin of allocation to be affectable. 
For instance in the above model with a cash in advance constraint we might look 
to endogenise labour supply, and hence output. ln mathematical terms such a 
model is equivalent to the cash/credit good set up Lucas and Stokey, with leisure 
as the credit good and consumption as the cash good. Since the key first order 
condition of the model is; 
MU (leisure) =, 8PO MU (consumption) P, 
then the time lag in payments can create a way in which monetary policy 
can affect the marginal rate of transformation and hence output. Clearly with 
a more general utility function U(c, 1, m) (that is not cash in advance) we must 
have Ua,, =54 0 for superneutrality to fail. 
A perennial topic in the field is the effects of money growth on capital ac- 
cumulation. Following a debate started by Tobin in the nineteen sixties in non 
optimising models, the first model to address the issue in an optimising framework 
was given by Sidrauski (1967). This representative agent model had no leisure 
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in the utility function, with an inelastic labour supply. Sidrauski found that in- 
dependent of the value of U, money was superneutral in the steady state, i. e. 
the steady state capital stock was independent of the rate of monetary growth. 
Fischer (1979) examined the issue of superneutrality on the transition path to the 
steady state. He found that money is superneutral if U,,,, = 0, but superneu- 
trality is violated if separability does not hold. Danthi4e, Donaldson and Smith 
(D. D. S)(1987) covered the issue for the case of uncertainty in the production pro- 
cess and f6imd that unless U,, =0 holds money is non superneutral. D. D. S give 
the explanation of such a result by saying that since the economy is continually 
buffeted by stochastic shocks then it is always away from the steady state. 
As Fischer's comments in his paper reveal, these results were not fully under- 
stood at the time. The non superneutrality results in the overlapping generations 
models of Drazen (1981) and Weiss (1980) deepened the puzzle. The issues were 
clarified by Cohen (1985) and Weil (1991), and Nve describe the sum of their 
explanations below. The basic problem of the consumer is to maximise; 
00 E O'U (ct, mt) 
t=O 
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subject to; 
kt+l + mt+l = m, + k't - ct (6) 
and the production function; 
f (kt) 
First order conditions are; 
In money; 
(7) 
U, (Ct) = '6 
A (U' (ct) + U' (Tnt+, )) 
Pt+l 
In capital; 
U' (ct) = 6f' (kt+, ) U' (ct+, ) 
If we look at the equation that governs the transition of the economy's capital 
stock; 
kt+l =f (kt) - ct (10) 
then clearly the only factor that can affect capital acciunulation is the path of 
consumption over time. We can characterise the path of constimption simply and 
heuristically in terms of its slope and its level. Firstly, we look at the 'level' of the 
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consumption path. The issue that clarifies this was addressed by Weil (1991) and 
questions whether money is net Nvealth or not. Consider the representative agent 
framework of Sidrauski, Fischer, et al., where there is no population growth. The 
question of whether money is net wealth and hence the wealth status of monetary 
injections/withdrawals can be answered in an intuitive fashion. Fiat money is of 
course simply an intrinsically worthless piece of paper ano , only 
has value if it is 
not spent. Hence the representative agent must hold it perpetually if it is to have 
a positive price, so that it will drop out of the consumer budget constraint when 
we look simply at wealth used for pure consumption purposes in the physical 
sense, which of course is all that affects the path of capital accumulation. The 
essence of money as a worthless piece of paper and the possibility of its positive 
value are of course addressed elsewhere in this thesis. We have also suggested 
elsewhere that things are different in an overlapping generations model (it should 
be noted that the arrival of new agents is the crucial factor rather than the dying 
of existing agents). The difference is that the pieces of paper can be passed on to 
newly arrived generations, as I document in chapters one and six. In addressing 
the question of for instance inflationary monetary policy, a similar argument can 
show that the injections are not net wealth either. Obviously inflation is the re- 
sult of the injections and the real monetary wealth that 'nets out' in the process 
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can be given a formal representation in terms of budget constraints as follows. 
The technique is to define total consumption in the individual consumer's budget 
constraint as the sum of 'physical ' consumption and the foregone return through 
holding money instead of capital, since money is dominated in rate of return. We 
will follow Weil at this point and switch to the continuous time formulation, of the 
model, which allows easier manipulation of budget constraints for the representa- 
tive agent. Without loss of generality we restrict attention to the steady state of 
the model, and denote the steady state net marginal product of capital as r and 
the rate of inflation as 7r. 
PV (wealth) = PV(total consumption) (11) 
n 
ko + 
Mo 
= 
loo 
e7 rt (Ct + (r + 7r) mt) dt PO 0 
If the argument above is to be correct then we need to prove; 
mo 
C- rt (r + 7r) mt. dt w= 
10, 
Since in the steady state of the model with zero money growth inflation is equal 
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to zero; 
Mo 
=fC "trmt. dt 
fl PO 0 
Hence; 
Mo 
= r'AIIO 
100 
e-"dt 
0 po PO () 
(15) 
This simply implies that; 
mo mo 
PO PO 
And hence the non net wealth proposition is proved. 
In the overlapping generations models things are different. Transfers of money 
spread through time cause inflation that lower real money balances now and re- 
distribute wealth towards the later born. The opposite redistribution occurs with 
a contraction. 
Having categorised the difference between representative agent models and 
overlapping generations models regarding wealth effects, we must now address the 
question of the slope of the consumption path. There is no key difference between 
the two types of models on this question. The key factors here are whether the 
utility function is separable in money and consumption and whether the economy 
is in a steady state or not; i. e. whether the rate of inflation is constant or not 
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(though of course superneutrality will fail in the overlapping generations model 
anyway! ). Examine the first order condition in capital (9); if the money stock does 
not affect U, then the slope of the consumption path is independent of inflation. 
If U,,, =A 0 then a time varying nominal interest rate, yields a changing level 
of money demand and real money balances over time. The link from equation 
(9) to the slope of the consumption path is hence broken. This accounts for the 
difference between the steady state and non steady state results. 
Interesting results are also yielded by the cash in advance approach of Stock- 
man (1981). He shows that a cash in advance constraint on consumption yields 
superneutrality in the steady state and even the level of real money balances in 
the steady state is independent of the rate of growth of the money stock. Asako 
(1983) and Abel (1985) show that this superneutrality even holds on the approach 
to the steady state. Stockman and Abel show that things are different however 
when investment expenditures are also subjected to a cash in advance constraint; 
superneutrality fails and the intuition can be easily thought out by looking at the 
first order condition in capital again. 
The surveys by Orphanides and Solow (1990) and Wang and Yip (1993) show 
that violations of superneutrality can also occur even in the steady state of the 
representative agent model if we include money in the production. function or allow 
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labour to be supplied elastically. Again, the first order condition in capital is the 
key. In the steady state the rate of time preference will pin down the marginal 
product of capital, independently of the rate of inflation. However, for instance 
with money in the production function, the link from the marginal product of 
capital to the capital stock is broken. 
5.2. The Model. 
I shall now demonstrate the result formally in a Bewley type model, showing that 
a fall in the money stock over time is equivalent to a fall in the money stock at the 
initial date. The case that I choose to exposit below is equivalent to the Bewley 
model with a positive probability of zero income in all periods. However the result 
can also be extended in two ways. We have seen from the work of Bewley and 
those who followed him (Mehrling(1995) for instance) that in the case of a strictly 
positive lower bound on income then there exists a strictly positive upper bound 
on the rate of interest that can be payed on money and equivalently a maximum 
possible level of real balances that can be used for insurance purposes. A similar 
concept applies here. Unlike the infinite horizon model, interest paid beyond the 
'upper bound' (beyond which some money is demanded for tax purposes) still 
allows equilibria to exist, but the welfare levels will be no higher than those that 
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result from paying interest at the 'critical' rate. Hence below the critical rate of 
return money is non superneiltral, above it is superneiltral. 
When agents set aside money equal to the present value of the total tax liability 
(discounted by the return on money) this is in effect equivalent to reducing the 
money supply at date zero by the total amount of the tax. This is so because the 
money is held out of circulation, only to pay the taxes. A staggered reduction in 
the money supply is then identical to a once and for all change. If the once and 
for all change is neutral then money will also be superneutral and so Bewley's 
difficulty with the optimum quantity of money yields another difficulty. We can 
easily conjecture that my version of the difficulty has a wider application also; to 
the superneutrality question. 
The economy lasts for N periods. It is populated by a large number of agents 
who are born at date zero and die after the N th period. Income in each period 
is random and has a strictly positive probability of an outcome of zero in each 
period of the agent's life. To overcome the terminal date problem, we artificially 
attach one unit of utility to each unit of money held at the end of the last period. 
This is not of course strictly necessary to give money a value, under taxation but it 
provides a better 'backdrop' to the superneutrality issue. We will simply state the 
fundamentals of an economy with a given nominal money stock distributed equally 
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among agents at date zero and show that the fundamentals of the economy are the 
same as this under deflation financed by equally distributed lump sum taxation 
(as opposed to paying interest on balances; the differences have no particular 
importance, in contrast to the environment of chapter 3). 
(1) Non - interventionist monetary economy 
Agent i maximises at time t; 
N-t 
Eit E OsUt (C-it+, ) + MiN (17) 
S=o 
Subject to; 
Mt+l =A- ptcit + ptyit 
Mt+l 
M, =M (20) 
(2) Monetary economy with taxes 
The govermnent levies himp sum taxes symmetrically across agents; 
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Tit ý-- Mt-i. X 
Where; 
(21) 
vt X) mt-1 (22) 
The problem for each agent is now to maximise the utility function above 
subject to; 
Mt+l ý= A- ptcit + ptyit - Tit (23) 
At any date t there are N-t periods left and by assumption there is a positive 
probability that the agent's income will be zero in each period. To meet his tax 
liability with probability one he must hence hold money equal to his total future 
tax liability. If the per capita money supply is ]Tt at time t then he must hold 
balances at least equal to; 
MT = XM t+ XM t 
(1 
_ X) + _, 
ýgt(1 
_ X)2 . ..... 
(24) 
Each consumer solves his problem in two stages. Firstly he sets aside money 
balances as described above. Then he manages his remaining wealth as though 
the tax liability did not exist. If we look at the monetary economy at date zero, 
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it can be represented in terms of the same set of agents, with real endowments 
and preferences as before. This time the only change is that each individual's real 
balances are split between the 'tax account' and the remaining balances are held 
for trading. We can hence say that the monetary economy with taxes is equivalent 
to the economy without taxes but an initial level of nominal money balances in 
per capita terms equal to V- HT. Under the assumption that the monetary 
policy has been applied symmetrically to match the symmetric distribution of real 
balances, all real variables of the economy (interestingly also including the level 
of real money balances in circulation) are independent of the size of the money 
stock or its rate of change. A one sided superneutrality is hence shown. 
5.3. Conclusion 
I have shown that in a finite horizon economy adapted from Bewley (1980,1983) 
even when we have monetary equilibrium existing with a deflationary monetary 
policy then problems with Friedman's proposal still occurs, namely that money 
can be superneutral. 
I would conjecture that if I was to develop a version of rny model of chapter 2 
with a finite horizon then a full two sided superneutrality result would occur, since 
the capitalisation of wealth is absolute, and not just with a positive probability 
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as in the Bewley case above. 
It is also interesting to note that the effects of a positive probability of zero 
income for the rest of life is not considered in the Ricardian equivalence literature, 
and such an application of the Bewle: ý/chapter 2 difficulty would be of benefit. 
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Chapter 6 
Financial Imperfections, Money, 
Endogenous Cycles and Persistence 
6. Financial Imperfections, Money, Endogenous Cycles and 
Persistence. 
I present two ideas in this final original chapter. I firstly show that a model with 
financial imperfections can yield multiple equilibria based on endogenous market 
participation, including the possibility of cycling between high and low states of 
activity. The driving force is the minimum real size of investment required to enter 
into an investment project, and the restriction brought about through imperfect 
financial intermediation that the investment projects are indivisible; i. e. that no 
more than one individual may invest in any given project. Low economic activity 
yields low liquidity levels and an inability to invest in productive projects. This 
is what yields the low economic activity. The endogenous participation yields the 
result that in states of low economic activity, the signals provided by prices to 
keep the competitive economy at full employment do not get through. I find that 
I am able to generate endogenous cycles without the need to violate the condition 
of gross substitutability between consumption at different dates as Grandmont, 
(1985) was forced to do. 
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The second model exhibits an essentially dynamic movement of liquidity round 
the economy. The distribution of the constant real stock of liquidity between 
agents of differing risk attitudes influences the investment level of the economy, 
since investment is essentially risky. The redistribution of liquidity round the 
economy and hence the rate of investment is influenced by financial structure and 
in the monetary economy potential investors must wait. to accumulate liquidity. 
If a low shock has occured then the monetary economy has to stay at a low level 
of activity for a further period. 
The key factor common to both models is the indivisibility of investment 
projects both in terms of the minimum size of investment and the indivisibility 
across individuals, making the participation in certain projects endogenous to the 
state of the economy. The effects of market participation are key to both models 
presented in this chapter and the review of the literature set out below outlines 
some of the implications of incomplete market participation. 
6.1. Review of the Literature. 
The focus of the thesis so far has been on economies where incomplete markets 
led to multiple budget constraints and inefficient steady states, and we looked 
at money's ability or otherwise to overcome these difficulties. The topic of study 
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would not be complete however without looking at the role of liquidity constraints 
and the distribution of liquidity in the cause and propagation of aggregate fluctu- 
ations. I will forward two results which provide some contrast with the existing 
literature in those two areas. I will firstly survey the literature that pertains to 
the indeterminacy of equilibria in models with restricted market participation. 
In overlapping generations models the restriction is exogqnoiisly specified. In the 
models of Bewley and Townsend already covered the liquidity constraint is exoge- 
nous and its biting occurs in each period for at least one agent and for each agent 
in at least one period, in the presence of impatience and a constant money stock. 
In the original models I will present, the financial imperfection is that the inter- 
mediary sector cannot facilitate the divisibility of projects and dependent upon 
the state of the aggregate economy, the constraint on the level of investment may 
or may not bite. This endogeneity contrasts importantly with the overlapping 
generations models and the Bewley class of models. We can also put the model 
alongside the emerging class of endogenous market participation such as Allen 
and Gale(1994) and Chatterjee and Corbae (1992) but these do not deal with 
aggregate fluctilations in economic activity. 
The second model 1 present has fundamentally exogenous shocks, but the way 
the economy redistributes liquidity has important implications for the frequency 
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of investment and the persistence of shocks. 
AVe have already encountered models that link the distribution of liquidity to 
aggregate fluctuations in the literature survey. We also briefly documented the 
possibility of multiplicity of equilibria in an overlapping generations model. I now 
turn to a more detailed consideration of indeterminacy in overlapping generations 
models and hence how they relate to models with contemporaneously lived agents, 
which are the focus of the thesis. The issue of the valuation of money will be 
touched on again also. 
A vast and still growing strand of literature concerns itself with the issue of 
multiplicity of equilibria in dynamic general equilibrium models. This issue is 
not always every-where an essentially monetary phenomenon, indeed an overlap- 
ping generations model with complete markets and no money might still posses 
a continuum of distinct equilibria. Conversely not all dynamic monetary models 
display indeterminacy. However, the common framework typically used to exam- 
ine the tivo areas and the extent of common occurrence of the two phenomena 
make some discussion of such a topic in a thesis such as this absolutely essential. 
As I have said the literature in this area is vast but a number of useful surveys 
have appeared on the topic. Among those are Woodford(1988), Farmer (1993), 
Kehoe (1992), Boldrin and Woodford (1990) and Azariadis (1993), and the dis- 
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cussion of the background to the original models presented in this chapter draws 
on these. 
We need to clarify a point of definition before we proceed. Indeterminacy 
refers to the existence of an uncountably infinite number of distinct competitive 
equilibria (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991)). This describes a lack of local 
uniqueness of equilibria. 
Apart from the purely theoretical interest aroused by the issue of indetermi- 
nacy in these models, the area has attracted much attention from macroeconomists 
since it allows a demonstration that the Keynesian notion of animal spirits in in- 
vestment can yield instability in the level of employment and output, yet be fully 
consistent with the presence of Walrasian prices, market clearing and rational 
expectations. The accomplishment of this has been termed the macroeconomics 
of self fulfilling prophecies. As I have noted the indeterminacy of equilibria does 
not always and everywhere rest upon the existence of valued fiat money. However 
I will shortly describe an environment in which indeterminacy does indeed rest 
upon the presence of outside money, and the discussion of such a case allows us 
to shed ffirther light on an issue discussed in the thesis already, that of the valu- 
ation of fiat money. Indeed if we stick to a framework in which there is a single 
consumption good, then the presence of valued fiat money is a necessary condi- 
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tion for the source of indeterminacy of equilibrium we consider in this chapter, 
since a necessary condition is the presence of two or more goods. The discussion 
centres around a comparison made by Kehoe (1992) between economies with a 
finite number of infinitely lived agents and one with an infinite number of finitely 
lived agents. 
Before looking at the difference between economies with a finite number of 
infinitely lived agents and an infinite number of finitely lived agents, we must 
examine the 'challenges' we have to face in creating an economy with fiat money 
and indeterminacy of equilibrium, some of which we saw in the survey chapter. 
If we have an economy with a definite starting date then we saw that in trying 
to derive a model with a positive value for fiat money we must face the challenge 
of a potential mis-match between the present value of expenditure and resources 
in the economy. In the case where money enters the utility function the solution 
is clearly achieved by having money 'held' throughout the infinite horizon of the 
economy, so that in terms of the budget constraints, money is held as a kind of 
consumption in itself (recall this discussion from chapter 5). In an overlapping 
generations model we have a situation where money is essentially held briefly 
then to be spent, and no such argument can be invoked. Recalling the budget 
constraints appearing in equations one and two in the survey that aggregates the 
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market valuation of the economy's wealth, we here adapt them to where we have 
one consumption good so that w and c are scalars and pt denotes the money price 
of the good in period t. We have, by aggregating over all consumers; 
00 00 
Eptwt + Eptct t=o t=O 
We saw that positivity of the value of money would violate the feasibility 
constraints in such a situation of 'spending' unless the present value of real wealth 
is infinite. This can be seen if we divide (1) through by po. We shall later note 
that a non decreasing price level through time is sufficient to achieve this. With 
a finite number of agents this implies that the wealth of at least one consumer 
is unbounded and clearly no equilibrium will exist. It is clear that if such a 
problem is to be avoided we must either look for an economy where the unbounded 
real wealth is divided among an infinite number of agents, each who have finite 
wealth, or to stop any agent with infinite real wealth from using his wealth in 
a manner that would yield unbounded consumption. The formal representation 
of the former is the overlapping generations framework covered in the survey 
chapter for the Cass, Okuno and Zilcha paper, and the latter is the infinitely lived 
agent debt constrained or incomplete market type model which is the focus of 
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this thesis. An alternative way to view the solution provided by the overlapping 
generations framework is that the infinite resources in the economy necessary for 
money to have value in the economy where it is continually spent are 'arriving 
from infinity' via the arrival of newly born agents with their endowments. It 
should be noted in passing that this is of course not a sufficient condition in itself 
for money to have positive value, as should be apparent from work in the rest of 
the thesis. In particular, we must have that the return on money is sufficiently 
attractive to agents and that the economy can support such a rate of return as an 
equilibrium. This of course alludes to the relation between the inefficiency of the 
barter equilibrium and the existence of a monetary equilibrium. In other words 
the rate at which the bubble which is money must grow for agents to value it 
must not exceed the rate at which new resources arrive in the economy to match 
tMs value. 
The difference between economies consisting of a finite number of infinitely 
lived agents without liquidity constraints and an economy with constraints (or an 
overlapping generations framework) is usually expressed as a difference in market 
participation. The phrase has a clear meaning when we look at the effect of the liq- 
ifidity constraints, but it should be noted that for instance ive can introduce some 
infinitely lived agents who are not debt constrained into an overlapping genera- 
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tions economy and retain the basic results of the overlapping generations models 
as long as these agents only control a small amount of the economies resources 
compared to the total, or more precisely that their endowment has finite value in 
equilibrium, so that unbounded consumPtion is prevented. In the interpretation 
of an overlapping generations type model as a model of infinitely lived agents with 
debt constraints then it will be the case that in the monetary economy the value 
of some agent's wealth will be infinite, but the presence of liquidity constraints 
truncates the planning horizon of the consumer, and the way that prices value 
future Nvealth is now 'irrelevant'. Despite the focus of the thesis, exposition is 
aided by from here only comparing the models of overlapping generations with 
those of infinitely lived unconstrained agents, hopefully all equivalent cases should 
be obvious. 
Two other important conchisions follow from the double infinity of goods and 
agents. They concern the Pareto optimality or otherwise of equilibrium and the 
number of equilibria in the model. Of course as we have noted the inefficiency 
of the non monetary equilibrium is very important. Firstly, an overlapping gen- 
erations monetary economy with an infinite valued endowment stream resulting 
from strictly positive inflation would not be Pareto optimal. If we have a positive 
rate of inflation yielding an infinite present value of resources then the equilibrium 
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will not be Pareto efficient. We can increase the welfare of all agents by 'bringing 
resources back from infinity'. We hence raise the consumption of the initial gen- 
eration and improve the intertemporal allocation of the subsequent generations. 
(The closer the return on money balances is to zero the closer individual and 
social opportimities are brought together). Amongst the continuum of equilibria 
that typically exist, that which has a constant price level will be Pareto efficient 
(crucially we assume zero population growth), although the endowment stream 
has infinite value. This can be explained as a 'borderline case '; pushing the rate 
of return higher by seeking a return on savings that is strictly positive would 
yield a Pareto optimal allocation (though no such case will exist with money in 
these simple cases since the value of money will grow too fast relative to the re- 
sources provided by a constant population whose total endowment value given 
by discounting with respect to the return on money will yield a finite number). 
A lower return yields a non optimal allocation. We can specialise the results of 
Balasko and Shell (1980) which give us a necessary and stOcient condition for 
Pareto efficiency of equilibrium to the one good case; 
00 
00 
t=o A 
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The other interesting, crucial and influential result concerns the number of 
equilibria in the model. The infinite horizon model without liquidity constraints as 
Kehoe (1992) shows can be proven to have under quite general conditions a finite 
number of locally unique equilibria. Kehoe uses the approach of Negeshi/BeNvley 
that utilises the second welfare theorem. As we might guess in the overlapping 
generations model with money such an application will, not be possible. In fact 
(as we showed graphically in the survey) that such a simple model as we consider 
with one good plus money might possess a continuum of inflationary equilibria 
that converge asymptotically to autarchy. 
Since in this simple model the reason for this indeterminacy is the presence 
of money, we can explain the presence of these two factors in one step. The key 
phrase is that there is a lack of market clearing at infinity. If the reader refers to 
the coverage of the question of money as net wealth in general equilibrium models 
(chapter 5) then the following discussion will come as no surprise. 
Following the argument of Kehoe, we can envisage an artificial finite horizon 
economy of T periods in length where there is a final young generation as well as 
the initial old generation. If money is to have value then the final young generation 
must accept it and relinquish goods. However we know from looking at finite 
horizon models of truly fiat money that such a situation is infeasible, since the final 
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generation will be unwilling to do this. A situation therefore where we envisage 
money being spent by existing generations and hence ultimately generation T-1 
which is matched by the delivery of goods from outside the first T-1 generations 
is characterised by non market clearing. Alternatively we can note that if we 
aggregate the budget constraints of the first T-1 generations then we have our 
original perplex of the total value of expenditure exceeding the total value of the 
endowment, hence Walras law will not hold. The extra degree of freedom in the 
determination of the 'equilibrium' in the T period model comes from our ability 
to vary the nominal price level that determines the net transfer of goods from 
the final young generation to the initial old generation. The obvious question is 
then; can we have a monetary economy where this indeterminacy remains without 
ever 'explicitly' forcing a final generation to literally behave sub optimally? The 
answer of course lies in the infinity of agents. Their never ending arrival means 
that we can retain the degree of freedom that varying the initial level of the money 
stock gives us without ever observing sub optimal actions by agents; the lack of 
market clearing is at infinity. Put another way, the budget constraint will be 
seen to hold asymptotically as xve increase the horizon of the economy without 
bound. We can show, as in the analysis of the Cass, Okuno and Zilcha paper of 
the literature survey that we can start the economy off at any of a continuum of 
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real money balances and show the existence for each of an inflationary equilibrium 
converging asymptotically to autarchy. 
We can show the same result of a dimension of indeterminacy by counting 
equations and unknowns as we move forward in time. We can view such a process 
in the context of a model of infinitely lived agents with borrowing constraints by 
noting that the extra constraints add restrictions that make some equations unable 
to contribute to the determination of equilibrium, though they are not essentially 
redundant. Some express this by saying that multiple versions of Walras law 
are present. Staying with the one good plus money framework, in the initial 
period, application of Walras law for the money and good market for that period 
yields one equation in two unknowns, po and pl, the respective money prices of 
the consumption good in the first two periods. As we move forward and apply 
equilibrium conditions in the subsequent markets, in adding one equation Nve 'lose' 
an unknown but gain another. The net effect is to yield after n applications of 
this procedure, n equations in n+1 unknowns. The indeterminacy problem can 
be clearly seen. 
The discussion above centres totally around the indeterminacy of equilibria by 
showing why we can have an economy with a contimulm of deterministic perfect 
foresight equilibria all converging asymptotically to autarchy. A further question 
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is whether such economies can exhibit perfect foresight equilibria which cycle 
from period to period or fluctuate in a stochastic fashion. The answers to these 
questions and indeed even the issue of when indeterminacy will occur still have no 
definitive general answers, hence the continually growing field of research output. 
We can nevertheless note some of the more central findings in the field. ln general 
a sufficient condition (see Azariadis (1993) p 86-87 for example) for a dynamical 
system to exhibit a cycle of period 2 is that the map that gives the transition 
from xt to xt+,, (call it f) should have two fixed points at zero and Y >0, and 
a point a>T such that a >f(a) and a> f2(a) (simply the difference equation 
applied twice) then F (T) < -1 is a sufficient condition for a cycle of period 2 to 
exist. This effectively means that the offer curve is strongly backward bending 
near the steady state, T. The need for the existence of two possible xt+l values for 
a given xt in the neighbourhood of the steady state for the existence of a2 cycle 
is intuitively obvious, and can be seen if we try to "use" the offer curve. 
We can use the intuition behind the notion of a cycle to examine the idea of 
a sunspot. A sunspot variable is a random variable whose realisation may poten- 
tially affect the real equilibrium allocations of the economy without having any 
effect on its fundamentals (endowments, preferences etc. ). The sunspot variable 
effectively selects the expectation of what will happen in the following period. It is 
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thus known as extrinsic uncertainty. In a standard real business cycle model with 
stochastic shocks to fundamentals (e. g. King and Plosser (1984) the uncertainty 
is termed intrinsic uncertainty. In the context of a simple one good plus money 2 
period lives overlapping generations model a stationary sunspot equilibrium con- 
sists of prices Pa, A in states a and b respectively and transition probabilities 7r,,,, 
and 7rbb in the interval (0, I). For the sunspot to matter (i. e. to affect real allo- 
cations) Nve must have that p,, =ýA pb. Building on these definitions we can clarify 
the notion of an endogenous cycle. If we note that a cycle is simply a degenerate 
stationary sunspot equilibrium with a transition matrix 7r ... = 7rbb = 0, then an 
endogenous 2 period cycle is a fluctuation in real variables that arises without 
the need for any fluctuation (stochastic or otherwise) in the fiindamentals of the 
economy, although there may be intrinsic uncertainty present as well. 
When will a sunspot exist in the class of overlapping generations models that 
we have discussed? There are two basic factors to consider. Firstly for some 
sunspots an essential difference between the nature of a cycle and a sunspot is 
brought out. Indeterminacy and the possibility of periodic orbits in the real 
variables determined in equilibrium does not necessitate the incompleteness of 
markets; the double infinity of agents and goods as in the overlapping generations 
model is what is important. Even the inability of agents to meet together and 
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trade at the start of time is not important. However if we are to have the presence 
of sunspots that matter, then they must be uninsurable. The original example of 
Cass and Shell (1983) emphasises not just the completeness of insurance markets 
but the question of whether all agents can participate in the insurance markets; 
similar to the notion of participation in the overlapping generations models. A 
possible reason why some agents can't participate in an ipsurance market that 
is relevant to them is that they are not born in the period when the insurance 
asset trading takes place. Hence the ability of agents to meet together at the 
start of time may be important. As Woodford (1988) shows, the basic notion 
is that sunspot realisations cannot matter if the first welfare theorem holds. If 
we suggest 2 different allocations that correspond respectively to 2 realisations 
of the sunspot variable, the property of strict convexity of preferences coupled 
with convexity of the set of feasible allocations means that the sunspot allocation 
cannot be ex- ante Pareto optimal. Hence for sunspots to matter ive must depart 
from the Arrow-D ebreu structure in some way that causes the first welfare theorem 
to fail. An overlapping generations structure is an obvious and popular one to 
go for. The indeterminacy it creates is useful in 'constructing' sunspot equilibria. 
Farmer describes the exercise as randomising over a set of multiple equilibria based 
on indeterminacies; of the kind we have described, non-convexities or externalities. 
229 
Woodford (1988) presents two examples of economies consisting of a finite number 
of infinitely lived agents under imperfect financial intermediation that can mimic 
the kind of dynamic behavior associated with overlapping generations models. 
This is in the spirit of the type of original model that I present in the second 
half of this chapter. An advantage of these types of models over overlapping 
generation models is that the periods implied for the cycle will be, less than those 
of the lifetime of the consumer that the overlapping generations models imply. 
The first type of model presented by Woodford is the cash in advance economy 
of Wilson (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1984). It is a representative agent model 
but one that has a representation of a financial structure imposed upon it in the 
form of a cash in advance constraint on the purchase of the consumption good. 
The worker has direct access to a production technology y=n, where n is labour 
supply. The single consumption good that is produced is perishable. The proceeds 
from the sale of the good cannot however be spent until the following period; the 
-renowned payments 
lag that motivates a holding of money. The consumer problem 
is hence; 
00 
max Eo E, 8' (u (ct) -v (nt)) (3) 
t=O 
subject to; 
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ptet < Allt 
Mt+l = Mt - ptet + ptnt 
The first order conditions are then; 
v'(nt) =, 6Et (u'(ct+, )) 
A 
Pt+l 
and; 
U, (ct) ý: V, (nt) (5) 
Woodford notes that the first order conditions of the model and also its equi- 
librium conditions are the same as would obtain in a standard overlapping gen- 
erations model. By linearising around the monetary deterministic steady state 
of the model, Woodford derives the result that sunspot equilibria exist in the 
neighbourhood of this steady state if there is a sharply backward bending labour 
supply curve. This implies strong income effects of a change in the ratio P' that Pt+1 
are felt to be empirically implausible, in general. Such a case would also violate 
the 'gross substitutability condition'. 
A solution to this problem found in the literature is to add the possibility of 
capital accumulation to the model. Reichlin (1986) was the first author to do 
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so. Woodford shows how this can be done in a model of contemporaneously and 
infinitely lived agents by ensuring that the capital stock is owned only by a set of 
agents who are separate to those who supply labour. Another solution is displayed 
in the original model that follows this survey. 
Some of the models surveyed in Farmer (1993) consider alternatives to over- 
lapping generations and infinite lives debt constrained models as ways to generate 
multiple equilibria, cycles and sunspots. The focus of part of Farmer's work is 
in looking at models of infinitely lived consumers that display non - convexities 
in the aggregate technology; externalities in production is one possible case. An- 
other framework is akin to the Diamond style search economy (1984) where there 
are transacting externalities created by the holding of money as a stimulus to 
the trade of others (see Benhabib and Farmer (1991)). Farmer uses this case to 
exposit the main ideas behind an important strand of his research, the response of 
real variables to changes in monetary policy, a recent tradition of models started 
by Farmer and Woodford (1984) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1985). He 
shows that in the face of a change in the nominal money supply, when the mone- 
tary steady state of the model is stable, that restricting attention to the rational 
expectations equilibria of the economy does not necessarily imply the policy in- 
effectiveness of the new classical tradition as would be the case with a unique 
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dynamically unstable steady state. The local stability of the monetary steady 
state means that the economy could follow a path with a level of real money 
balances which gradually converges to the steady state level over time. 
Before presenting the original contributions of this chapter, two other types 
of models that may display non-uniqueness of equilibria should be mentioned. 
Matsuyarna (1991) addresses the issue of multiple eqiiilibria in the Sidrauski- 
Brock money in the utility ftinction model, for the case of endowments rather 
than capital (see Brock 1974). Azariadis (1993) summarises the model and the 
essential results of Matsuyama. The model is that of a pure exchange economy 
with a single representative agent who lives forever and maximises the discounted 
value of utility in consumption and end of period real money balances; 
00 
E, 8'W (ct, mt) 
t=O 
(6) 
Azariadis notes that the crucial factor in determining the mimber of equilib- 
ria of the model, where y is the perpetual per-capita endowment stream of the 
economy's consumption good, is the value of mNv, (y, m) (in goods market equilib- 
rium). If for instance the period utility function is separable in consumption and 
money balances then m-, vr is increasing in m, then the steady state is unstable 
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and this is the unique equilibrium of the model. If however the function miv, is 
locally decreasing in m then the map of the difference equation mt+l as a function 
of mt is non monotone and may admit the possibility of cycles, since the monetary 
steady state may then be asymptotically stable. 
Another type of model exhibiting indeterminacy of equilibria deserves mention 
here. The 'source' of price indeterminacy specified in the model below is different 
from that of the overlapping generations models. The way in which it affects 
real allocations in some ways resembles the mechanism in the sunspot overlap- 
ping generations literature, since money is a nominal asset in both models whose 
variation in value across states of nature mean a variation in the -%vay in which 
the asset pays off in real terms across the states. In the overlapping generations 
model the indeterminacy of the price level comes from the lack of market clearing 
at infinity already described. In the Nvork of Cass (1985) and Geanakoplos and 
Mas-Collel (1989), the source of indeterminacy is Walrasian indeterminacy. The 
context of such work is to explain how a factor that is innocuous in the context 
of real assets or complete markets, has definite real effects when the assets are 
financial and the asset market complete. The notion of Walrasian indeterminacy 
describes the result that the 'absolute' price level is indeterminate in a set of spot 
markets (say). By the absolute price level we mean prices expressed in some ab- 
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stract non-traded unit of account; 'moon dust' say. Imagine an economy with 2 
dates, no uncertainty at the first date, but two or more states of nature at the 
second date. If we express absolute spot market prices at the second date in moon 
dust and the asset market is complete then by definition there are enough degrees 
of freedom in the pricing of the nominal assets so that varying the absolute price 
level in across states will not affect the real allocation. , 
When there is market 
incompleteness (i. e. a payoff matrix with rank less than the mimber of states) 
then the requisite degrees of freedom are not present in the asset structure. If 
the payoff in the assets is real (i. e. paying off in a muneraire commodity whose 
price is determinate) then the nominal indeterminacy is not important and has 
therefore no real effect. If however the assets are nominal and pay off in the unit 
of account whose value is indeterminate then the indeterminacy becomes real also, 
since the payoff of the asset is changed in real terms across states. For instance 
let us say that we are in an economy with uncertainty at the second date where 
the only asset is flat money, (which is used as the numeraire) whose nominal re- 
turn in all states is the same, and the value of money is indeterminate: then real 
indeterminacy would result. If the money price of goods was determinate then no 
real indeterminacy would occur. Geanakoplos and Mas-Collel exposit a situation 
where the assets are 'monetary' and the money price of goods is indeterminate 
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in the states at the second date due to an assumption about the way in which 
money is given value. The case selected is that of a nominal tax demand at the 
end of the second period which as we have discussed earlier in the thesis leaves 
the price level indeterminate (a real tax would remove the indeterminacy)- 
6.2. Endogenous Market Participation and Endogenous Economic Fluc- 
tuations. 
Imperfect financial intermediation can manifest itself in many forms and one of 
these is the indivisibility of investment projects across individuals. Potential fi- 
nanciers may have difficulty in finding partners to join in a project and this par- 
ticularly becomes a problem when the minimilm scale of investment is such that a 
single investor cannot finance any investment project on his own. If the level of liq- 
uidity that determines his participation or otherwise in the market is determined 
endogenously then the possibility of multiple equilibria may be created. 
Following this conjecture and the survey above I present an original result 
that demonstrates that a model with endogenous market participation can dis- 
play endogenous fluctuations, in contrast to the exogenous participation restric- 
tion models previously described. The model I present hence complements the 
type of literature cited above on endogenous fluctuations and also a new and 
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growing literature on endogenous market participation, for instance see Allen and 
Gale (1994). The result I derive shows that violations of gross substitutability in 
preferences are not necessary to generate endogenous cycles and also has market 
participation playing a role subtly different to that in the overlapping generations 
models. The essence of the mechanism is the same in both the model below and 
the overlapping generations models in that the non participation means that sig- 
nals provided by some prices do not get through. However, in the overlapping 
generations framework the result is the opening up of a dimension of indetermi- 
nacy, whereas the model below exhibits switching to a different yet locally unique 
level of economic activity, if financial market participation does not take place. 
The models described in the short literature survey above showed the impli- 
cations of exogenously imposed liquidity constraints for the impediment of the 
signals transmitted by prices that otherwise prevail in a complete markets set up. 
Results analogous to the overlapping generations literature were then shown to 
be possible. It would be interesting to know if a constraint whose binding was 
endogenous and dependant on the state of the economy could produce economic 
fluctuations. I show that such a result is possible by 'telling' the following story of 
activity in an economy. Imperfect financial intermediation manifested as a lack of 
divisibility of investment projects with a minimum size can leave 'poor' households 
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unable to participate in the market for funds which will finance these projects; 
with only one person able to supply finance for any one project. If these projects 
are what ultimately generate the income of households then we have a scenario 
where participation is endogenous and is the source of multiple equilibria. 
I present a model of an economy which has a large number of firms and house- 
holds so that we can suggest that a relatively low level of liquidity in the aggregate 
would be no barrier to participation in the investment in firms if the projects were 
divisible between individuals. Given a high interest rate fundswould be channelled 
through the 'intermediary sector' and would flow through to investment projects. 
The only possible competitive equilibrium with -I- >0 would be the 'full employ- Pt 
ment' level. To provide intuition on this, we can try to imagine a situation where 
real money balances are too low to finance all projects but enough to finance 
at least one project. Say that all funds are invested in just one project. Given 
the assumption of constant returns to labour, agents could Nvork as much as they 
I 
wished at the going wage rate and the level of output produced and consumed 
would be such as to raise the level of real money balances and make investment 
in all projects possible, so that the hypothesised low level of activity could not 
be an equilibrium with divisibility of projects across agents. The high level of 
real money balances generated means that in equilibrium there is no rationing 
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of funds and all projects are funded to the same amount, by symmetry of the 
firms. If there was some upper limit to the scale of one firm then it might be 
interesting to see if low level equilibria with divisibility of projects were possible, 
whilst retaining the minimum participation requirement. 
To reiterate, the mechanism in operation is that in a shimp a low level of real 
money balances means insufficient liquidity for one agent., to finance an investment 
project, which requires a minimum level of investment, x. We can interpret the 
financial market therefore as a market for units of funding of minimum size x. 
There is hence no participation by savers in the bond market. They are hence 
unable to take advantage of the high real interest rate which arises to clear the 
bond market. Since the firms have to borrow to employ labour this reduces labour 
demand and hence output. Since money is used as a medium of exchange in this 
I 
model economy with velocity equal to one, this generates the low level of real 
money balances that caused the illiquidity problem in the first place. The source 
of multiple steady states in the model (high and low activity levels are both 
possible) and of cycles between high and low activity levels is hence clear. 
The IoNv level of real money balances is characteristic of the form of the model 
in slump states, with the price level being determined by the ensuing level of real 
activity (see the Townsend, Bewley and overlapping generations models also). As 
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an analogous situation. we might imagine a formulation of the model with purely 
inside money where people are constrained by an inability to borrow an amount 
greater than their next pay cheque, a constraint which like the case above may or 
may not bite, dependent upon the endogenously determined state of the economy. 
The absence of such a constraint would allow fiill market access in all states and 
the interest rate would always guide the economy to a unique Itill employment 
steady state. 
6.2.1. The Economy 
I begin by reviewing the basic mathematical model, based on that of Fuerst (1992) 
and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). This structure is selected simply because 
it demonstrates the kind of configuration of households, firms and the intermediary 
sector within which the story I have sketched can be demonstrated. Indeed this 
is the kind of approach taken by Christiano and Eichenbaum in following Mierst's 
- work. The economy is populated by a large number of identical and infinitely lived 
households. The motivation of Fuerst and Christiano and Eichenbaum in their 
models was to examine the short run effects of the distribution of liquidity in the 
economy whilst avoiding the complexity of a distribution of wealth evolving over 
time. They employed a trick first introduced by Lucas who splits the household 
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into sectors to exposit the mechanism of trade in the economy and then reunites 
them at the end of the period. The story that is told and used below is that the 
household separates out into 3 separate entities. The 3 sectors of the economy 
are workers/savers, a financial intermediary sector (essentially imperfect in this 
model) and a firm sector. At tile start of each period after splitting up to trade we 
assume that all the stock of fiat money in the economy is held by the worker/saver 
sector. The worker/saver has two options for his money in the current period. 
He can hold it to finance consumption expenditure in the current period or save 
with the intermediary sector. I part company with nierst and Christiano and 
Eichenbaum by assuming that there is a minimum size of investment required if a 
project is undertaken and that investment in any one firm can only be carried out 
by one agent at most. Hence the projects are indivisible, so I am assuming that one 
of the essential roles of the financial intermediation sector works only imperfectly. 
I shall retain the terminology of 'saving with the intermediary sector' to describe 
the channelling of funds from households to firms even though the intermediary 
sector only manages to carry out a one to one matching of 'savers' and firms in 
my model. 
If the saving in the inside asset marketed by the intermediary sector does take 
place then they will earn a gross nominal interest rate of Rt payable in period 
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t+1. The funds acquired by the financial intermediary in that period are then 
loaned out by the profit maximising intermediary (As long as Rt ý! 1 holds) to 
firms who use the money to employ the labour of the workers/savers (they must 
borrow to do this). The money earned as wages can then be spent on the output 
of the firms which is produced from labour. (Note there is no cash in advance 
constraint on consumption purchases, only a within period cash constraint). The 
firms (price taking profit maximisers) then use the receipts to repay the loans 
to the bank. The intermediary then repays the debt to the worker/saver with 
interest, at the end of the period, for use in the following period. I assume that 
the production technology is fixed and has labour as the only input. As part of 
the story we assume some hidden heterogeneity so that the household's firm does 
not employ its own labour or consume its own good so that the clecentralisation 
imposed makes sense; again it is a story in the spirit of Lucas(1980) (or see the 
Blanchard/Kiyotaki type models (Blanchard and Fischer (1989)). 
Another change to the set up of Fnerst et al is in addition to allow the firm 
sector to have an endowment F of the economy's good each period which they 
can sell on the goods market. The motivation for that action can be seen by 
remembering that the firm's objective ftinction is end of period nominal profits, 
noting that the good is not storable. When the period is over the profit will be 
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returned straight to the worker/saver (or effectively to the household as a whole) 
for the start of the next period. Shares in firms are not tradeable. Note that the 
cash in advance constraint is on labour used in the investment projects and not 
consumption, since the wages earned in the current period can be spent on the 
consumption good. 
6.2.2. Individual Optimisation Problems. 
All households are distinct yet identical, so no index is necessary to distinguish 
different decisions, asset holdings etc. All variables below are in per capita terms. 
The worker/saver maximises; 
00 E pt [In ct + In (I - lt)] (7) 
t=O 
(Nvhere ct denotes consumption at time t and It is labour supply). O< 0<1 is 
assumed. 
Subject to; 
Mt+l = pty + StRt (8) 
This says that total money held at the start of period t+1 will be the sum 
of saving with the intermediary and interest plus the profits of firms. St is the 
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level of saving at the intermediary in period t. ptF is the nominal profits of the 
firm at the end of period t, where F is the exogenous endowment of the good 
that the firm owns, noting that there are constant returns to labour. Rt is the 
gross nominal return on savings in period t, the yield being paid at the end of 
the period. Initial money balances equal to the per capita money supply, M are 
given to each household at the start of the model. 
This form of the budget constraint (8) (which 'short circuits the maximisation 
problem) can be derived from the following information: 
Mt = St + Et (8a) 
Where Mt is the stock of money held at the start of period t and Et is the money 
allocated to augment wage income in the purchase of the consumption good in 
period t. I have assumed in advance that all this money held after the saving 
decision (given by the amount St put into the intermediary) is spent on goods 
during the period and that all wages earned are spent during the period, so that 
saving in 'bonds' (i. e. at the intermediary) and the profits of the non-market- 
tradeable firms are the worker/savers only form of saving for the next period. This 
is later justified firstly by the return on saving at the intermediary being greater 
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than that on money for the case where such saving does occur and secondly that 
when there is no participation in that debt market then the return on money 
is too low to encourage saving in it. Hence Mt+ldenotes the amount of money 
held at the start of period t+1 after the return on saving at the intermediary and 
profits have been payed out, rather than saving directly in fiat money. 
The cash constraint on consumption is: 
ptct :ý Et + wtlt (8b) 
wt denotes the nominal wage in period t. 
Total funds held at the start of period t+I are then the stun of profit and 
saving phis return at the intermediary plus any unspent 'consumption' balances: 
Mt+l = pty + StRt + Et - ptet + wtlt (8c) 
Following the argument I sketched out (to be validated later), the value of 
unspent consumption balances will be zero and hence (8) will obtain. 
In addition we have the minimum participation constraint; 
St 
> x, unless St is zero. Pt - 
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We might describe the financial market as a market for 'bundles' of liquidity of 
size at least equal to x. 
The income constraint from the labour market is; 
Nominal labour income = wt1t 
First order conditions are then in labour supply; 
1= Wt I (10a) 
I- lt Pt Ct 
And in saving at the intermediary; 
1= 
ORt-! ýt 
1, 
if St >0 (10b) 
Ct Pt+l Ct+l 
The financial intermediary takes deposits from the workers/savers and as profit 
maxiniisers will clearly loan them all if Rt > 1. (We assume that indifference causes 
no problems if Rt = 1). 
The firm will maximise the nominal value of profit in period t; 
-7r = ptYt - wtRtlt + pty (11) 
246 
Subject to; 
Yt == lt 
Where Yt denotes output. 
I shall now describe some of the equilibria of the model; 
6.2.3. Full Employment Steady State. 
(12) 
We obtain the full employment steady state in the model where the stock of liq- 
uidity held by households is sufficiently large to enable investment in a productive 
project via the intermediary. 
The nominal interest rate can be obtained from the worker/saver's first order 
condition in saving at the intermediary, (10b) since by definition the level of 
consumption here is the same from period to period. The upper bars denote 
steady state boom values (Y is exogenous, as is M) ; 
11 
== rR-= PC PC 
Therefore -%ve have; 
(14) 
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The real Nvage is determined by (14) and the first order condition for the firm 
hiring of labour, which comes from the maximisation of (11) subject to (12); 
R-W 
==1 p 
With (14), (15) yields; 
w 
=O p 
(14) yields the result that the nominal interest rate will be strictly positive since 
the rate of time preference is strictly positive. Money is hence dominated in rate 
of return. 
Goods market equilibrium is given by; 
Zý = Y+F (16a) 
From the production f-Lmction we have; 
1=Y 
Substituting (16a) and (17) into the first order condition for labour supply then 
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determines output; 
11 
T T- ýY) wy ý+-Y) 
With (16) this implies 
1+ß 
(19) 
(note that at even at 'full employment' impatience is an impedime4t to economic 
activity) 
The price level is then determined by the quantity equation; 
=F+Y (20) 
Where M denotes the per capita money supply, all held equally among the house- 
holds at the start of the model. 
Clearly F+F >x is necessary for the existence of such a steady state, given (9), 
the minimum level of real wealth holdings for participation in the debt market, 
which comes from the minimum size of investment and the indivisibility of projects 
across individuals. We assume this holds, so that we have participation in this 
state. 
Is the quantity equation. valid? If the velocity of circulation is unity in all 
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periods then nominal income is the same in all periods and we then have this first 
order condition in money; 
1>6 Pt 1, vt 
Ct Pt+l Ct+i 
since we have 6<I and the quantity equation dictates; 
mý Act ý-- Pt+lct+i (21a) 
This is hence self supporting and will. later be seen to hold for both steady 
state booms and shimps and the cycle that follows these (indeed it should be 
apparent from the formulae at this stage). In other words Nve have the result 
that agents do not wish to save by holding fiat money. The flow of fiat money 
around the economy is that Et the level of 'consumption' balances is all spent, as 
is established above and the amount that passes to the intermediary is all loaned 
out to the firm, as follows from the positive nominal interest rate from (14). This 
- money is all used to pay wages. In other words; 
wtlt = St (21b) 
These are then all spent on consumption by the workers. Combining this infor- 
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mation with equation (8a) then establishes the unit velocity quantity equation. 
6.2.4. Steady State Slump. 
In the scenario that follows Nve have that a low level of real balances generates 
the result of no participation in the 'bond' market and hence no money channels 
through to investment in productive projects. The indivisibility of the investment 
projects as a result of imperfect financial intermediation is crucial here; only one 
person can invest in any one project (via the intermediary), and so low individual 
liquidity is the impediment to full employment. The high interest rates that 
result to choke off the demand for funds have no effect on the supply of funds. 
The endogenously determined non-participation in the bond market means that 
the signals that would otherwise guide the economy to full employment do not 
get through. 
Lower bars will denote steady state slump values, and again all variables are 
in per capita terms. 
Output, given that no savings flow through to firms to finance investment 
projects, is given by the level of exogenous output V (which is state independent)- 
The equation T' yields the price level if the velocity of circulation is equal to P 
one. A glance at equation (21) and the accompanying argument will reveal that 
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this holds. Clearly a necessary condition for the existence of such a steady state 
slump is then V<x, so that the non-participation occurs. Can we also find a full 
set of prices such that the above is an equilibrium? For zero labour demand, we 
must have that; 
Rw> 
p 
must hold. 
(22) 
On the other hand for zero labour supply, with equilibrium consumption equal 
to -g , 
(10a) dictates that ive must have; 
(23) 
Clearly if we choose ! v- to satisfy this condition for zero labour supply then p 
we can make R arbitrarily high to choke off labour demand, since no matter how 
high is the interest rate, participation by the savers is effectively prohibited. The 
-indeterminacy of the nominal and real interest rate and the real wage rate is a 
result to be noted. 
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6.2.5. Business Cycle. 
The scenario that I described above for the economy in a steady state slump in 
which the interest rate cannot transmit the 'required' signals provides intuition 
as to why the economy may fluctuate between states of high and low activity 
in successive periods. The spot markets that are held in a slump period are 
effectively isolated from those in the ensuing boom period due to the lack of 
voluntary holding of any intertemporal value store. 
As a result of this 'isolation', in the slump part of the business cycle, allocations 
and prices will be the same as in the section above. (R or ! V- may again be P 
indeterminate). We should further remind ourselves that the unit velocity of 
circulation of money that we hypothesised is 'self supporting' and does indeed 
hold since we have; 
I>01 
ptct Pt+lct+i 
(24) 
if we have 8<I then the inequality will clearly be satisfied, for both booms 
and slumps; the same argument applies as previously. 
The prices and interest rates in the boom part of the cycle are the same as in 
the boom steady state equilibrium, as is verified by the intertemporal saving first 
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order condition; 
I=R1 
TTC- Pf 
(25) 
This implies that )3R =I holds since velocity of circulation is equal to one. 
In conclusion, as well as demonstrating the existence of two possible steady 
states of the economy I have also shown the possibility of fluctuating activity 
from period to period as determined endogenously by the level of real money 
balances. The economy switched between participation and non-participation 
in investment into firms, via participation and non-participation in the 'bond' 
market. An interesting contrast with the surveyed literature is that in the model 
I have exposited the non participation in the 'bond' market causes activity to 
switch to a different level of activity which is itself locally determinate. This 
compares with the situation in overlapping generations models for instance where 
the non-participation opens new dimensions of indeterminacy. 
An important result is also that I have shown the existence of an endogenous 
two period cycle without the need to violate gross substitutability between labour 
and consumption. This is contrary to the assumptions of Grandmont (1985) and 
although Authors such as Reichlin (1986) have found solutions, the method used 
above is a new application to the problem. 
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6.3. Distribution of Liquidity and Investment Behavior. 
6.3.1. Introduction. 
The focus of the thesis prior to this chapter has been on ex-ante identical agent 
economies which evolved over time to exhibit a non-degenerate, distribution of 
liquidity across agents. The model above had a 'temporary' distribution effect as 
the representative household separated into different units to trade. The model 
I develop below has some ex-ante heterogeneity. I appeal to the intuitive notion 
that when investment projects are intrinsically risky and no insurance is available 
then only the less risk averse agents in the economy may wish to invest. It then 
becomes an important issue as to whether these agents have a stock of liquidity 
sufficient to yield the highest possible level of investment that is feasible in the 
economy, and which financial structure can provide that. The distribution of 
-liquidity in the economy is hence important, and 1 show that it can affect the 
rate of investment and lead to the persistence of low levels of output over time, 
when we invoke the assumption of the indivisibility of investment projects and a 
minimum, size of investment. The key factor of the model here is again endogenous 
participation in investment, as determined here by the risk attitudes of the agents 
255 
in the model. I assume again that the projects are indivisible across agents. The 
shocks to productivity are assumed to be aggregate in nature. 
We can contrast the result I obtain below with the work of Scheinkman and 
Weiss (1986) -%vho obtain a result for the persistence of shocks by noting that those 
with a low income shock have to run down their assets now and so cannot spend 
later, and those with a high income shock can accumulate wealthwhich means 
that future work incentive is reduced. I develop a model where the heterogeneity 
is exogenous and liquidity flows round the economy in a non-stochastic fashion 
(simply to aid tractability), but the persistence of a low shock to output can 
be explained in terms of the need for investors to accumulate wealth to reach 
the minimum level of Nvealth required to finance a project. In an economy with 
a debt market I shall show that the acquisition of liquidity can be 'immediate' 
and so low output levels need not persist. In a pure monetary economy with debt 
constraints however the Avealth needs to be accumulated over time. In Scheinkman 
and Weiss a process of accumulation is associated with undesirable results whereas 
the opposite is true in my model. 
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6.3.2. The Model. 
The changes in the level of liquidity in the model exposited in the last section are 
endogenous and unconnected to any variation in the fundamentals. The fluctua- 
tions sketched out are deterministic, but one might imagine the construction of a 
sunspot equilibrium, where the economy switches between high and low states of 
activity according to a stationary 2 state Markov proceýs. The model exposited 
below exhibits random aggregate fluctuations which have a different source to the 
class of fluctuations examined above. They are of the real business cycle type, 
with random productivity the underlying cause. The role of liquidity that I ex- 
amine is in explaining the persistence of a low shock to productivity on output. 
I develop a scenario where investment projects are ffindamentally risky and only 
some agents in the economy will possibly wish to invest in these projects. The 
lack of any opportunity for investors to borrow following a poor productivity shock 
interacts with the indivisibility of investment projects and a minimum investment 
size to yield a situation where they must spend time accumulating liquidity to 
be able to invest again. In some aspects this is in a similar vein to the effect 
examined by Scheinkman and Weiss (1986). What I present below is different in 
that the model shows the effect of liquidity distribution on the ability to invest 
in productive but risky projects, again utilising the indivisibility of investment 
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projects. The effect of what I show is that any initial period of low output is 
followed by another period of output below the 'maximum' output possible with 
probability one. A period of high or low output will in turn follow this dependent 
upon the realisation of the productivity process. The economy can be viewed as 
an endowment economy augmented with a risky production technology. This re- 
quires a minimum investment size which is one that would make ifivestment in all 
projects in each period feasible given the total level of resources in the economy. 
However I model consumer preferences relative to the production technology such 
that only one set of consumers will wish to invest in the technology. Models such 
as mine with an infinite horizon and a potentially infinite number of shocks might 
lead to a distribution of money that is difficult to handle. Authors such as Taub 
(1988) and Lucas and Stokey(1989) whose methods I have followed in chapter 4 
employ utility functions that yield corner solutions, as does Levine (1991), and 
this is the method I employ here. The degenerate utility functions employed here 
yield a simple price path, and aids the logistics of the model. I make agents on 
one side of the economy behave in a manner that implies a liking for the risky 
asset. I do this by assuming that they only value constimption at some particular 
level, and that their rate of time preference is arbitrarily high; they are hence 
impatient to reach this target. I assinne that level is sufficiently high in relation 
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to the per period income of the consumer B type, so that he prefers to gamble in 
the risky investment technology which will yield him the possibility of a return 
quicker than through waiting for accumulation through the safe asset. 
The financial set up we analyse first is a pure monetary economy in which 
money flows from one side of the economy to the other in alternate periods. This 
alternating flow is essentially driven by periodically fluctuating tastes on the part 
of the risk averse agents. Such a situation is created for the sake of simplicity 
in the flow of money around the economy and does not prejudice the analysis 
of the persistence of shocks, but is essentially tied tip with the lags in liquidity 
accumulation inherent in the credit constrained economy. 
To trace out the story that the model will tell, we begin by imagining a period 
following a poor production outcome from which the type B agents carry over no 
wealth as a result (this will be justified later). The enclowment of the good the 
consumer of type B has is insufficient to finance an investment project (remember 
that no more than one agent can finance any given investment project) and is also 
below the minimum level of consumption at which he derives utility; so his only 
available policy (other than disposal) will be to sell his endowment y on the market 
for money to save until the next period. Given this saving, in the following period 
lie then has enough wealth to meet the minimum size of investment required, 2y (I 
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will assume that this is also the maximum investment per project; i. e. complete 
indivisibility in that sense). The level of wealth however is still not enough to 
meet his minimum consumption requirement, 3y and so he will choose to invest 
in the risky production technology. He makes this choice since there is a positive 
probability of reaching the threshold level of consumption in this period since the 
investment pays off this period if it is successful. Coupled with impatience this 
makes the risky asset more attractive than saving in money. This he does by 
spending his money on the competitive spot market to obtain the real resources 
from consumer A to invest. If the project is successful (with probability p) then 
the investment of 2y will yield a return of 4y this period and 3y next period. The 
shocks to productivity are aggregate shocks; they are perfectly correlated across 
all individual projects. I assume that the consurners of type B are satiated at a 
level of consumption 3y and so consume the proceeds in this period. Given my 
assumption about the rate of time preference he will obviously consume no less, 
and any potential difficulties in the calculation of B's optimal policy is avoided by 
the arbitrarily large rate of time preference; he will always favor consumption over 
saving as long if lie has liquidity enough to take him to his minimum consumption 
level, but of course he will consume no more than 3y. I assume that only one round 
of investment and one round of trading is permitted in any one period. This is a 
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simplifying assumption to add a time dimension to activity and make the model 
'move forward'. In the following period the second part of the output of 3y is then 
added to the endowment of y for each B agent. The optimum strategy is then to 
consume 3y this period (since he is satiated at this level of consumption) and to 
carry over the value of y in money to the next period to carry out investment, 
and so oil. 
The desirability of the risky asset for this investor might be termed to be the 
'liquidity' that it provides in the sense of providing the possibility of reaching 
his required target of a minimum consumption level more quickly. However, a 
poor shock will yield no output at all and the ensuing period must be spent by 
the investor accumulating enough wealth to invest during the period that follows 
that. We may view that period as one during which the bankrupt investor must 
earn to accumulate enough wealth to invest again in the risky asset. I shall 
show that in a pure credit economy this problem does not occur, and indeed 
that investment takes place in every period of the model in that case, even when 
seemingly unnecessary. 
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6.3.3. The monetary economy. 
The economy is populated by a large number of agents who are divided equally 
into 2 types, A and B. They differ only in respect of their utility functions, which 
are, for type A; 
00 
UA 
-= 
EO T,, OýUAt 
t=O 
(1) 
I assume 6A >0 but that 6A may be assumed to be as low as needed to prove 
required results that will follow. 
Where UAt =H In (x + cAt) if t is even and CAt :ý 3y 
UAt =H In (x + 3y) if t is even and CAt ý: 3y 
UAt =L In (x + CAt) if t is odd and CAt :! ý 3y 
UAt =L In (x + 3y) if t is odd and CAt > 3y 
I also assume; 
H>L 
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I will later invoke the assumption that this dominance by H can be assumed 
arbitrarily large to prove required results. 
For type B; 
Eo 
16ý 
00 UB t UBt 
t=O 
Where IlBt = 3y if CBt > 3y 
UBt =0 otherwise 
Each agent ( regardless of type ) has an endowment stream of y per period of the 
economy's homogenous consumption/investment good. In addition each agent of 
type A has 2M in nominal money balances at the start of period zero. 
All agents have access to a random production technology whose gross multi- 
plicative return for a minimurn investment of 2y is 2 in the period of investment 
and a in the following period with probability p( hence yielding a sequence of 4y 2 
and 3y in total). Failure of the project occurs with probability (1-p) and yields 
a gross multiplicative return of 1 in the period of investment and zero in the fol- 2 
lowing period. I will assume that in a period where investment has taken place 
then no trade after the production outcome has taken place is permitted. Re- 
investment within a period is also forbidden. In the following period however any 
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output that accrues from the investment in that initial period may be traded or 
reinvested. In other words, only one round of trading and one round of investment 
may take place in any period. 
There is a sequence of spot markets, one at each date on which money can 
be traded against the homogenous consumption/investment good. There are no 
other markets or assets in existence in this monetary economy. 1, shall denote the 
per capita nominal money stock as R. The money price of the good at time t is 
pt. Social feasibility at each date lience requires per capita consumption less than 
or equal to y and per capita money demand less than or equal to 
We shall determine the equilibrium by firstly suggesting a path of output, 
trade, consumption and prices, and then demonstrating that it satisfies individual 
optimisation conditions subject to these prices, and of course social feasibility. 
The monetary equilibrium I propose is one with a constant nominal price of 
goods in which the whole stock of fiat money changes hands each period across 
- the two types of agents, starting the model off at time zero 
(note this is an 
'even period') with the A type consurners holding 2M, and type B consumers 
not carrying out any investment. This will later be seen to be equivalent to the 
period following a poor productivity shock). I propose that type A consumers 
will consume 2y each in this period upon spending their money, and zero in 
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the next period (one) as they sell their endowment for money. We are hence 
proposing a price level of 2 Af . In period zero the accumulation of wealth by type y 
B's is taking place in readiness for investment in the following period. When 
this period arrives ( period one in this scenario) the type B agents will spend 
their accumulated balances on the market for goods to obtain the extra y they 
need to make a real investment which then occurs. If the investment fails then 
an output of y accrues which by assumption cannot be retraded (i. e. the agents 
cannot sell it for money to gain liquidity for future use since investment and 
trading have each taken place once in the period already). Re-investment is ruled 
out by assumption but of course there is now not enough to meet the minimum 
investment level anyway, neither is the level y enough to give agent B utility. The 
output is then simply and costlessly disposed of by B. The economy then returns 
to the initial situation in the following period (two), as I suggested, as it will be 
a post 'low outcome ' period during which the type B agents must accumulate 
- liquidity. The per capita level of output of -V in for that initial investment period 2 
will then hence be followed by a period of no investment (an accumulation period), 
with per capita output equal to y, the exogenous endowment which is below that 
which a successfifl investment would yield. This is the essence of the persistence 
in the monetary economy, and will be seen even more clearly when we contrast 
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this with a credit economy later. 
If the initial investments in period one are successful however then a return of 
4y per project is yielded. The type B agents will consume 3y and then dispose 
the rest, since they are satiated at that level and the arguments sketched above 
on uselessness will follow also. The 'extra' output will come into play when we 
analyse the non monetary economy. 
In the period following this output of 3y per project accrues to the type B's and 
is added to their endowment of y. Given their utility ffinction and arbitrarily high 
degree of impatience they will consume the amount 3y. The remaining quantity 
y of the good they will not consume this period as it yields them no utility. 
Investment using this quantity y is not prohibited by the assumptions of the 
model but is not sufficient to finance investment in this period due to the fixed 
size of each undertaking. We shall see that the credit economy on the other hand 
will allow investment again in this period. The only option in a monetary economy 
for the type B consumers is to sell the amount y on the spot market for flat money 
to gain balances of ý-M-. As a result of the successful investment in the preceding 
period, output was hence high in the period we have just described. 'Positive' 
persistence is hence forced on the model exogenously. It is 'negative' persistence 
that we seek to explain in talking about financial structure. We should also note 
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however that in the credit economy which follows we can have investment in every 
period of the model, regardless of the shock history. 
The period (period 3) two periods after the investment was first undertaken 
then begins with the type B agents each holding 2V in nominal money balances 
and the type A agents holding zero balances. The trade that occurs then is that 
the type B agents spend their balances and the type A agents sell their endowment. 
Investment by the type B agents then can take place at the level of 2y. Whether 
the investment is successftil or not determines which of the paths described above 
will be subsequently followed by the economy. Note that investment will occur in 
alternate periods in this monetary economy, which correspond to periods in which 
constimers of type A consume zero. 
In summary of this position, ive can describe the equilibrium sketched above 
as follows. It is a sequence of consumptions for agents of type A of 2y, 0,2y, 
Ol .......... starting with an even period. 
The sequence of activity for Agent B types 
begins with them holding zero money balances Corresponding to the first period 
of 2y consumption for the type A agents, type B will have a consumption sequence 
starting with zero (an accumulation period) followed by a period of investment, 
and consumption of 3y if the investment is successful, with probability p. Such 
an occurrence would mean consumption of 3y in the subsequent period also. If 
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the investment fails, with probability I-p , consumption is zero in the period of 
investment and zero in the subsequent period as accumulation of money takes 
place. Investment is zero in this period following failure; we have hence returned 
to the initial situation we described and the process starts again. This period of no 
investment that follows means the persistence of output below the maximum level 
possible. This is the key result; the rate of investment that is facilitated by the 
financial structure of the economy. If we use final per capita output potentially 
available for consumption as our measure of economic activity ( including output 
that rnight be disposed) then we have a stochastic sequence as follows. Beginning 
in a period of investment we have with probability p per capita output of 2y in 
this period and output of ýy in the following period. (Remember that only the 2 
type B agents will invest). This latter figure includes the exogenolis endowments 
of the two agents (y in per capita terms, with no investment taking place in that 
period) . Returning to the initial period of investment, per capita output will 
beý 2 with probability 1-p and y in the subsequent period (i. e with no investment 2 
taking place whilst accumulation occurs) . VAiatever the outcome of the initial 
investment, two periods later the process will 'start again'. The persistence I have 
described can be seen from the period of low output following the failed investment 
period with probability one. Investment will occur in this monetary economy in 
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alternate periods with probability one. In the intervening periods agents of type 
B are accumulating money to buy goods for investment in the next period. This 
is not a problem when the investment has been successful as output is high for 
two periods running, but when investment has failed output will remain below the 
highest possible level with probability one in the ensuing period. The problem 
is the liquidity constraint on agents of type B that arises because'. of the lack of 
a market to channel the endowment of agent type A to the investor 'class'. The 
contrast will be seen most sharply when we later examine an economy that has 
such a set up, where we may have investment occurring in every single period of 
the model, regardless of the economy's history. Serial correlation for high shocks 
will remain but low production outcomes need not hamper future investment. 
Having sketched the suggested equilibrium for the monetary economy, I now 
need to show that the policies of the two types of agents described are indeed 
optimal, including their decisions on participation in risky investment. 
-I must firstly show that for the agents of type Aa consumption sequence of 2y, 
0,2y, 0 ....... is optimal 
(beginning in an even period), and that they achieve this 
only by holding money and choosing not to participate in the risky investment. 
If they do choose to hold only money then given a constant price level of the V 
consumption stream described can be supported by selling all their endowment in 
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the odd period and spending all the proceeds in the following even period. If we 
look back to equation (1) that gives us the utility function of type A agents then 
we can see that given a constant price level then the conditions below will suffice 
to ensure that such a consumption sequence is optimal. 
H In (x + 2y) ýý ßAL In (x) (3) 
L In x< ßAH In (x+ 2y) 
Clearly (4) is sufficient for both, and we can ensure that this holds by making the 
value of H sufficiently high relative to the value of L. This Nvill suffice even if 8A 
is made arbitrarily low. In other words, whatever the value of )3A >0, there will 
exist a value of 1ý such that (4) holds. L 
What parameter restrictions will suffice to yield non participation in risky 
. investment by the type A's ? The minimum size of participation in a project is 
2y and so like the type B's they must wait to accumulate wealth if they are to 
invest. Given that H>L is assumed to hold (along with discounting) then if we 
can show that the policy of accurnulation in an V period and investment in an 
'H' period is dominated then so is a policy of accumulation in an 'H' period and 
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investment in an V period. Furthermore, following this we can rule out a policy 
of waiting to accumulate precautionary balances over a longer period and then 
investing only part of them in the risky asset by making, 6A arbitrarily small. We 
begin the analysis by assuming that they have chosen the former. We start by 
assuming that they arrive in the 'H' period with 2y as their disposable wealth 
(note that (4) still holds). Their margin of decision is between consumption of 2y 
with probability one now, and investment with a probability p of consumption 3y 
in both this period and the next, or with probability 1-p consumption of y this 
period (they have no lower threshold for deriving utility) and zero next period, 
when accumulation occurs after the investment failure (i. e. we return to the 
original situation). Remember that type A's as for type B's are satiated at a 
level of consumption 3y. If successful the extra output above 3y is discarded in 
the first period, as by assumption it cannot be stored, traded or invested again, 
and the second period excess is sold on the market for money in the process of 
hecumulation for reinvestment next period, as in the scenario I described for the B 
agents. Following this the sequence Nvill repeat and so the analysis can be reduced 
to what appears below. 
If investment in the risky technology is to be less attractive then we must have; 
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Hln(x+2y)+, 3ALln(x) 
H (pln (x + 3y) + (1 - p) In (x + y» 
+, 8AL (p In (x + 3y) + (i - p) In x) 
(5) 
Given risk aversion on the part of the type A agents then clearly a sufficiently 
low L relative to H will suffice to make this inequality hold if we have; 
Pýj (6) 
We now have to show that the actions of the type B agents that I described in 
the equilibrium are optimal under such conditions. In the period following a poor 
production outcome the type B agent has no choice other than accumulation in 
money. His wealth of y is below both his investment and consumption thresholds. 
In the period following that, lie has wealth of 2y and faces the choice between 
saving again in money to obtain a level of consumption of 3y the following period 
with probability one and gambling in the investment project which has a positive 
probability of success this period, allowing consumption of 3y now if that is the 
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case and 3y next period also. Utilising this information then given the form of 
the type B's utility function in (2) a sufficient condition for 'investment no,, vl to 
be more attractive is; 
p (3y +, 6B3y) > J3B3y (7) 
Rearrangement will yield that for any strictly positive value of p, if 8B is 
I 
sufficiently low then the 'invest now' strategy is optimal. 
I have hence verified that the optimising actions of the two types of agents are 
compatible with the monetary equilibrium I described. 
The scenario analysed above is such that only one set of agents will ever wish 
to invest in the productive technology available. The result was the persistence 
of a 'low' level of output with probability one for the next period, due to the 
distribution of liquidity in the economy. A level of wealth of 2y that will make 
investment feasible but is held by an agent of type A will not cause investment to 
take place. The financial structure I impose on the model in the analysis below 
is such as to remove that tendency, by allowing investment in every period. 
6.3.4. A Credit Economy. 
The financial structure I assume here is such that there exists equal access to the 
risky technology as previously, but the riskless debt asset 1 introduce has restricted 
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usage. I allow Type B agents to lend and borrow in the asset, but type A's are 
constrained only to lend. This aids the tractability of the model by avoiding an 
embarrassment of riches in the wish of agents to participate in the risky asset. 
Endowments and preferences are exactly the same as in the monetary economy, 
except that the endowment of fiat money is no longer present. Preferences and 
technology are exactly the same as in the monetary economy. 
The inside asset is allows the lender to lend and receive repayment for con- 
sumption purposes within the same period with probability one. Hence type A 
agents may loan to type B agents and receive repayment within the period so that 
consumption in that period by type A's may take place. Given the lack of ability 
to borrow in the safe asset that I impose on type A agents and the absence of the 
intertemporal value store (money) in this economy the only options open to these 
agents are either autarchy or investment in the 'within period' safe asset (they 
can never accumulate the level of wealth required to invest). Clearly if the gross 
return on the safe asset is greater than or equal to one then the type A agents 
will be willing to invest in it. If not they will choose autarchy. 
We shall again assume that the projects are not divisible among the investors. 
We again begin the analysis in a period in which investment is required (post 
failure or two periods after a success). We will call this period zero. All agents 
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of type B have an endowment of y each and if the interest rate is favourable then 
they will borrow to invest in the risky asset at the threshold level of 2y. Since 
they are required to repay the debt within the period with probability one then 
the minimum return of y on the investment means that a gross interest rate of 
one or less will induce the desire to borrow, as such a scenario means that if 
the investment was successful then this leaves 3y for consumption., As we noted 
a gross interest rate of one will be sufficient to induce lending and so that the 
equilibrium gross interest rate for that period will be one. Investment by type B 
agents will take place and if the project fails the return per project of y will be 
repaid to each agent A. If the project succeeds then the total return per project 
is 4y, so that the type B agents can consume 3y and repay the loan of y to the 
type A agents. The period following a success sees the type B agents with their 
endowment of y plus the second round of returns on investment, 3y. They will 
consume 3y and borrow y from the type A agents at a gross interest rate of one 
and reinvest during this period. Recall that one investment per period may be 
made. A repayment of y will then be made to the type A agents no matter what 
the state. If the investment fails then the following period the economy will return 
to the initial state we began with. If the investment fails then the payoff of 3y 
above that needed to repay the type A agents will be costessly disposed of as 
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the type B agents are satiated and have no opportunity to save the output. This 
was the case with the original excess y from the previous period; i. e. a lack of 
options. The investment is carried out in this post success period since there is a 
zero opportunity cost to its usage and since 6B is strictly positive then expected 
discowited utility gains can be made through the possibility of the successful 
payoff next period. If this period one investment is successful then in period two 
the type B agents will each have 4y to handle. We are hence back in the post 
success scenario we just described. If the investment in period one failed then we 
simply begin again in the period zero scenario. We summarise the equilibrium as 
follows. In all periods the 'within period' interest rate is unity and each time the 
type A agent chooses to 'invest' in this asset. In a period after a failed investment, 
then in contrast to the monetary economy investment will take place again. Per 
capita output will then be 2y with probability p and 2 and with probability 1-p. 2 
In the period following a success investment will occur again and may result in 
per capita output as high as 7-2 if successful. 2 
I have shown in this credit economy that investment will take place in every 
period of the model, even in those where it is apparently unecessary, namely 
those periods following an initial success where agents of type B are satiated 
for that period. This speeding up of the rate of activity or the frequency of 
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investment (which effectivelY doubles) is a result of the financial structure I have 
assumed. This is of course the credit instrument which allows the transfer of 
resources 'immediately' from the risk averse side of the economy to the risk loving 
investors. This contrasts with the lags inherent in the pure monetary economy 
where all agents are liquidity constrained. The key point of interest however is 
that low outcomes of production process do not mean low output with probability 
one in the following period. The persistence of low output states disappears. 
6.3.5. Conclusions 
This chapter looked at the implications of financial imperfections for aggregate 
fluctuations that were endogenously generated or persistence that was explained 
enclogenously. The key contributions flowed from the indivisibility of investment 
projects among the potential investors and the minimum size of investment re- 
quired. Endogenous market participation was the key which was determined by 
_ 
the state of the economy or by the time taken to accinnulate the necessary liq- 
iiidity. 
In the first model I showed that a minimum size of investment coupled with 
an endogenously determined level of liquidity could yield market participation 
that was endogenous to the model and lead to multiple equilibria. The possibility 
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of endogenous cycles without the need to violate gross substitutability was also 
noted. 
The second model again used minimum investment size and indivisibility of 
projects across investors, but this time to demonstrate the possibility of persis- 
tence in exogenous aggregate productivity shocks. In general we can say that 
non-convexities and incomplete markets were shown to be crucial and results sug- 
gest that more research along these lines may be of benefit. For instance we might 
look at the implications for endogenously generated fluctuations of irreversible in- 
vestment and persistence. In particular we might view the irreversibility as coming 
from the thickness or thinness of the second hand capital goods market. This can 
influence willingness to participate in investment in the first place, with the kinds 
of implications that we have traced out already. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
7. Conclusions. 
In this thesis I have presented a number of original models which all consist 
of contemporaneous and infinitely lived agents who face an imperfect financial 
system, which creates the opportunity for fiat money fo be valued and so adds 
to the strand of literature begun by Bewley (1980). The essential nature of these 
models is that individuals are essentially heterogeneous in the equilibriinn of the 
model; buffeted by stochastic shocks or affected by endogenous fluctuations in 
the model; also they may be in different sectors of the economy, or carry differing 
attitudes to risk. Such a style of modelling is surely important if we are to gain the 
full benefits of a general equilibrium modelling strategy to answer monetary and 
macroeconomic questions. In these models money changes hands amongst agents 
in equilibrium, affecting the real allocation of resources and allowing the claim 
that the models are 'essentially' monetary in the sense of Hahn (1965,1973). 
In all models presented, the distribution of currency played a central role. 
Chapters 2 to 5 exposited models where money was valued as insurance against 
idiosyncratic production, income or taste risk. In chapters 2 and 5 the fact that 
money had to change hands between agents to perform its role led to interesting 
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conclusions about the implementation of the optimum quantity of money proposal 
of Friedman (1969). 
As I suggested in the introduction to the thesis, the concern of those first 
four chapters was anchored in a field that essentially grew out of microeconomic 
general equilibrium theory and pure monetary theory; i. e. that part of mone- 
tary theory which does not deal with macroeconomic fluctuations. Also, as Lucas 
(1992) points out, the study of the means by how an economy deals with individ- 
iial risk can shed light on 'current' unequal income distributions; inequality may 
be the result of an uneven distribution of past income or taste shocks not corrected 
for by the market. The area of pure monetary theory that the models addressed 
principally was of course the optimum quantity of money, and I found some inter- 
esting results which contribute to that question by applying a non-representative 
agent framework. However, the quantitative importance of these models has not 
been addressed. The key results in the literature that address this issue, namely 
the welfare costs of inflation under imperfect insurance, are by Kehoe, Levine and 
Woodford (1992) and Imrohoroglu (1992), who present contrasting results. Imro- 
horoglu, finds that an inflation rate of ten per-cent yields a welfare loss equivalent 
to one per-cent of GNP. Kehoe, Levine and Woodford show in their model that an 
increase of inflation of about one percent yields only a 0.004 percent GNP equiv- 
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alent change in welfare, though they concede that a model with a more complex 
role for money (i. e. with other assets) may yield different results. Kehoe et al 
correctly ascribe the difference to the fact that their model is one with aggregate 
uncertainty and the possibility of a maldistribution of liquidity that Scheinkman 
and Weiss(1986) and Levine(1991) also consider. It is this kind of problem that 
inflationary policy can aid; redistributing the liquidity in the economy rather than 
raising its level by the Friedman style policy. Imrohoroglu has a model in which 
there is no aggregate uncertainty and high transition probabilities between states 
so that such a distribution issue is less important. What I feel is interesting about 
these two results is that they show that the welfare costs of inflation may not be a 
trivial issue per se. What drives the small welfare cost in the Kehoe et al model is 
that there are both positive and negative effects of inflation on welfare, not that 
the absolute values of these two factors are necessarily low. This also implies that 
more sophisticated models of money might yield larger figures for the effects of 
- inflation than Kehoe et al. 
The results can hence be billed as being of theoretical interest for those fields 
of pure monetary theory and distribution but also yielding some 'macroeconomic' 
insights; the functioning of 4 general equilibrium model with money and an im- 
perfect financial structure is clearly of interest to that discipline. Abstract though 
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many of the models seem to be, there is no reason why the low level of exchange 
that results from incomplete markets and an insufficient stock of liquidity cannot 
be considered as an explanation of the level of macroeconomic activity. Again I 
can say that the models are more than purely monetary. We can indeed follow 
chronologically the appearance of models in the literature and the themes they 
tackle; from Bewley (1980) through to Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) and Fuerst 
(1992) who apply the study of the quantity and distribution of liquidity to aggre- 
gate fluctuations. We might also hence trace such a thread through the models 
presented in the thesis. The final theoretical chapter contains two models, the 
first one of which displays the possibility of the level of liquidity fluctuating in 
equilibrium in an economy which also displays an indeterminate steady state, due 
to the endogenously determined possibility of incomplete market participation. 
As the literature reviewed in that chapter emphasises, the kind of financial im- 
perfections that are investigated in the thesis have profound implications for the 
set of equilibria that the model possesses and for the role of expectations in en- 
dogenously generating aggregate fluctuations. The second model shows how the 
distribution of liquidity in a real business cycle type model with ex-ante hetero- 
geneous agents can have implications for the persistence of real shocks. A model 
such as that presented by Farmer(1993) that is essentially a non representative 
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agent model in its form shows the link between the two strands of literature and a 
promising direction for the future. Farmer exposits the idea that the opportunity 
cost to society of holding money is higher than that which the nominal interest 
rate implies. This is due to the externalities in trade of holding money of the kind 
first suggested by Diamond(1984), who then builds on this to show the possibility 
of multiple equilibria. 
I shall now briefly review the contributions of each chapter and discuss possible 
extensions. 
Chapter 2 filled a gap in the valuation of money in general equilibrium liter- 
attire by showing that we could obtain a positive value for intrinsically wortliless 
fiat money when it was held as a precaution against poor idiosyncratic production 
outcomes. The role of the rate of time preference in determining when it would 
be valued was seen to be essentially different to the role it took in the models 
of Bewley (1980,1983), since the rate of capital accumulation and inflation were 
endogenous. The role given to money in the model is that of a portfolio asset as 
described by Tobin(1958), and we can justify the model's importance in a literal 
sense by saying that it depicts an essentially Keynesian financial asset motive for 
holding fiat money. I have talked about the role given to money in the models 
at the end of the literature survey but we can again recall the defence of Wallace 
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(1980) of overlapping generations models that the ftindamentally non representa- 
tive agent form of the model with money changing hands is a better representation 
of the medium of exchange representation in representative agent models (cash in 
advance or money in the utility function models for instance) . We might in the 
future fruitfiffly examine a portfolio model with a financial system in which money 
is ascribed the role of the only acceptable means of payment in the economy as 
the ultimate backing for inside financial assets so that these assets served as the 
medium of exchange but flat money played a role in the background. We could 
also then examine money's interaction with real aggregate fluctuations. It -, voidd 
be particularly interesting to see if a model could be constructed where the price 
level stayed constant despite the aggregate fluctuations, reinforcing its safe asset 
role (i. e. surety of real value as well as of nominal value; as opposed to assets with 
a possibility of default). This might be fruitfully approached within the context 
of a model of imperfect competition, so that the price level was truly endogenous. 
I then looked at the implementation of Riedman's optimum quantity of money 
proposal under the conventional restriction that the taxes should be lump sum 
in nature and independent of the agent's income. 1 showed that no equilibritun. 
with circulating fiat money could exist if the rate of interest payed on money was 
strictly positive. This was shown to hold in spite of the presence of an alternative 
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store of value; namely capital, so that agents could hold money strictly less than 
the present value of the tax bill at all points in time and still stay solvent with 
probability one, so that the Bewley difficulty was proved to be absent from that 
case and I proved that the result I found has an essentially different cause to the 
Bewley problem. I then applied the intuition gained from the model to conjecture 
another difficulty that could arise in the Bewley type pure exchange model; that 
of a kind of 'preference' motivated Bewley difficulty, based on the period utility 
functions having infinite marginal utility at the point of minimum income. 
Chapter 3 used the same mathematical framework for the model that I devel- 
oped in chapter 2, but specified an information structure which allowed taxes to 
vary with individual actions in an attempt to prevent the problem described in 
chapter 2 occurring. Due to the similarity of the nature of that problem to BeNv- 
ley's in that it results from the nature of the taxation, I addressed the study to a 
conjecture of Hellwig (1982) and Woodford (1990) that if taxes could be levied on 
individuals in a way that avoided the 'Bewley difficulty' in an endowment model 
then the information structure would have to be such as to render money inessen- 
tial to the model; i. e. its value would go to zero. I examine this conjecture in the 
context of my risky capital model and find that it is not necessarily true. The 
basis of the result is that the verification of a transfer is only truly costless to the 
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receiver. Tax payment can be verified costlessly by the government but insurance 
payouts can only be verified by the consumers who receive them. It is clearly in 
their interest to cheat and claim non receipt whereas the government is assumed 
to be essentially benevolent to society as a whole. The difficulty can be overcome 
using an alternative form of payout scheme. Instead of directly redistributing 
the proceeds to individuals who may not be truly needy, the government can 
just carry out the optimum quantity of money proposal since the tax difficulties 
are avoided. We assume an information structure in the model that means the 
form of taxation used is in fact non-distortionary, so there are no problems of the 
kind first noticed by Phelps (1973). Nevertheless I have identified an essential 
asymmetry that can be used to refute the Hellwig/Woodford conjecture. I also 
suggested that in a model where the state of nature (as governed by the exogenous 
stochastic process) was directly observable, then the same result could be derived 
(i. e. refutation of the Hellwig/Woodford conjecture) by assuming an asymmetry 
between observation and recording of the initial state and the registering of the 
reallocation of goods legally with a third party. 
Of course, the optimum quantity of money issue is not new, but its interpre- 
tation as overcoming an information problem certainly is. The way it overcomes 
the information problem builds on some of fiat money's essential properties of 
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anonymity, common usage and ability to store information implicitly about an 
agent's previous expenditures. Carrying out a policy to change its value will ben- 
efit all money holders; namely all those in the economy, by giving them improved 
means to insure against poor production outcomes. The result also implied an 
advantage of deflating the price level over paying interest directly on money bal- 
ances; verification of a transfer is again the key factor. 
The notion of money being an aid to information is established, but its possi- 
bilities as a restrictor of the flow of information is less well commented on. The 
problems created by saving in an anonymous asset instead of buying contingent 
claims for goods in the future and its implications for macroeconomics are well 
known, but I feel that more consideration of money's information properties may 
be worthwhile; perhaps the anonymity of money may be a two edged sword. For 
instance we might conjecture that in some circumstances the level of trade sup- 
portable in the long run by an enduring trade relationship formed in the absence of 
money would exceed that supportable by the contimied usage of the immediately 
beneficial fiat money. 
Chapter 4 looks at another essential property of fiat money, that its nominal 
return is the same in all states of nature, and this is used to construct an equi- 
librium in which money is relatively 'not a good thing'. This led us to an answer 
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to the conjecture of Levine (1985) as to whether an equilibrium with fiat money 
could be Pareto dominated by one without it. The key question was how we 
could construct an economy with infinitely lived agents where the rate of return 
on money was higher than that matching individual and social opportunities, and 
yet was compatible with the existence of monetary equilibrium, (I gave a few ex- 
amples which showed the nature of the challenge). The crucial factor in achieving 
this result was to add extra assets to the model, which is of course an important 
future direction for the field of study to take. The result I found was achieved 
by showing that money was 'wrongly' accepted by agents instead of an insurance 
asset which was overpriced. I suggested that this was connected very essentially 
to money's imperfections as an insurance asset as opposed to a buffer stock. 
Chapter 5 looked at the issue of the superneutrality of fiat money and found a 
superneutrality result that is new to the monetary growth literature in its form. 
Usually superneutrality results show that real activity is independent of the rate 
of inflation. This result, which builds on Bewley's difficulty shows that the rate of 
inflation is independent of the rate of monetary growth for negative rates of money 
growth; hence a new difficulty with the optimum quantity of money proposal is 
uncovered, for this finite horizon economy. The source of the result can be said 
to be that the wealth of the agents is non-capitalised with a probability less than 
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one and since the tax bill must be met with probability one, then this produces 
a Ricardian type 'timing independence' result. Two obvious extensions of this 
for the future are hence to apply the 'positive probability of zero income forever' 
factor to a model that examines Ricardian equivalence explicitly (which is yet to 
be done), and secondly to produce a finite horizon version of my chapter 2 model 
so that the problem I uncover there can be used to produce a superneutrality 
result, but one that holds for both positive and negative rates of money growth. 
Chapter 6 turns to issues different to those of 'pure' monetary theory by ex- 
amining the effects of the level and distribution of liquidity in the economy on 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Two models were presented which had non-convexity 
in investment opportunities in the form of a minimum size of real investment re- 
quired and indivisibility across agents. In the first model I showed how, when 
coupled with a shortage of liquidity held by investors; the non convexity led to 
the possibility of high and low steady states of activity and also cycles. Par- 
ticipation was endogenous in contrast to the overlapping generations models of 
enclogenous fluctuations and violation of the gross substitutes assumption was 
not required to produce periodic solutions. In the second model I showed ho-%v 
the distribution of liquidity can determine the rate of investment and cause the 
persistence of low output. Again, non convexity of the set of investment choices 
289 
is crucial in interacting with the imperfections of the financial system. The ef- 
fect of incomplete financial markets was in restricting the flow of liquidity to the 
agents whose preferences led them to undertake investment whenever possible. 
Impatience by them to reach a certain threshold level of consumption was seen 
to be the key factor. This way of using general equilibrium models with financial 
imperfections to explain macroeconomic fluctuations and persistence is one on 
which I feel fruitful research time may be spent in the future. As I have docu- 
mented, the role of financial imperfections in allowing expectations to influence 
aggregate economic activity is already a large and growing literature. However 
it is surprising in some ways that models of the type of Scheinkman and Weiss 
that use the distribution of liquidity have received much less attention than for 
instance menu costs of changing prices in the search for explanations of the per- 
sistence of shocks. One possible area of synthesis has been suggested by Laidler 
(1988): He notes that since the costs of individual agents not changing prices is 
a crucial factor then the level and distribution of precautionary balances present 
in the economy is can help to determine agent's price setting actions. 
As a direction for future research I would suggest that an issue that needs clar- 
ifying is exactly in what circumstances restricted market participation can have 
the kinds of effects that we have described, particularly in allowing expectations 
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to influence the real equilibrium. The models in the literature so far are only 
really suggestive of what happens when no set of consumers of positive measure 
are allowed to participate in all markets. With many markets, goods and agents 
it would be interesting to know what configurations of ability to participate in 
which markets led to which sets of possible allocations. 
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